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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates nominal frictions in price setting behaviour from both microe-
conometric and macroeconometric perspectives. Chapter I and II use the unpublished 
retailer-level and producer-level microdata underlying CPI and PPI in the UK statisti-
cal authority to study empirical price rigidity and price setting mechanisms. Based on 
the conventional frequency-based method, little rigidity is found since the implied 
price duration is less than half a year. However, this method is shown to significantly 
underestimate the true duration due to oversampling of short price spells. Alternative-
ly, a trajectory-based cross-sectional approach is adopted, giving an unbiased and ro-
bust estimate for average duration over 9 months (retailer price) and 15 months (pro-
ducer price). That is to say, producer price has higher degree of rigidity than retailer 
price if cross-sectional approach is used. Both time-dependent and state-dependent 
features exist in price setting. In particular for retailer price, results also suggest con-
spicuous heterogeneities in price rigidity across sectors and shop types, but weak dif-
ference across regions and time. The overall hazard function of price change can be 
decomposed into a decreasing component from goods sectors and a 4-month cyclical 
component from services sectors.  
The empirical findings in the microdata not only contribute to the microdata literature 
on price setting behaviour, but also make possible the calibrations of macroeconomic 
DSGE model with heterogeneous price setting. Hence, based on the microdata find-
ings in Chapter I and II, Chapter III uses Classical maximum likelihood and Bayesian 
inference to evaluate and estimate DSGE models with various price setting mecha-
nisms. A vital problem with homogeneous price setting models is that they cannot 
generate enough persistence while keeping calibration of average price rigidity con-
sistent with microdata evidence. In contrast, this ―persistence puzzle‖ is successfully 
resolved by heterogeneous price setting models, which greatly improve the dynamic 
performance of macroeconomic models. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Nominal frictions (price rigidity and wage rigidity) lie in the heart of macroeconomic 
research. In fact, it is the fundamental criterion to distinguish among different schools 
of thought. Before 1936, the mainstream Classical school of thought treated prices 
and wages as flexible in perfect competition, leading to the ideal Walrasian equilibri-
um. The Keynesian revolution initiated by Keynes (1936) argued that nominal varia-
bles (prices and wages) are rigid in the short run, which contributed to the prolonged 
disequilibrium in Great Depression from 1929 to late 1930‘s. Following that, ―Neo-
classical Synthesis‖ framework (IS-LM-Phillips Curve) was developed as the domi-
nant macroeconomics from 1950‘s to mid-1970‘s, combining the short run Keynesian 
theory and long run Classical theory, with backward looking adaptive expectations.  
However, rational expectations and Lucas (1976) led to a new ―microfounded‖ mod-
elling paradigm. Real Business Cycle (RBC) by Kydland & Prescott (1982) has estab-
lished a benchmark model without nominal frictions, which is termed as ―New Clas-
sical‖. Almost at the same time, ―New Keynesian‖ incorporated rational expectations 
and microfoundation from New Classical models with nominal frictions from late 
1970‘s to 1980‘s, such as Taylor (1979), Calvo (1983), Akerlof & Yellen (1985) and 
Mankiw (1985). The former two are the most famous ―time dependent pricing mod-
els‖, while the latter two are important examples of ―state dependent pricing models‖. 
Under both types of models, firm‘s price setting behaviour is not perfectly flexible 
due to various nominal frictions. Before long, in the 1990‘s, a combination of the dy-
namic structure from New Classical theory with nominal frictions from New Keynes-
ian theory leads to the ―New Neoclassical Synthesis‖①. Since then, many popular Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with nominal frictions are de-
veloped, such as Yun (1996), Chari et al. (2000), Smets & Wouters (2003), and 
Christiano et al. (2005).  
However, these models will be all rejected by data if serious macroeconometric ap-
proaches are applied. A vital reason for this failure is that these models based on ho-
mogeneous price setting behaviour cannot generate enough persistence. Chari, Kehoe 
& McGrattan (2000) argue that ―monetary economists have long searched for a mech-
anism that has a multiplier effect in the sense that small frictions lead to long periods 
of endogenous price rigidity and, hence, persistent output movements‖. They also 
show that a standard staggered price setting cannot achieve enough persistence, unless 
five-year exogenous price stickiness is used—which is obviously not plausible from 
                                                 
① For a detailed survey of New Neoclassical Synthesis, see Dixon, H. 2007. "New Keynesian 
Macroeconomics: Entry for New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics." Cardiff Business School Working 
Paper Series. 
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microdata evidence. This dilemma is termed as ―persistence problem‖ or ―persistence 
puzzle‖. One of the important contributions of this thesis is that it provides a hetero-
geneous price setting model solution to this puzzle, consistent with both microdata 
evidence and macrodata evidence. 
Along with the development of theoretical economic models, empirical methodology 
has evolved from simple calibration in Kydland & Prescott (1982), to partial-feature-
based approaches such as Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) in Hansen & 
Singleton (1982) and indirect inference in Le et al. (2010), to system-based approach-
es such as maximum likelihood in Sargent (1989) and Bayesian inference in Geweke 
(1999). In addition to macrodata research, numerous microdata studies are also con-
ducted to estimate the degree of price rigidity directly based on firm-level data in or-
der to facilitate macrodata analysis of DSGE models. Often referenced works include 
Bils & Klenow (2004) for US, Bunn & Ellis (2009) for UK, Baumgartner et al. (2005) 
for Austria, Aucremanne & Dhyne (2005) for Belgium, Vilmunen & Laakkonen 
(2004) for Finland, Baudry et al. (2007) for France, Hoffmann & Kurz-Kim (2006) 
for Germany, Veronese et al. (2005) for Italy, Lünnemann & Mathä (2005) for Lux-
embourg, Jonker et al. (2004) for Netherlands, Álvarez & Hernando (2004) for Spain, 
Dias et al. (2004) for Portugal and Dhyne et al. (2005) for the whole Euro area. 
In the light of these theoretical and empirical frameworks established in previous lit-
erature discussed above, this PhD thesis attempts to answer two research questions, 
which are closely correlated but addressed by very different methodologies. The first 
question is how firms set prices from microeconometric perspective, while the second 
question is the effect of price setting behaviour on performance of DSGE model from 
macroeconometric perspective. The link between the two inquiries is that microdata 
evidence will be used to calibrate the degree of price rigidity in conducting macrodata 
analysis of DSGE models. 
To answer the first research question, two subtopics are investigated. The first subtop-
ic focuses on the outcome of price setting behaviour, and the second focuses on the 
mechanism of price setting behaviour. The former aims to descriptively measure the 
degree of price rigidity, while the latter tries to identify the covariates or factors that 
might affect this price rigidity, resulting in a detailed explanation of price setting be-
haviour. These two subtopics are studied in both retailer price microdata (Chapter I) 
and producer price microdata (Chapter II). Note that these two chapters are the first 
systematic attempt in literature to explore microdata-level evidence for price setting 
behaviour in the UK, based on the confidential microdata underlying price indices in 
Office for National Statistics. 
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Regarding the first subtopic (outcome of price setting behaviour), both conventional 
frequency-based approach (popularly used in current literature for other economies) 
and cross-sectional trajectory-based approach (proposed by Dixon (2010)) are applied. 
The conventional approach implies an average price duration less than 6 months or 
little price rigidity, but it is criticised to be underestimated due to oversampling of 
short price spells. In contrast, the cross-sectional approach uses ―duration across 
firms‖ (DAF) treating price trajectory, rather than duration, as the basic unit. Follow-
ing this, substantial price rigidity (DAF is over 9 months) is found. Moreover, the two 
approaches also give different implications between retailer and producer price rigidi-
ties. Conventional approach suggests that producer price has less rigidity, but cross-
sectional approach finds that this is merely an illusion due to high weights in energy 
goods and oversampling of short price spells.  
Turning to the second subtopic (mechanism of price setting behaviour), survival anal-
ysis is employed to investigate the factors that might influence the observed price ri-
gidity, or equivalently, the hazard function of price change. The least restricted ap-
proach, nonparametric analysis, is applied first, which includes time as the only inde-
pendent variable to explain the variation in hazard function. Next, semiparametric 
analysis is used to account for effects of other covariates in time, space, microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic dimensions. After controlling for these factors, the base-
line hazard function is obtained, measuring the pure relationship of conditional proba-
bility of price change with time. Moreover, parametric analysis is also explored, 
where the baseline hazard function is explicitly specified in a parametric form. Some 
stylised facts in price setting behaviour for both retailers and producers are observed 
and summarised. 
Based on the microdata findings in Chapter I and Chapter II, not only the average de-
gree of price setting behaviour, but also the distribution of price rigidity across the 
economy, can be estimated. As mentioned earlier, the prevailing DSGE models as-
sume homogeneous price setting, i.e. there is a representative firm with the average 
degree of price rigidity. However, this framework fails to explain the persistence of 
structural shocks under calibrations consistent with microdata findings. In other words, 
to get enough persistence, a ridiculously high degree of rigidity is needed. This di-
lemma results from the inability of homogeneous price setting models to generate dis-
persion of distribution of price duration. This ―persistence puzzle‖ induces the second 
research question, which is successfully resolved by heterogeneous price setting be-
haviour models in Chapter III.  
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Following the seminal work in Dixon & Le Bihan (2010), heterogeneous price setting 
models are incorporated into the most popular DSGE framework in Smets & Wouters 
(2003). In order to conduct model comparison and evaluate whether heterogeneous 
agent model improves the performance of DSGE models, the price setting behaviour 
in the benchmark model, which is Calvo with Indexation (ICE), is replaced by Gener-
alised Taylor Economy (GTE), Generalised Calvo Economy (GCE) as well as simple 
Taylor and simple Calvo. Bayesian model comparison is applied and it turns out that 
heterogeneous price setting models, especially GCE, performs much better than ho-
mogeneous agent models. This relative ranking seems to be robust to different cali-
bration, prior and approach. In particular, indirect inference approach gives exactly 
the same result as obtained under Bayesian inference. However, if one only cares 
about dynamics in output, inflation and nominal interest rate, GTE might performs the 
best. Furthermore, some specific features of DSGE models, such as impulse response 
functions and variance decomposition, are also investigated. Heterogeneous price set-
ting models can again better capture the stylised facts (based on unrestricted VAR). 
Some important findings of this thesis are summarised below in terms of the two re-
search questions. 
Research Question 1: Microdata Analysis 
Subtopic 1: Degree of Price Rigidity 
This thesis is the first attempt in literature to estimate the degree of price rigidity us-
ing the cross-sectional approach. The frequency-based approach used in most studies 
is shown downward biased due to oversampling of short durations. The average price 
duration for retailer price is 9.3 months in terms of cross-sectional approach, much 
longer than that (5.5 months) under the frequency-based approach. Meanwhile, it is 
found that producer price on average lasts longer (15.3 months) than retailer price.  
There is little support for rigidity in direction of price change, but the results do show 
evidence for rigidity in magnitude of price change. In other words, price faces the 
same friction to rise or fall, but it tends to end with attractive numbers (e.g. £6.99) and 
change by fixed proportions (e.g. 20% off).  
For retailer price, significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in price rigidity is observed 
by sector and by shop type, while little regional difference or time-series heterogenei-
ty is found. Goods sectors tend to be more flexible than services sectors, while multi-
ple shops change prices more frequently than independent shops. For producer price, 
heterogeneity is much less between consumption goods and production goods. 
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Subtopic 2: Mechanism of Price Setting 
For retailer price, the hazard function can be decomposed into decreasing component 
from goods sectors and the cyclical component from services sectors. One remarkable 
feature is the 12-month major spikes and 4-month minor spikes in hazard functions. 
January is the calendar month with the highest hazard rate of price change, followed 
by April and August due to seasonal sales. Also, both backward looking and forward 
looking expectations are supported by microdata evidence. 
A very similar pattern is found in hazard function of producer price, i.e. downward 
sloping and typical 4-month spikes. Heterogeneity across sectors is also examined and 
consumption goods sectors have longer implied duration than production goods sec-
tors. After filtering out the effects from seasonality, macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic covariates, the baseline hazard functions of different sectors turn out very simi-
lar across sectors. The downward slope and typical spikes features still remain, but the 
difference between consumption goods sectors and production goods sectors vanishes.  
By comparative study between retailer and producer prices, it is implied that the up-
stream firms (producers) in the supply chain tend to have more nominal frictions in 
price setting than downstream firms (retailers). As moving more towards the down-
stream of supply chain, the number of firms grows, and the products are more differ-
entiated. Competition is greater due to more substitutable goods in the market. The 
structure of the supply chain looks like an ―ecological pyramid‖. This conclusion not 
only holds in general from producers to retailers, but also holds in particular industry. 
For example, although some sectors such as energy goods sector might have more 
flexible prices than retailer prices as a whole, the energy goods producers still have 
more rigidities than the energy goods retailers. 
Research Question 2: Macrodata Analysis 
Chapter III proposes a DSGE model with either homogeneous or heterogeneous price 
setting behaviour. Based on the microdata findings in microdata analysis, calibrations 
for heterogeneous price setting models (GTE and GCE) become possible. Both Clas-
sical maximum likelihood and Bayesian inference are applied to evaluate and estimate 
the DSGE model. It is shown that, in both general and specific, heterogeneous price 
setting models (GCE, GTE) outperform homogeneous counterparts (ICE, Calvo, Tay-
lor), because homogeneous agent models can only explain the ―first order‖ properties, 
such as means and correlations of variables. However, this simplification averages 
away many important aspects which are essential to explain the ―second order‖ prop-
erties, such as dispersion and persistence of variables. Chapter III extends the bench-
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mark DSGE framework in the direction of heterogeneity in price setting behaviour, 
which successfully improves the performance in dynamic persistence and distribution 
of price rigidity. This is a novel solution to the ―persistent puzzle‖ in monetary eco-
nomics literature.  
If all the 7 macroeconomic observables are used, GCE then performs the best and 
GTE follows. In homogeneous price setting models, simple Taylor is the worst, be-
cause it generates the least persistence. This model ranking is also robust to different 
calibrations, priors and approaches. However, GTE could be the best model if one 
puts more weight on explaining output, inflation and interest rate. 
In fact, this is not just a particular solution limited for nominal frictions, but also a 
general prescription for any scenario when heterogeneous agents might emerge. For 
example, if the policy maker cares about both per-capita growth in GDP (first order 
inquiry) and the distribution of wealth across the society (second order inquiry), then 
representative agent model is not enough for the second issue. It then entails the use 
of heterogeneous agent models with different endowment, resulting in a distribution 
or a dispersion of income as in Gorman (1953), Bewley (1986) and Chatterjee (1994). 
Another example of heterogeneous agent model might be idiosyncratic risks in finan-
cial markets as in Aiyagari (1994). Hence, if one only cares about simple relationships 
of per capita variables, representative agent model might work quite well. However, if 
one tries to address distributional issue or persistence, heterogeneous agent models are 
necessary.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity and Rigidity of  
Retailer Firm’s Price Setting Behaviour① 
 
 
                                                 
① This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and reproduced with the 
permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen‘s Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical 
data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analy-
sis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National 
Statistics aggregates. 
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1. Introduction 
The price rigidity has been the fundamental issue of the dispute between Keynesian 
and Classical schools of thought since macroeconomics was established in the 1930‘s. 
In recent theoretical literature, many influential works
①
 incorporate price rigidity into 
the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. This trend of combing 
the New Classical microfoundation and New Keynesian rigidity is often termed as 
―New Neoclassical Synthesis‖②. However, this integration in methodology does not 
resolve the discrepancy in assumption on nominal frictions between the two schools. 
Usually, to make judgement, macroeconomic models are compared in terms of good-
ness of fit to macro evidence, such as second moments of output and employment. 
Little effort was made in terms of micro evidence mainly due to lack of data.  
Recently, there is a growing literature on price rigidity using unpublished microdata
③
, 
such as Bils & Klenow (2004) and Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) in the US, Inflation 
Persistence Network (IPN) series in the Euro area, and Bunn & Ellis (2009) in the UK. 
There are two profound effects of the micro evidence on macroeconomic theory. On 
the one hand, these works make it possible to justify or falsify the assumption of price 
rigidity, at least in particular place and period. On the other, many papers
④
 start to uti-
lise the results in calibration to improve the performance of macroeconomic models. 
There are basically three aspects of price rigidity, namely, the rigidity in frequency of 
price change, the rigidity in direction of price change and the rigidity in magnitude of 
price change. The frequency of price change is defined as the proportion of firms that 
change prices at a particular point in time. The direction of price change investigates 
whether price increases and price decreases share the same rigidity. The magnitude of 
price change analyses the frictions in the size of change. A price spell is defined as a 
period of time during which a price does not change, and price duration is the length 
of the price spell. Price duration is an important measure of rigidity in frequency of 
price change, and it is vital for macroeconomic modelling as well as monetary policy. 
According to the previous empirical findings, price rigidity is not strong since the im-
plied average price durations are only around 2 quarters for most countries. Unfortu-
nately, the approach used in these studies is criticised by Baharad (2004) as being 
                                                 
① For example, Goodfriend & King (1997), Rotemberg & Woodford (1997), Chari, Kehoe & McGrat-
tan (2000), Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1999) and Smets & Wouters (2003). 
② The ―old‖ neoclassical synthesis is to name the trend of attempting to summarise the Keynesian theo-
ry in the form of neoclassical economics in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. 
③ Microdata are usually collected by national authorities to construct macroeconomic statistics, such as 
price indices, GDP and unemployment.  
④ For example, Dixon & Kara (2010) use US micro evidence, while Dixon & Le Bihan (2010) use 
French and UK micro evidence. 
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downward biased due to oversampling of short durations. The results obtained by 
conventional method are effectively the duration across contracts, rather than the du-
ration across firms. Dixon (2010) pushes this argument further and develops a unified 
framework to indirectly derive the cross-sectional distribution of duration across firms 
(DAF) from other estimated distributions.  
This paper is the first attempt in literature to estimate this new measure of price rigidi-
ty from real microdata. It turns out that the conventional method gives a much lower 
estimate of duration (5.5 months) than the true duration (9.3 months) according to the 
cross-sectional method. Moreover, two other important issues of price rigidity are dis-
cussed. One is to investigate the cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity in dis-
tribution of DAF. The other is to figure out important factors affecting the price set-
ting behaviour, which generates the distribution of DAF. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 summarizes the methodologies in a consistent 
and strict terminology system, for both descriptive and inferential sections. Section 3 
introduces the data source used in this paper and describes the features of our sample. 
Section 4 and Section 5 are devoted to the outcome of price setting behaviour, by 
conventional and cross-sectional methods respectively. Section 6 characterizes the 
mechanism of price setting behaviour by survival analysis, where nonparametric, 
semiparametric, and parametric methods are applied to pooled and separate models. 
To link the five methods presented in this paper, Section 7 develops a uniform meas-
ure to contrast the results, and Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Methodology 
There are two issues in price setting behaviour to be addressed. The first question is to 
summarize the outcome of price setting behaviour, i.e. price change. The purpose of 
the first question is actually to measure the rigidity of price change. The second ques-
tion, in contrast, is to investigate the mechanism of price setting behaviour, i.e. factors 
affecting the price change. The purpose of the second question is to obtain the risk 
profile of price change that is influenced by various factors. As a result, different 
methodologies are needed to deal with the two tasks. 
2.1. Cross-Sectional Method 
To study the outcome of price setting behaviour, duration is used as a measure of ri-
gidity. The conventional method, as adopted by most authors such as Bils & Klenow 
(2004) and Bunn & Ellis (2009), is to calculate the frequency of price change for each 
period, then use its inverse as the average duration. Dixon (2010) points out the over-
sampling problem for this method, which leads to underestimation of rigidity. The 
argument is that ―price spells across time are linked by the fact that they are set by the 
same firm‖, and ―focussing on the distribution of durations is in effect ignoring the 
panel structure and the fact that it is firms which are generating the price spells‖. In 
other words, it is unfair to firms with longer spells, because firms with short spells are 
considered too many times. For example, if there are two firms, one changes its price 
every month, while the other changes price every 12 months. The frequency of price 
change is 50% each month, and the implied duration is 2 months. However, the true 
mean duration across the two firms is  1 12 / 2 6.5   months, much higher than the 
implied duration using conventional method. 
To address the oversampling problem, Dixon (2010) proposes a cross-sectional meth-
od in terms of duration across firm (DAF). This new method chooses a cross-section 
of firms at a particular point in time. Each firm‘s price belongs to a certain duration, 
whether it is completed or not at that moment. The essence of this new method is to 
collapse the panel structure into a cross-sectional structure to remove the over-
sampling problem. In the previous example, the mean DAF for each period is equal to 
6.5 months, exactly the same as the true mean duration. Dixon (2010) also develops a 
unified framework to transform between distribution of DAF, distribution of age, dis-
tribution of duration and ―hazard function‖. Note that distributions of DAF and age 
are defined in the cross-sectional sense, while distributions of duration and ―hazard 
function‖ are defined in the panel sense. Hence, the ―hazard function‖ here is different 
from that used in this paper, which is defined in the cross-sectional sense.  
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2.2. Survival Analysis Method 
Survival analysis, also termed duration analysis, studies the time to the occurrence of 
a random event. It originates in statistics, dealing with topics such as death in biologi-
cal organisms and failure in mechanical systems. If price change is treated as the ran-
dom event, then price setting behaviour can be studied using the same method. Many 
papers, such as Jonker, Folkertsma & Blijenberg (2004) and Nakamura & Steinsson 
(2008), apply survival analysis to studying price duration. However, different authors 
use different terminology systems, and they only use nonparametric and semiparamet-
ric analysis to model the price setting behaviour. Standing on their shoulders, this pa-
per tries to unify the definitions under the strict terminology of statistics, and con-
struct a comprehensive econometric model by nonparametric, semiparametric as well 
as parametric analysis. 
2.2.1. Terminology 
The object of survival analysis in this paper is price duration, which is a random vari-
able due to the uncertainty of when the price change occurs. T  is defined as a non-
negative random variable denoting the time to a price change event for a price dura-
tion. It could be either continuous or discrete, depending on whether or not the time 
line is infinitely divisible. 
An important note on discrete time is due here. The time line is discrete because either 
(i) the time line is intrinsically discrete, or (ii) failure event occurs in continuous time 
but duration is only observed in discrete intervals. The price duration data in our case 
is actually the second possibility, since the price change could occur any time within a 
month, but the event is only observed in monthly interval. This distinction leads to 
different formulae for calculating distributions and relevant properties, because the 
second case actually assumes interval censoring. Unfortunately, this important issue is 
ignored by most of the current literature. 
This paper defines t  as any given date in the time line, with   ,0t . In discrete 
time, the time line is divided into several periods of the same length. In continuous 
time, the time line is infinitely divisible. In fact, continuous time is the limiting ver-
sion of discrete time, in which the period length is infinitesimal. The time line in our 
case is discrete with an equal size of one month. Following the tradition in statistics, 
the first observation of a duration is recorded at 0t  . A period is nominated by the 
date at the end of that period. For example, the 1
st
 period means  1,0 , the 2nd period 
means  2,1 , and the thn  period means  nn ,1 . Note that the time here means analy-
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sis time, rather than calendar time. A duration could begin at any point in calendar 
time, but it always starts at 0 in analysis time. 
Like other random variables, there are several equivalent ways of presenting the dis-
tribution of T .  tf  is the Probability Density Function (PDF) of T  if it is a continu-
ous random variable, or the Probability Mass Function (PMF) of T  if it is a discrete 
random variable.  tF  is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of T , defined 
as    tTtF  Pr .  tS  is the Survivor Function, which is the probability of surviv-
ing beyond date t :      tFtTtS  1Pr . 
The most important way of presenting the distribution of T  is the Hazard Function, 
 th , which returns instantaneous Hazard Rate at any time t . Here, two possible cases 
for discrete time are distinguished, and the last formula will be used as argued earlier. 
 
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Accordingly, the Cumulative Hazard Function up to date t  can also be defined: 
   
t
dhtH
0
 , which measures the accumulated risk for a price to change during 
the period  0, t . 
The hazard function  h t  actually describes a conditional probability, as opposed to 
the unconditional probability function  f t . The condition here is that the price suc-
cessfully survives up to t . There are several well-known function forms to model 
 h t  in statistics. This paper will bother exponential distribution and Weibull distri-
bution in parametric analysis. If  h t  is subject to exponential distribution, then the 
hazard rates are constant over the time line. It is just a special case of Weibull distri-
bution, which could be increasing, decreasing or constant. The shape parameter of 
Weibull is equal to 1 if it reduces to exponential distribution. 
By definition, it is easy to transform from one to another among  f t ,  F t ,  S t , 
 h t  and  H t . However, there are several advantages to think in terms of  h t , ra-
ther than other forms.  h t  gives a more natural way to interpret the process that gen-
erates duration, and regression models for survival data are more easily grasped by 
observing how covariates affect the hazard rates.  
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Also, the properties of the distribution of T  can be derived, such as expectation, me-
dian and variance. The detailed formulae can be found in any standard statistics text-
book, such as Jenkins (2004) or Cleves et al. (2008). 
2.2.2. Model 
Nonparametric Analysis follows the philosophy of letting the data speak for itself 
and makes no assumption about the function form of the distribution. Hence, the ef-
fects of covariates are ignored. The most popular nonparametric methods are Kaplan 
& Meier estimator of  S t  and Nelson & Aalen estimator of  H t . As indicated pre-
viously,  h t  can always be derived easily according to the relationship between 
them.  
In particular, the Kaplan & Meier estimator (also known as the ―product limit estima-
tor‖) estimates the survivor function from survival time data. A plot of the Kaplan & 
Meier survivor function is a series of horizontal steps of declining magnitude which, 
when a large enough sample is taken, approaches the true survival function for that 
population. The value of the survivor function between successive distinct sampled 
observations is assumed to be constant.  
An important feature of the Kaplan & Meier estimator is that the method takes into 
account ―censored‖ data, namely, the losses from the sample before the final outcome 
is observed. It assumes that all the censored subjects do not fail when censoring oc-
curs. The Kaplan & Meier estimation of survival function is given by: 
 
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Here, Nttt  21  is the analysis time when either failure or censoring occurs. in  
is the number of subjects which survive in the beginning of period it , id  is the num-
ber of observed failures during the subsequent period, and il  is the number of losses 
due to censoring or truncation. 
[Example 1] Kaplan & Meier estimate of  tS  without censoring 
Assume that there are 10 products at the beginning of the analysis time, or at date 0. 
Note that there is no censoring at any time, so the il  column is always zero. We can 
order the failure time in the table and calculate the Kaplan & Meier survivor function 
 tS  step by step as follows: 
14 
 
it  in  id  il  calculation  tS  
0 10 0 0 (10 – 0)/10 = 1 1 
1 10 2 0 ((10 – 2)/10)*1= 8/10 0.8 
2 8 3 0 (5/8)*(8/10) 0.5 
3 5 4 0 (1/5)*(5/8)*(8/10) 0.1 
4 1 0 0 1*(1/5)*(5/8)*(8/10) 0.1 
5 1 1 0 0*1*(1/5)*(5/8)*(8/10) 0 
[Example 2] Kaplan & Meier estimate of  tS  with censoring 
Now assume that there are censored observations at time 2, 4 and 5, when some sub-
jects do not fail but are no longer under observation. Here, we follow a convention in 
survival analysis that censoring occurs after the failures of other uncensored subjects.  
it  in  id  il  calculation  tS  
0 10 0 0 (10 – 0)/10 = 1 1 
1 10 2 0 ((10 – 2)/10)*1= 8/10 0.8 
2 8 3 1 (5/8)*(8/10) 0.5 
3 4 1 0 (3/4)*(5/8)*(8/10) 0.375 
4 3 1 1 (2/3)*(3/4)*(5/8)*(8/10) 0.25 
5 1 0 1 1*(2/3)*(3/4)*(5/8)*(8/10) 0.25 
Since Kaplan & Meier estimator is estimated from a random sample, it is also a ran-
dom statistic with standard error. A popular estimator is Greenwood‘s (1926) formula: 
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To obtain the confidence intervals, the following asymptotic variance is usually used 
instead of Greenwood formula: 
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Hence, the confidence intervals at significant level of   are calculated as: 
          tztz tStS   ˆexpˆexp 2/2/ ˆ,ˆ   
Parametric Analysis, on the other end, explicitly uses covariates to model  h t  in a 
function form. The most popular model assumes proportional hazard (PH): 
     0 exph t h t  β x  
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The name ―proportional hazard‖ comes from the feature that the hazard function  h t  
is proportional to  exp β x , with the Baseline Hazard Function  th0  common to all 
observations. In parametric analysis, a specific function form has to be assumed for 
 0h t , which could be exponential, Weibull, log-logistic, lognormal, Gompertz or 
others. After the trial and error, Weibull turns out to be the most appropriate choice 
due to its flexibility. The vector of covariates x  is sometimes called regressor, ex-
planatory variable, control variables or independent variable by other authors, but 
they mean the same thing, i.e. the factors that affect the hazard rate. Besides, β  is the 
coefficient vector for x , but occasionally Hazard Ratio  exp i  for each coefficient 
is used instead. The hazard ratio can be interpreted as the multiplier effect of the coef-
ficient on  0h t . It is greater than 1 if the coefficient is negative, and it is less than 1 if 
the coefficient is positive. 
Semiparametric Analysis lies in the middle of the two ends. Cox (1972) model is the 
counterpart of PH model in parametric analysis. Instead of imposing a specific func-
tion form for  th0 , it is left unspecified in Cox model, while covariates are still ex-
plicitly specified. One property of Cox model is that the baseline hazard function 
 th0  does not affect the estimate of β . That is also why it is termed semiparametric 
analysis, since it is not estimating the full model.  
Arguably, nonparametric analysis is too naïve to generate informative results because 
it does not control for covariates. However, parametric analysis is too restrictive due 
to its inflexibility in assuming  0h t . As a result, semiparametric analysis has the ad-
vantages of both, and is expected to generate the most reliable conclusions. This sec-
tion will mainly focus on the interpretations of semiparametric analysis results, while 
adventuring on nonparametric and parametric analyses at the same time. 
2.2.3. Censoring and Truncation 
In practice, price change may have not yet occurred by the end of the observation pe-
riod, or the duration may also have lasted for a while before entering the observation. 
In these cases, there are incomplete observations over time. These complications en-
tail a discussion in censoring and truncation, which are always confusingly defined in 
different papers. This paper will disambiguate the confusions by strictly following the 
definitions in statistics. 
A subject is defined as the process being studied, which is price in our case. The sub-
ject is said to be in observation period after it enters and before it leaves the study. A 
failure is referred to as an event to end the duration, meaning price change in our case. 
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Censoring is the case where the subject is not under observation when failure occurs. 
It is like a veil preventing you from seeing the exact time of the failure that does occur. 
This is a partial ignorance about the duration. There are three types of censoring: 
(i) Right Censoring: the subject is under observation for a while, but it is not 
under observation when failure occurs. 
(ii) Left Censoring: the failure occurs prior to the subject entering the observa-
tion. It is often abused as left truncation. 
(iii) Interval Censoring: rather than observing the exact time of failure, all one 
knows is that failure occurs within a given interval. 
Truncation, on the other hand, is the case where there is completely ignorance about 
the subject over a truncated period. The censoring stresses the knowledge of failure 
time. In contrast, the truncated subjects are not even detectable during the truncation 
period, and it emphasises a complete ignorance of the subject. There are also three 
types of truncation: 
(i) Right Truncation: the subject is under observation for a while, but it leaves 
the study before it fails. (indistinguishable from right censoring) 
(ii) Left Truncation: the subject has been under risk before it is under observa-
tion. It is a case of late entry, often confused with left censoring. 
(iii) Interval Truncation: the subject is observed at first, but it is not under ob-
servation for a while, and is then back after the truncation period. 
To show the comparison between censoring and truncation, an intuitive graph below 
is used to present the relationship. The solid line is the duration under observation, 
with a beginning (circle) and an end (cross). The dashed part means censoring, while 
the blank part means truncation. As indicated earlier, right censoring and right trunca-
tion are indistinguishable. 
In practice, the left censored and left truncated cases are dropped, because the dura-
tion information cannot be extracted under these circumstances. This treatment is also 
followed in other studies. Fortunately, other cases can still be used, since precise in-
formation on duration up to the time of censoring or truncation is known. For example, 
when a duration is right censored, it is known that the price does not change in the 
previous month before censoring. The information before that period is still usable, 
and the last observation in estimation is simply ignored. By this means, the estimate is 
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both unbiased and efficient. A detailed statistical presentation for dealing with censor-
ing and truncation can be found in Jenkins (2004). 
 
 
 
under observation 
time line 
normal 
left censored interval censored right censored 
left truncated interval truncated right truncated 
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3. Data 
The data used in this chapter are retailer-level price quotes collected by the Office for 
National Statistics ONS) in the UK. The price microdata are monthly collected from 
1996m1 to 2008m1, underlying the construction of various price indices such as Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) and Retail Price Index (RPI). Both price indices measure the 
changes in the general price level of products
①
 purchased for the purpose of consump-
tion in the UK. However, they have subtle differences in coverage, methodology and 
purpose. For example, a key difference between CPI and RPI is that housing costs, 
such as buildings insurance and council tax, are given higher weight in RPI. Also, CPI 
uses geometric mean to calculate the primary indices, while RPI uses arithmetic mean. 
The price microdata collected by ONS are not publicly available due to the confiden-
tiality issues. To assist the researchers to make full and secure use of these microdata, 
the Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML) was launched in 2004 to allow for access to 
these potentially valuable resources including price microdata. This dataset is not up-
dated frequently, and the latest release only includes price microdata from 1996m1 to 
2008m1 for CPI/RPI. The only previous users of this price microdata are Bunn & 
Ellis (2009) from Bank of England. 
Each price quote represents the price of a particular product in a particular retailer in a 
given month. The observations not used by ONS in constructing indices are excluded. 
The double entries and the zero weighted observations are also omitted. After filtering 
out the improper observations, there are around 12.8 million price quotes finally been 
used in the clean data, spanning 144 months from 1996m1 to 2007m12.  
3.1. Data Description 
Individual price quote is collected either locally or centrally. Local collection is used 
for most items, where prices are obtained by visiting the retailers in about 150 loca-
tions. Central collection is used for central shops or central items, where prices do not 
vary throughout the country. However, the centrally collected data is not available in 
VML. The problem of lacking access to the underlying centrally collected microdata 
also exists for most studies, such as Bils & Klenow (2004) for the US, Álvarez & 
Hernando (2004) for Spain, Veronese, Fabiani, Gattulli & Sabbatini (2005) for Italy, 
and Bunn & Ellis (2009) for the UK. Fortunately, the coverage of the clean data on 
the aggregate CPI/RPI is 60.69%, which adequately represents the general price set-
ting behaviour in the whole economy.  
                                                 
① In this thesis, goods and services are both termed as products. 
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There are over 650 representative items each year to represent price movements in the 
fixed CPI/RPI basket each year. For each item collected locally, the sampling process 
could be stratified by region, by shop type
①
, or by both. There are in total 12 govern-
ment office regions and 2 shop types, so there can be 12 strata, 2 strata, or 24 strata, 
depending on the stratification method. Within each stratum, locations and retailers 
are then randomly sampled. Finally, price quote of an item in a randomly sampled re-
tailer is collected on a particular Tuesday of each month (Index Day). Once the price 
quotes are collected, one can calculate indices in 4 steps.  
Step 1: Elementary Index ( E tskjI ,,, ) is obtained for each item within a stratum by ei-
ther geometric mean (CPI) or arithmetic mean (RPI), taking into account the shop 
weight P tskjiw ,,,,  for each price quote tskjip ,,,, . Here, the subscripts tskji ,,,,  uniquely 
identify the retailer, stratum, item, division/group
②
, and time of any price quote. Ac-
cordingly, jN  is the total number of price quotes (i.e. retailers) in stratum j  for item 
k , kN  is the total number of strata for item k , sN  is the total number of items for 
division/group s , and tN  is the total number of divisions/groups for period t . 
Step 2: Item Index ( I tskI ,, ) is obtained across the strata within an item based on ele-
mentary indices E tskjI ,,,  and strata weights 
E
tskw ,, .  
Step 3: Division/Group Index ( StsI , ) is obtained across items within a division/group 
based on item indices I tskI ,,  and item weights 
I
tskw ,, .  
Step 4: Aggregate Index ( AtI ) for a month is obtained across divisions/groups based 
on division/group indices StsI ,  and division/group weights 
S
tsw , . 
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3.2. Weight System 
The weights in calculating price indices reflect the expenditure or market share. The 4 
steps above need 4 weights corresponding to each step, i.e. the shop weight P tskjiw ,,,, , 
stratum weight E tskw ,, , item weight 
I
tskw ,, , and division/group weight 
S
tsw , . If one ig-
                                                 
① There are 2 shop types: independent shop, defined as retailer with fewer than 10 outlets; and multiple 
shop, defined as retailer with 10 or more outlets. 
② Between item level and the aggregate level of CPI/RPI, there is an intermediate level. For CPI, it is 
called ―division‖ based on COICOP (classification of individual consumption by purpose); while for 
RPI, it is called ―group‖. For details, please refer to Consumer Price Indices Technical Manual. 
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nores the centrally collected price quotes, then the process for the aggregate indices 
can be summarised into one big formula: 
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The aggregate indices can be interpreted as a weighted average of price quotes, with a 
―grand weight‖ tskji ,,,,  specific to each observation: 
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Thus, the big formula now becomes: 
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Similarly, to study price rigidity, this cross-sectional ―grand weight‖ tskji ,,,,  will be 
used to calculate the weighted measures. One thing to be noted here is that the grand 
weight tskji ,,,,  is different from the official weight used in calculating price indices, 
because the centrally collected data is not available in VML. Hence, the grand weight 
is recalculated among the weights of locally collected observations. It could be higher 
or lower than the official weight, since some divisions are more or less likely to be 
locally collected. Luckily, the difference between the grand weight and official weight 
is tiny. This treatment of weight is similar to other studies. 
The last problem is then to choose between CPI weights and RPI weights for calculat-
ing the grand weight tskji ,,,, . The CPI weights are preferred in this chapter due to 
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three reasons. Firstly, the published CPI weights are largely calculated from House-
hold Final Consumption Expenditure (HHFCE) data, since they cover the relevant 
population and range of goods and services and, in addition, are classified by CPI di-
visions. This is supplemented by data from the EFS and the International Passenger 
Survey, which are used to calculate the weights of package holidays and airfares re-
spectively. By contrast, the RPI weights are mainly based on data from the EFS and 
relate to expenditure by private households only, excluding the highest income house-
holds and pensioner households mainly dependent on state benefits. Secondly, when 
the Bank of England was announced independent in May 1997, the inflation target 
was originally set at 2.5% in terms of the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments 
(RPIX). However, since December 2003, the inflation target has changed to 2% in 
terms of CPI, previously known as Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HCIP). 
The importance of CPI in monetary policy justifies the use of CPI weight in this chap-
ter. The comparability is the third advantage of using CPI weights, since HICP is also 
used by European Central Bank as the measure of price stability across the Euro area.  
3.3. Descriptive Summary 
As mentioned earlier, there are over 650 representative items each year, and a number 
of products across strata are sampled for each representative item. Each product has a 
price trajectory
①
 made up of several ―price spells‖ or ―durations‖, while each duration 
is made up of several price quotes. Thus, the dataset has a panel structure, because 
there are 612,173 products (cross-sectional variation) over 12 years (time-series varia-
tion). The panel of price trajectories are described by the distributions. 
3.3.1. Overall Distribution of Price Trajectory 
As in other studies, this panel is unbalanced, because new items enter while old items 
exit the CPI/RPI baskets frequently. Table 1 provides a summary of trajectory length: 
Table 1 Descriptive Summary of Retailer Price Trajectory (Overall) 
Mean 1% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 95% Obs. 
20.72 1 3 7 14 30 46 56 612,173 
As shown in Table 1, the mean length of price trajectory is higher than the median, so 
the distribution is positively skewed. This means that the right tail of the distribution 
is longer, and it has relatively few long price trajectories. There are 18,767 price tra-
jectories longer than 60 months, while 1,929 price trajectories stay in the dataset for 
                                                 
① A ―price trajectory‖ is defined as the entire series of price quotes for a particular product. 
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longer than 120 months, and only 49 price trajectories are present in the dataset 
throughout the entire 144 months (12 years).  
3.3.2. Heterogeneity in Distribution of Price Trajectory 
The first criterion of classifying price trajectories is by category. Given that CPI divi-
sion is quite similar to RPI group, we will just use CPI division categories, which are 
classified according to COICOP (classification of individual consumption by purpose). 
The distribution of price trajectory across CPI division is summarised as follows: 
Table 2 Descriptive Summary of Retailer Price Trajectory by Division 
Division Median Mean Obs. 
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 17 22.70 135,201 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 20 26.75 19,439 
Clothing and Footwear 9 13.35 136,910 
Housing and Utilities 19 23.57 25,567 
Furniture and Home Maintenance 16 21.62 79,352 
Health 23 28.27 7,741 
Transport 23 25.64 27,501 
Communications 12 16.03 1,600 
Recreation and Culture 13 19.32 60,037 
Education – – – 
Restaurants and Hotels 21 24.26 76,651 
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 18 23.26 42,174 
Total 14 20.72 612,173 
The price trajectories for divisions like clothing and communications are relatively 
shorter, because there are more frequent rotations in these industries. Note that there 
are few observations for education division, because it is centrally collected and not 
available. To make the divisions more balanced, the 12 divisions are re-categorised 
into 9 sectors, following Bunn & Ellis (2009). 
Table 3 Descriptive Summary of Retailer Price Trajectory by Sector 
Sector Median Mean Obs. 
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 17 22.70 135,201 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 20 26.75 19,439 
Energy Goods 23 25.71 11,272 
Non-Energy Industrial Goods 12 17.84 314,346 
Housing Services 20 23.44 17,210 
Transport and Travel Services 23 25.67 10,892 
Communications 12 16.03 1,600 
Recreational and Personal Services 22 24.52 92,150 
Miscellaneous Services 21 22.64 10,063 
Total 14 20.72 612,173 
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Similarly, sectors such as non-energy industrial goods (e.g. clothing) and communica-
tions have shorter price trajectories, due to the frequent rotations of product lines. The 
first 4 categories are put together as ―goods sectors‖ and the rest 5 categories are put 
together as ―services sectors‖. For the same reason of rotation frequency, goods sec-
tors tend to have shorter price trajectories. 
Table 4 Descriptive Summary of Retailer Price Trajectory by Goods/Services 
Sectors Median Mean Obs. 
Goods 13 19.76 480,258 
Services 21 24.23 131,915 
Total 14 20.72 612,173 
The second criterion of classifying price trajectories is by shop type. This distinction 
is important because the price setting behaviour differs significantly between big and 
small firms. According to the convention in CPI/RPI, the ―independent shop‖ is basi-
cally defined as small retailer, while the ―multiple shop‖ is defined as big retailer. The 
price trajectories for multiple shops tend to be longer, since new products are mostly 
sold there and the rotation frequency is higher. 
Table 5 Descriptive Summary of Retailer Price Trajectory by Shop Type 
Shop Type Median Mean Obs. 
Multiple 13 20.70 372,940 
Independent 17 20.76 239,180 
Unknown – – 53 
Total 14 20.72 612,173 
The third criterion of classifying price trajectories is by region. It turns out that the 
heterogeneity in price setting behaviour across region in the UK is not significant, 
though London has a bit shorter price trajectories because of high frequency of rota-
tions and fierce competition. 
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Table 6 Descriptive Summary of Retailer Price Trajectory by Region 
Region Median Mean Obs. 
London 13 19.69 71,978 
South East 15 20.51 99,512 
South West 16 20.78 52,272 
East Anglia 15 20.84 44,335 
East Midlands 16 22.15 42,295 
West Midlands 15 21.09 53,260 
Yorkshire & Humber 14 20.50 51,582 
North West 13 19.73 63,928 
North 12 20.12 32,078 
Wales 16 23.45 28,183 
Scotland 15 20.89 46,905 
Northern Ireland 15 20.45 22,536 
Unknown – – 3,309 
Total 14 20.72 612,173 
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4. Conventional Method 
The primary results reported in this section follow the conventional method and pro-
vide a comprehensive descriptive statistics of the three aspects of rigidity, including 
the frequency, direction and magnitude of price change. These results are in line with 
Bunn & Ellis (2009) and other IPN literature. If these naïve empirical results are used 
to describe price setting behaviour in the UK, not much rigidity is found. However, 
next section will show that this conclusion is biased. 
4.1. Rigidity in Frequency of Price Change 
4.1.1. Overall Frequency 
In existing literature, both mean
①
 and median
②
 are used for the measure of frequency 
of price change. The advantage of median over mean is that it is more robust to outlier 
observations. As shown later, there is indeed an outlier around 2005m6, so median is 
preferred. For the interest of comparison with other literatures, both measures are used 
in this chapter and summarised in Table 7. 
Table 7 Overall Frequency of Retailer Price Change 
 Mean Median S.D. Skewness Period 
Unweighted 17.89% 17.54% 0.02904 3.311818 
1996m1-2007m12 
Weighted 18.63% 18.34% 0.03525 2.936525 
  Literature  
UK 18.80% Bunn & Ellis (2009) 1996m1-2006m12 
Euro Area 15% Dhyne et al (2005)  
Austria 15% Baumgartner et al (2005) 1996m1-2003m12 
Belgium 17% Aucremanne & Dhyne (2005) 1989m1-2001m12 
Finland 20% Vilmunen & Laakkonen (2004) 1997m1-2003m12 
France 19% Baudry et al (2007) 1994m7-2003m2 
Germany 10% Hoffmann & Kurz-Kim (2006) 1998m1-2004m1 
Italy 9% Veronese et al (2005) 1996m1-2003m12 
Luxembourg 17% Lünnemann & Mathä (2005) 1999m1-2004m12 
Netherlands 17% Jonker et al (2004) 1998m11-2003m4 
Portugal 22% Dias et al (2004) 1992m1-2001m1 
Spain 15% Álvarez & Hernando (2004) 1993m1-2001m12 
US 
26% Bils & Klenow (2004) 1995m1-1997m12 
27% Nakamura & Steinsson (2008) 1998m1-2005m12 
                                                 
① Mean is popular in IPN literature, such as Dhyne et al (2005). 
② Median is used in Bils & Klenow (2004) and Nakamura & Steinsson (2008). 
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The result presented here is almost the same as that found in Bunn & Ellis (2009) ex-
cept that the mean frequency is slightly lower. That is because the mean frequency in 
2007 is relatively lower (16.46%), which is not included in their chapter, dragging the 
overall mean a bit downward. This tiny difference does not affect the conclusion they 
find, i.e. the mean frequency of price change in the UK is higher than that in the Euro 
area, but lower than that in the US. Furthermore, according to the conventional meth-
od, the ―duration‖ can be calculated by the inverse of frequency, which describes how 
long for all the prices to turnover once. Therefore, the implied mean duration based on 
this conventional method, 5.5 months, also lies between the Euro area and the US, and 
so does the degree of price rigidity in the UK.  
4.1.2. Time-Series Heterogeneity in Frequency of Price Change 
The frequency of price change varies across time, and this time-series heterogeneity 
can be seen from Figure 1. Two features are found: (i) some months (January and 
April have mean frequency higher than 20%) tend to have higher frequency, com-
pared to the other months; and (ii) there is an outlier around 2005m6, where the fre-
quency is extraordinarily high, over 40%. This outlier will be explained in details later 
by oil price shocks. 
Figure 1 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Frequency of Retailer Price 
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4.1.3. Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Frequency of Price Change 
There are also significant cross-sectional heterogeneities in terms of sector, shop type, 
and region. A key factor affecting the frequency is degree of competition. The higher 
is competition, the less is price rigidity, and the higher is frequency of price change. 
Firstly, the cross-sectional heterogeneity is significant between goods sectors and ser-
vices sectors. The goods sectors tend to have higher frequency, compared to services 
sectors. In general, goods markets are more competitive than service markets, result-
ing in a higher frequency in goods sectors. By contrast, the services sectors are more 
rigid, because the services markets are more close to monopolistic competition. Also, 
service prices often involve long term contracts, which cannot be flexibly changed. 
Figure 2 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Frequency by Sector (Retailer) 
 
Secondly, the cross-sectional heterogeneity across shop types is also significant. Ar-
guably, multiple shops actually face much more competition than independent shops. 
For example, a local grocery may not care about the price change in TESCO, because 
its customers are quite fixed within the neighborhood. However, ASDA cannot ignore 
this change, because it will lose a lot of customers if it does not change the price ac-
cordingly. Hence, the multiple shops are more likely to be state dependent in pricing 
strategy, while the independent shops tend to use time dependent pricing strategy. 
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Figure 3 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Frequency by Shop Type (Retailer) 
 
The third cross-sectional heterogeneity lies across region, which turns out to be quite 
small as shown in Figure 4. It is not surprising for the UK, whose economy is quite 
balanced across regions. There is indeed a remarkable exception in London, given that 
London is the economic and political centre of the whole UK. The frequency of price 
change in London is relatively lower, because service industries account for a high 
proportion in the London‘s economy. Moreover, there is another interesting regional 
difference, i.e. the ―South England‖ (including London, South East, South West, and 
East Anglia) has frequencies less than 18%, while the ―North England‖ (including 
East Midlands, West Midlands, Yorks & Humber, North West, and North) has fre-
quencies more than 18%. Meanwhile, Wales and Northern Ireland seem to be closer 
to the south England, and Scotland is closer to the north England. Though small, this 
heterogeneity between the south and the north is still detectable.  
To summarise, the cross-sectional heterogeneity in frequency between goods and ser-
vices is the most significant stylised fact, given that the most frequent sector (energy 
goods) has a weighted median over 60%, while the least frequent sector (transport and 
travel services) only has a counterpart less than 7%. The heterogeneity across shop 
types is also significant and stable. Though little, regional differences are observable 
between London and non-London, as well as between south and north. 
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Figure 4 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Frequency by Region (Retailer) 
 
4.2. Rigidity in Direction of Price Change 
Another conclusion drawn from the frequency of price change is that price increases 
(11.03%) are more frequent than price decreases (7.59%), as shown in Figure 1. This 
finding is also consistent with other literatures in the US, UK and Euro area. The 
higher proportion of increase results from the persistent inflation over time. Hence, it 
should not be regarded as an evidence for the so-called ―downward rigidity‖, which 
asserts that price is more difficult to adjust downward. Moreover, as shown in Figure 
5, the symmetry of the distribution of price change reinforces the conclusion that there 
is no downward or upward rigidity. The summary of increase versus decrease of price 
changes is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 Direction of Retailer Price Change 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 Mean Median S.D. Skewness Mean Median S.D. Skewness 
Overall 17.89% 17.54% 0.0290 3.3118 18.63% 18.34% 0.0352 2.9365 
Increase 10.08% 9.92% 0.0200 4.8750 11.05% 10.81% 0.0320 2.5707 
Decrease 7.82% 7.29% 0.0198 2.1103 7.58% 7.08% 0.0234 2.8011 
4.3. Rigidity in Magnitude of Price Change 
There are two seemingly contradictory opinions on the rigidity in magnitude. On the 
one hand, Mankiw (1985) menu cost model provides an influential explanation on the 
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―fixed adjustment costs‖ of price resetting. Similarly, Akerlof & Yellen (1985) sug-
gest that the firm has an interval of optimal prices, rather than a point estimate of a 
single optimal price. It results in a so-called ―band of inertia‖, within which a firm 
will not reset its price. Only when there are big changes in the fundamentals, the firm 
will review its price and conduct the costly marketing research. Hence, the magnitude 
of price change cannot be too precise due to this ―fixed adjustment costs‖. If this is 
true, then one expects to see two interesting phenomena: (i) price levels tend to end 
with some particular numbers, like £X.X0, £X.X5, or £X.X9, which is referred to as 
―attractive pricing‖; (ii) price changes tend to be integers, like 20% or 50%, rather 
than fractional percentage changes, like 3.1415926%. On the other hand, Rotemberg 
(2005) argues that the magnitude of price change cannot be too large, because it will 
upset the customers, and firms are reluctant to invoke this ―customer anger‖. If this is 
true, then one expects to see more small changes than large changes. 
Many authors, including Bunn & Ellis (2009), misunderstand that these two strands of 
models are competing against each other. However, imprecise change does not neces-
sarily lead to more large changes, and more small changes do not either imply that all 
changes are precisely set. The two models focus on different aspects of price change, 
i.e. the precision of magnitude and the range of the magnitude. Two empirical results 
are used to check the two models: the distribution of magnitude of price changes and 
the distribution of the last decimal of price level. 
The first feature from Figure 5 is that most price changes are around zero. In other 
words, the ―customer anger‖ models are supported. This finding is similar to Bunn & 
Ellis (2009) in the UK, but different from the IPN literatures. For example, Álvarez & 
Hernando (2004) find that most price changes in Spain are quite large, not around ze-
ro. The second feature is that the distribution of magnitude is almost symmetric, with 
several stylised spikes around ±20%, ±25%, ±30%, and ±50%. When sales are ex-
cluded, this stylised pattern is weaker but still significant. This suggests that firms 
tend to change their prices by a fixed proportion, rather than tiny fractions. Thus, it 
supports the ―fixed adjustment costs‖ models, in the sense that firms prefer to follow 
―rule of thumb‖, because carrying out marketing research is too costly. For firms with 
bounded rationality, it is better for them to change imprecisely than doing nothing. 
Hence, the two opinions are not actually contradictory. Rather, they can perfectly co-
exist under our empirical result. 
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Figure 5 Distribution of Magnitude of Retailer Price Change 
 
Another interesting evidence for ―fixed adjustment costs‖ models is the distribution of 
the last decimal of prices. It is termed ―attractive pricing‖ in Aucremanne & Dhyne 
(2005) and other literatures. If there are no adjustment costs, the distribution of the 
last decimal should be close to uniform. However, as shown in Table 9, the prices 
ending in ―0‖ have the highest proportion up to 32.73%, followed by ―8‖, ―9‖ and ―5‖. 
The other numbers do not have balanced proportions. This result is confirmed by our 
everyday experience that these numbers are more attractive. Bergen et al. (2003) find 
that over 65% of the prices in the US food industry end in ―9‖. Álvarez & Hernando 
(2004) also study the last two decimals of prices, detailing the distribution. 
Similar to the frequency of price change, there are also time-series and cross-sectional 
heterogeneities in magnitude of price change. In particular, the goods sectors tend to 
have higher proportion around zero, compared to services sectors. Also, the multiple 
shops change their prices in smaller steps, compared to independent shops. This result 
is consistent with the relationship between frequency and magnitude of price change, 
as suggested in Bunn & Ellis (2009). The more frequent is price change, the smaller is 
the magnitude. Since the goods sectors and multiple shops have higher frequencies 
compared to services sectors and independent shops, their prices have smaller change 
in magnitude. 
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Table 9 Distribution of Last Decimal of Retailer Price 
Last Decimal Example Percentage 
0 £9.50 32.73% 
1 £8.31  2.11% 
2 £7.62  2.02% 
3 £6.23  2.45% 
4 £5.04  7.01% 
5 £4.75 10.01% 
6 £3.86  2.20% 
7 £2.17  3.37% 
8 £1.48 21.22% 
9 £0.99 16.87% 
To summarise the findings by conventional method, little rigidity is found in frequen-
cy of price change (implying a mean duration of 5.5 months), featured with both time-
series and cross-sectional heterogeneity. There is no evidence for rigidity of direction 
of price change. However, rigidity in magnitude is supported in the data. 
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5. Cross-Sectional Method 
Based on the conventional method, one cannot say there is much rigidity in price set-
ting behavior, since the frequency is quite high (around 18.63%) and the implied du-
ration is less than half a year. However, there are several drawbacks of this method of 
measuring duration and rigidity. On the one hand, this naïve method, which computes 
the duration by the inverse of frequency, has the problem of oversampling. On the 
other hand, the data available is designed for price indices rather than duration, so the 
basket is changing each year, resulting in many censoring and truncation cases.  
Dixon (2010) argues that the duration implied by the inverse of frequency is down-
ward biased due to oversampling of short durations. He also suggests that the cross-
sectional distribution of duration across firm (DAF) is an unbiased measure of dura-
tion and robust to censorings. The DAF here is defined as the length of the lifespan of 
the current price. In reality, it is difficult to know the duration of a current price, be-
cause one does not know ex ante when this price will change in the future. However, 
the duration for each price can be easily worked out ex post in the historical data. 
5.1. Cross-Sectional Distribution of DAF 
5.1.1. Overall DAF 
Table 10 summarises this new method of calculating duration, in contrast with the du-
ration implied by conventional method. The detailed distribution of DAF can be used 
to calibrate macroeconomic models. 
Table 10 Cross-Sectional Method versus Conventional Method (Retailer) 
 Cross-Sectional Method Conventional Method 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Mean 9.1847 9.3460 5.7007 5.5165 
Median 9.3145 9.5493 5.7027 5.4531 
S.D. 0.5194 0.7094 0.7364 0.8489 
Skewness -2.8158 -1.2760 -0.5532 -0.2191 
1% 6.5289 6.7016 3.6598 3.2552 
5% 8.1957 7.9567 4.5075 4.2309 
10% 8.7173 8.5054 4.7611 4.5223 
25% 9.1443 8.9375 5.3522 4.9836 
75% 9.4350 9.9120 6.2047 6.1083 
90% 9.5571 10.0024 6.5755 6.5076 
95% 9.6654 10.1311 6.8573 6.9420 
99% 9.9782 10.2182 7.2006 7.3768 
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Not surprisingly, DAF is much higher than duration implied by frequency. This is be-
cause the frequency is based on the oversampled short durations, as argued in Section 
1. As a result, the inverse of frequency is a downward biased estimate of duration. By 
contrast, DAF does not have this problem. At any point in time, each product‘s price 
quote corresponds to a duration, i.e. the length of lifespan of the current price. The 
cross-sectional distribution of durations, or DAF, can then be obtained. The estimated 
mean and median of DAF are both over 9 months, much longer than the implied dura-
tion. This measure of duration strongly supports the price rigidity in frequency. 
5.1.2. Time-Series Heterogeneity in DAF 
Similar to the frequency of price change, DAF is also heterogeneous in two dimen-
sions, time-series and cross-section. The mean DAF fluctuated over the sample period 
from 1996m1 to 2007m12, which can be divided into three subperiods in terms of the 
historical changes in monetary policy. The first subperiod is from 1996m1 to 1997m5, 
due to the independence of Band of England in 1997m5. The second subperiod is 
from 1997m6 to 2003m12, when Bank of England changed its inflation target from 
2.5% based on RPIX
①
 to 2% based on CPI. The third subperiod runs from 2004m1 to 
2007m12, until the end of the microdata sample period. The UK economy was close 
to but not always in steady state during the 12 years, since there are several important 
events and shocks occurred. Figure 6 shows the evolution of mean DAF over time, 
and Figure 7 shows the difference in distribution of DAF over the three subperiods, 
where each curve represents the distribution of DAF in a particular month. 
The first feature is the importance of monetary policy on pricing behaviour. In the se-
cond subperiod after the independence of Bank of England, mean DAF steadily in-
creases, with a special spike in 1999m1. This overall trend reflects that independence 
of monetary policy did stabilise the price levels and the expectation of inflation of the 
public. The mean DAF does not change much in the third subperiod after the change 
in inflation target, except for the two low spikes in 2005m1 and 2007m1. This is be-
cause the change in measure of inflation target does not actually change the effective 
inflation target much, since RPIX per se tends to be lower than CPI.  
The second feature is the importance of macroeconomic state on pricing behaviour. In 
particular, the oil price shocks seem to have a co-movement with mean DAF. If Fig-
ure 6 and Figure 8 are contrasted, it is clear that the oil price has a conspicuous nega-
tive effect on mean DAF. This finding shows support to state dependent models, and 
also suggests including oil price in econometric models. 
                                                 
① RPIX is RPI excluding mortgage interest payments. 
35 
 
Figure 6 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Mean DAF of Retailer Price 
 
Figure 7 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Distribution of DAF of Retailer Price 
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Figure 8 Crude Oil Price in Pounds 
 
The first outlier in 1999m1 can be explained by the level of oil price, which drops to 
bottom in 1999m1. Arguably, when the oil price level is low, the pressure of changing 
prices on the whole economy is much relieved. Similarly, the outliers in 2005m1 and 
2007m1 can also be attributed to the high oil price. As the oil price starts to surge, the 
firms are more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks. Due to the drastic fluctuations of 
oil price in the third subperiod, the distribution of DAF is quite volatile, compared to 
the stable distributions in the first and second subperiods. There is a process for the 
effect of oil shocks to pass throughout the whole economy, because different sectors, 
shops, and regions react to oil shocks differently. From Figure 6, after about 2 quar-
ters, the shocks die away and DAF converges back to its normal level.  
The third feature observed in the results above is that the distribution of DAF is de-
creasing, with typical spikes around 4 months, 8 months, and 12 months. This stylised 
fact indicates that at least some firms tend to reset prices at fixed time intervals, and 
this overall feature will be explained in details later by decomposition of distribution 
of DAF. The length of cycles is a bit different from the empirical findings in the Euro 
area, where firms are more likely to reset prices every 3 months, not every 4 months. 
The existence of cycles also supports the time dependent models.  
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5.1.3. Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in DAF 
In addition to time dimension, DAF is also heterogeneous across sectors, shop types, 
and regions. Similar to the conclusion obtained in conventional method, services sec-
tors (11.38 months) have longer DAF than goods sectors (7.43 months), while inde-
pendent shops (10.06 months) have longer DAF than multiple shops (7.60 months). 
The heterogeneity across regions is still small. Thus, the new measure of rigidity does 
not change the cross-sectional rankings in rigidity, but the degree of rigidity. The de-
tailed distributions of DAF by sector and by shop type can also be used for future use 
in calibrating macroeconomic models.  
In particular, Figure 9 shows the heterogeneity in distribution of DAF across sectors, 
in comparison to the overall distribution of DAF. A key finding is that the decreasing 
feature of the overall distribution of DAF is mainly due to the goods sectors, while the 
cyclical feature is mainly due to the services sectors. It is because the services sectors 
involve contracts to be signed over a certain period, which is found 4 months in UK 
case. Thus, services sectors are more time dependent. By contrast, the goods sectors 
are more competitive and flexible, resulting in a decreasing and smooth distribution. 
This decomposition provides deeper insight into the firms‘ pricing strategy by sector. 
Figure 9 Decomposition of Distribution of DAF of Retailer Price 
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5.2. Cross-Sectional Distribution of Age 
The age of price is another cross-sectional measure of rigidity, which is closely corre-
lated with DAF. Age is defined as how long the current price has survived since the 
last change. Instead of using complete duration, the current age of each firm‘s price, 
i.e. how many months have passed since the last change, is used. In fact, age is an in-
complete duration, so the mean/median age must be less than mean/median DAF. 
The result of distribution of age is presented in Table 11, compared with the distribu-
tion of DAF. As expected, both the mean and median of age are less than DAF, but 
quite close to the duration implied by frequency in Table 10. 
Table 11 Distribution of DAF versus Age (Retailer) 
 DAF Age 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Mean 9.1847 9.3460 5.5663 5.6044 
Median 9.3145 9.5493 5.5405 5.6459 
S.D. 0.5194 0.7094 0.4110 0.4689 
Skewness -2.8158 -1.2760 -0.1492 -0.6205 
1% 6.5289 6.7016 4.1205 3.9284 
5% 8.1957 7.9567 4.9946 4.8069 
10% 8.7173 8.5054 5.1511 4.9801 
25% 9.1443 8.9375 5.3588 5.3373 
75% 9.4350 9.9120 5.7408 5.8709 
90% 9.5571 10.0024 6.1389 6.1696 
95% 9.6654 10.1311 6.3450 6.3445 
99% 9.9782 10.2182 6.5316 6.7028 
Indeed, the distribution of age is just another perspective of looking at the same pro-
cess, so it also has time-series and cross-sectional heterogeneities, similar to the dis-
tribution of DAF. As shown in Figure 10, the distribution of age is also stable during 
the second subperiod, since the oil price is relatively low and stable. However, in the 
third subperiod, when oil price is volatile, the distribution of age becomes wild.  
Hence, the stabilisation effects of monetary policy and destabilisation effects of oil 
price shocks are found in the distribution of age, reinforcing the earlier conclusions in 
Section 5.1 that firms have state dependent feature in pricing strategy. 
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Figure 10 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Distribution of Age of Retailer Price 
 
5.3. Relationship between DAF and Age 
Dixon (2010) develops a unified framework to switch between DAF and age in steady 
state. On the one hand, given the distribution of DAF,   1
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This method is only valid in the steady state, so the average distribution of DAF and 
age in the most stable subperiod (2000m1-2003m12) are used to check the two formu-
lae. The true and derived distributions of DAF and age are compared in Figure 11. It 
is obvious that the true and derived distributions are quite close, especially for the de-
                                                 
① Here,   denotes simplex as defined in Dixon (2010). 
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rived distribution of age. This simple practice successfully justifies this important the-
oretical contribution of Dixon (2010). 
Figure 11 True and Derived Distribution of DAF and Age of Retailer Price 
 
That is to say, once the distribution of age or other distributions are already obtained, 
the distribution of DAF can also be easily derived using the formula in Dixon (2010). 
Further work is to be done based on the empirical findings. This unbiased distribution 
of duration is essential for macroeconomic modelling, because the micro evidence can 
be applied to calibrating and simulating New Keynesian heterogeneous agent models, 
or testing theoretical models.  
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6. Survival Analysis 
To describe the price setting behaviour, different methods are employed for different 
purposes. Two classes of measures have been covered in the previous sections for the 
purpose of studying price rigidity. They both focus on the outcome of price setting 
behaviour, saying little about how retailers set prices. This section diverts the perspec-
tive to hazard function  h t  (and other equivalent forms) of price duration. The in-
sight provided by the survival analysis is useful to investigate the mechanism of price 
setting behaviour, in addition to the resulting distribution of durations. 
6.1. Nonparametric Analysis 
This paper starts with nonparametric analysis as a connecting link with the previous 
sections, since nonparametric analysis does not impose any assumptions about the da-
ta generating process, except that  h t  depends on time t . Hence,  h t  presented in 
this section is closely correlated to the rigidity measures in previous sections, because 
time is the only extra factor considered. 
6.1.1. Pooled Hazard Function 
As shown in Section 1, there are four equivalent forms of presenting the distribution 
of duration. It is easy to derive one from another among hazard function  th , cumu-
lative hazard function  tH , survivor function  tS , and cumulative density function 
 tF . Figure 12 shows the four equivalent forms of presenting the distribution of du-
ration T . Since  h t  is the most popular form, this paper will only focus on the fea-
tures of  h t . Also, the weighted and unweighted distributions do not differ qualita-
tively, therefore only the weighted results are reported hereinafter.  
The first feature is that  th  has a downward slope in the first 72 months, starting with 
a quite high hazard rate, over 0.25 in our chart. This feature is also found by Bunn & 
Ellis (2009) and other IPN literature.  th  is omitted beyond 72 months because the 
standard error of the estimate is quite high. However,  th  will finally rise and reach 1, 
since all prices will change some day.  
The second conspicuous feature of  th  is that there are regular big spikes every 12 
months (major cycle) and small spikes every 4 months (minor cycle) up to 48 months. 
The spikes imply high risk of changing prices, so retailers tend to change prices at 
fixed time intervals. This is a support to time dependent models, such as Generalised 
Taylor Economy (GTE). In GTE model, there are many sectors with different dura-
tion lengths, and there is a Taylor process within each sector. The minor cycle in 4 
months is mainly due to the periodic sales, while major cycle in 12 months may result 
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from the annual change in contracts such as wage. Note that it is consistent with the 
spike pattern of the distribution of DAF.  
Figure 12 Distribution Functions of Retailer Price 
 
In nonparametric analysis, the object is the average price setting behaviour across the 
whole economy in a cross-sectional sense. One important issue of this method is that 
only the first non-left-truncated duration of each product is used. Once a price is reset, 
the duration is completed and the product leaves the analysis. One reason for this 
choice is that the panel is not balanced, because the price trajectories are of different 
lengths. Thus, if all the durations in a price trajectory are used, those with longer price 
trajectories will be considered more than those with shorter trajectories. Moreover, the 
whole dataset is too large to be utilised anyway. There are totally 12.8 million price 
quotes and 612,173 price trajectories. Due to the memory limit of STATA in VML, 
even if the panel is balanced, it is impossible to use all the data in practice. This is al-
so the way that other studies, such as Jonker, Folkertsma & Blijenberg (2004) and 
Bunn & Ellis (2009), have used in survival analysis. Fortunately, thanks to a large 
enough sample, the estimate is still unbiased, without losing much efficiency. Fur-
thermore, the omitted information here will be still used in studying time-series heter-
ogeneity anyway. 
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6.1.2. Time-Series Heterogeneity in Hazard Function 
Note that in the nonparametric analysis,  h t  only varies with analysis time, not cal-
endar time. Hence, a duration may start at any time during the whole sample period. 
The validity of the overall  h t  depends on the stability of the price setting behavior 
during the sample period. Only when the true  h t  does not vary significantly over 
the 144 months, the estimated overall  h t  is meaningful.  
This entitles an inspection of time-series heterogeneity in  h t . This section follows 
the division of subperiods earlier in terms of structural breaks of monetary policy, re-
sulting in 3 subperiods. Figure 13 shows the comparison between all periods, period 2 
and period 3. Period 1 (1996m1-1997m5) is not used, because it is too short. They 
seem to be quite close, and share the stylised features.  
Figure 13 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Hazard Function of Retailer Price 
 
To strictly test the equality of the distributions between subperiods, the two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is employed, which is a form of minimum distance 
estimation used to compare two distributions. The KS statistic quantifies a distance 
between the empirical distribution functions of two samples. The null hypothesis of 
KS test is that the samples are drawn from the same distribution. 
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There are three distributions on hand, so all possible combinations are tested: all peri-
ods versus period 2, period 2 versus period 3, and all periods versus period 3. Table 
12 summarises the results of KS tests.  
Table 12 KS Test of Time-Series Heterogeneity in Hazard Function (Retailer) 
 Distribution D P-Value Corrected 
Test 1 
All 0.3611 0.0090  
Period 2 0.0000 1.0000  
Combined KS 0.3611 0.0180 0.0100 
Test 2 
Period 2 0.0000 1.0000  
Period 3 -0.3056 0.0350  
Combined KS 0.3056 0.0690 0.0430 
Test 3 
All 0.1389 0.4990  
Period 3 -0.1111 0.6410  
Combined KS 0.1389 0.8780 0.8250 
The null hypothesis of equal distribution cannot be rejected for any of the three tests 
at 1% significance level. In particular, period 3 is very similar to the whole sample 
period with a high probability of 82.5%, which means the price setting behavior does 
not change much after the monetary policy reform. Hence, the time-series heterogene-
ity in  h t  is not strong, if any. 
6.1.3. Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Hazard Function 
Apart from time-series dimension, cross-sectional heterogeneity is of interest as well. 
Similar to previous analysis, the retailers are classified in terms of sector, shop type, 
and region, to investigate the cross-sectional heterogeneity. 
Firstly, the heterogeneity by sector is significant, because retailers in different sectors 
do follow different price setting strategy. Figure 14 graphs the  h t  for different sec-
tors, divided into goods sectors and services sectors. The key to explaining the differ-
ence across sectors is again the competitiveness of market structure. 
The goods sectors share a decreasing and smooth  h t , with energy goods as an ex-
ception. Since goods are mostly homogeneous, the goods sectors are regarded as more 
competitive markets and flexible prices. As a result, a high hazard rate is observed in 
the short run, leading to the decreasing feature. Also, it is not necessary to follow time 
dependent pricing strategy, as retailers can change price at any time. 
By contrast, the services sectors share a horizontal and cyclical  h t , with communi-
cation as an exception. Since services are differentiated between retailers, so the mar-
ket structure for services sectors is more like a monopolistic competition. The lack of 
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competition makes the hazard rates lower in the short run and flat over a long period. 
Moreover, services are likely to involve contract, so the contracted price cannot 
change flexibly during a fixed period.  
Among others, communication sector has the shortest duration, which ends within 2 
years. It is because the contracts subscribed for mobile or internet services usually last 
12 months or 18 months. The short duration of contracts reflects the short product life 
cycle and fast evolution in communication industries, but it still has a cyclical feature 
as other services sectors. 
As a result, the two features of overall  h t  in Figure 12 can actually be decomposed 
into a decreasing feature from goods sectors and a cyclical feature from services sec-
tors. This finding can also be linked to the results in Section 1, where goods sectors 
reset the prices more frequently on average. 
Figure 14 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Hazard Function by Sector 
 
The second cross-sectional heterogeneity in  h t  exists between shop types, as shown 
in Figure 15. Consistent with earlier argument, multiple shops face fiercer competi-
tion from their opponents, so they have to react to changes in the market quicker and 
have relatively higher hazard rates than independent shops. For the same reason, their 
cyclical feature is weaker than the independent shops, because they have more flexi-
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ble pricing strategy. The result here is consistent with the findings in frequency of 
price change by conventional method.  
Figure 15 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Hazard Function by Shop Type 
 
The last cross-sectional heterogeneity considered is across regions, and it turns out to 
be little. As shown in Figure 16,  h t  of the 12 government office regions are almost 
identical in the first 36 months. The discrepancies after 36 months are again mainly 
due to the decreasing sample size and increasing standard errors. 
This finding seems a bit different from that in Section 1, but they are not contradictory. 
 h t  describes the risk profile of price change in terms of time, while frequency is 
just a simple measure of rigidity without reference to any covariate. Some regions 
may have higher frequency, but it does not mean they have different pattern of risk of 
changing price. The pairwise KS tests also suggest that there is no difference in  h t  
by region at 5% significance level. With high confidence, one can conclude that  h t  
of the 12 regions share the same decreasing and cyclical features as the overall  h t .  
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Figure 16 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Hazard Function by Region 
 
To summarise the nonparametric analysis, the cross-sectional heterogeneity in  h t  is 
significant across sectors and shop types, but little across regions or periods. Decom-
position of the overall  h t  between decreasing feature (goods sectors) and cyclical 
feature (services sectors) provides detailed information of the price setting behaviour. 
It implies a strong need to model the economy by heterogeneous agents in theoretical 
model, and also a strong need to estimate  h t  separately in empirical model. 
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6.2. Semiparametric Analysis 
As shown in Section 1, the advantage of semiparametric analysis is that it controls for 
covariates that differ across observations, leaving the baseline hazard function  0h t  
unspecified. Thus, it is more flexible and reliable in obtaining both qualitative and 
quantitative effects of various covariates on hazard function  h t .  
6.2.1. Model Specification 
Based on the previous findings, there are cross-sectional and time-series heterogenei-
ties in  h t . Coupled with controls for other possible distinctions, four sets of covari-
ates are classified in the pooled semiparametric model. There are several candidate 
semiparametric models, but the most popular one, the proportional hazard (PH) Cox 
model, is adopted. 
(i) Covariates from Time Dimension: ix  
Indeed, semiparametric analysis already uses the  0h t  to capture the common 
features of variation over time in  h t . However, it depends on analysis time, ra-
ther than calendar time. Thus, to characterise the seasonality of  h t , it is advisa-
ble to put the 11 calendar month dummies into the Cox model, where January is 
the reference group. Based on the significance of these dummies, the validity of 
time-dependent models could be checked. 
(ii) Covariates from Space Dimension: iix  
To investigate the cross-sectional heterogeneity in space, 11 region dummies are 
also included in the model, where London is the reference group. In the nonpara-
metric analysis, not much regional difference is found, and now this conclusion 
can also be checked by the significance of region dummies. 
(iii) Covariates from Macroeconomic Dimension: iiix  
To control for the state of the macroeconomy, both the revenue side and the cost 
side are considered. The revenue side of a retailer is influenced by the inflation, 
since the real revenue will be lower if inflation is high. The cost side is influenced 
by three factors: interest rate (capital costs), wage (labour costs), and oil price (re-
sources costs). The percentage changes are used in these covariates to consider the 
sensitivity of price change to the volatilities. Also, both lags and leads are includ-
ed, allowing for dynamics and expectations. The reaction of retailers to these co-
variates can be used to check the validity of state-dependent models. 
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(iv) Covariates from Microeconomic Dimension: ivx  
There are several characteristics to distinguish a retailer from another, such as sec-
tor, shop type, level of price, percentage change of price and demand. The price 
here is the price of the specific product (good/service), and the demand is meas-
ured by the share of expenditure on a particular product of a particular retailer 
within the whole CPI basket, i.e. the grand weight tskji ,,,,  as defined in Section 1. 
It can also be understood as the relative market share of the product across the 
whole economy. 
The Cox model can be expressed as:      0 exp i i ii ii iii iii iv ivh t h t        β x β x β x β x , 
where iviiiiii xxxx ,,,  are the four sets of covariates, and iviiiiii ββββ ,,,  are the corre-
sponding coefficient vectors. Two notes for iiix  are due. Firstly, the absolute values of 
percentage changes
①
 for the covariates are used, because this section focuses on the 
price change without specifying increase or decrease, on the ground that there is little 
rigidity in direction of price change as shown in Section 1. The second issue is that, 
many papers
②
 also consider other macroeconomic covariates, such as Euro changeo-
ver and VAT change. However, there were no such changes during our sample period 
(1996m1-2007m12) in the UK. Hence, it is not necessary to consider these covariates.  
Firstly, a pooled Cox model is estimated for all sectors and all years. Based on the 
nonparametric analysis results, there is a significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
 h t  across sectors. In particular, goods sectors tend to have decreasing and smooth 
 h t , while services sectors share a horizontal and cyclical  h t . Also, energy sector 
and communication sector are quite special, entailing separate estimation. Thus, the 
Cox models for goods sectors excluding energy, services sectors excluding communi-
cation, energy sector and communication sector are estimated separately. The estima-
tion results of pooled and separate Cox models are reported in Table 13 and Table 14. 
To check whether there is time-series heterogeneity in  h t  across periods, the Cox 
models for period 2 (1997m6-2003m12) and for period 3 (2004m1-2007m12) are also 
estimated separately. The estimation for period 1 (1996m1-1997m5) is not used, be-
cause the sub-sample period is not long enough and observations are too few to gen-
erate meaningful estimates. The results are summarised in Table 15 and Table 16. 
                                                 
① Note that inflation itself is the percentage change, so we just use the absolute values of inflation di-
rectly. Interest rate itself is a percentage, so the absolute values of changes in interest rate are used. 
② For example, Jonker et al (2004) use VAT in the Cox model, while Aucremanne and Dhyne (20005) 
use VAT in the logit model. Almost all the IPN literatures consider the Euro change in 2002m1. 
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Table 13 Estimation Results of Pooled and Separate Cox Model by Sector (Part A) 
  Pooled 
Goods sectors 
excluding Energy 
Services sectors 
excluding Communication 
Energy Communication 
  H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. 
C
o
v
a
r
ia
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
T
im
e 
D
im
en
si
o
n
 
February 0.7386** -0.3030** 0.8219** -0.1961** 0.5216** -0.6509** 0.7525* -0.2844* 0.6684 -0.4029 
March 0.8001** -0.2230** 0.8397** -0.1747** 0.6999** -0.3568** 1.2306  0.2075 0.9112 -0.0929 
April 0.8819** -0.1257** 0.8952** -0.1107** 0.7516** -0.2856** 1.7705**  0.5712** 0.9649 -0.0358 
May 0.8331** -0.1826** 0.8019** -0.2208** 0.9215** -0.0817** 2.0940**  0.7391** 0.7840 -0.2433 
June 0.7836** -0.2438** 0.8028** -0.2196** 0.7358** -0.3067** 1.3441**  0.2957** 0.8863 -0.1207 
July 0.8361** -0.1790** 0.9174** -0.0862** 0.5718** -0.5590** 1.5283**  0.4242** 0.9741 -0.0263 
August 0.6967** -0.3614** 0.7683** -0.2636** 0.4703** -0.7543** 1.1068  0.1015 1.0789  0.0759 
September 0.6904** -0.3704** 0.7300** -0.3148** 0.5220** -0.6501** 1.5495**  0.4379** 0.5197* -0.6545* 
October 0.7762** -0.2534** 0.8106** -0.2100** 0.6135** -0.4886** 2.1013**  0.7425** 1.1778  0.1637 
November 0.7537** -0.2828** 0.7916** -0.2337** 0.5853** -0.5357** 1.7168**  0.5405** 0.8203 -0.1980 
December 0.7393** -0.3020** 0.8104** -0.2102** 0.4826** -0.7285** 1.3210**  0.2784** 1.2570  0.2287 
C
o
v
a
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a
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fr
o
m
 
S
p
a
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o
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South East 0.9997 -0.0003 1.0025  0.0025 1.0026  0.0026 0.9529 -0.0482 0.7414* -0.2992* 
South West 0.9903 -0.0097 1.0001  0.0001 0.9627* -0.0380* 0.8944* -0.1116* 0.8160 -0.2034 
East Anglia 0.9728** -0.0276** 0.9808* -0.0194* 0.9276** -0.0752** 0.8972* -0.1085* 0.8522 -0.1600 
East Midlands 1.0197*  0.0195* 1.0250**  0.0247** 1.0181  0.0179 0.9151 -0.0887 0.9360 -0.0662 
West Midlands 1.0236**  0.0234** 1.0259**  0.0255** 1.0108  0.0107 0.9800 -0.0202 0.8648 -0.1453 
Yorks & Humber 1.0014  0.0014 1.0033  0.0033 0.9930 -0.0070 0.9838 -0.0163 0.8928 -0.1133 
North West 1.0205**  0.0203** 1.0180*  0.0179* 1.0343  0.0337 0.9729 -0.0274 0.8504 -0.1620 
North 1.0178  0.0176 1.0238*  0.0235* 1.0068  0.0068 0.9022 -0.1029 0.8843 -0.1230 
Wales 0.9929 -0.0071 0.9982 -0.0018 0.9928 -0.0072 0.8300** -0.1863** 0.9384 -0.0636 
Scotland 1.0102  0.0102 1.0121  0.0120 1.0151  0.0150 0.9228 -0.0803 0.7950 -0.2294 
Northern Ireland 0.9968 -0.0032 0.9997 -0.0003 0.9826 -0.0176 0.8266 -0.1905 0.9573 -0.0436 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. H. R. denotes hazard ratio, which is equal to  coeffexp .  
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Table 14 Estimation Results of Pooled and Separate Cox Model by Sector (Part B) 
  Pooled 
Goods sectors 
excluding Energy 
Services sectors 
excluding Communication 
Energy Communication 
  H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. H. R. Coeff. 
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Inflation t 0.9978 -0.0022 0.9990 -0.0010 0.8849** -0.1223** 1.3050**  0.2662** 1.3806  0.3225 
Inflation t-1 1.0520**  0.0507** 1.0532**  0.0518** 1.0132**  0.0131** 1.9294**  0.6572** 1.8299  0.6043 
Inflation t+1 0.8901** -0.1164** 0.8918** -0.1145** 0.9054** -0.0994** 0.8546 -0.1571 0.8547 -0.1570 
Interest Rate (∆) t 0.9303** -0.0723** 0.9314** -0.0710** 0.8563** -0.1551** 1.1891  0.1732 0.8384 -0.1763 
Interest Rate (∆) t-1 1.1409**  0.1318** 1.0853**  0.0819** 1.3396**  0.2923** 1.3960**  0.3336** 0.6903 -0.3707 
Interest Rate (∆) t+1 0.8558** -0.1558** 0.8731** -0.1357** 0.8776** -0.1306** 0.7882* -0.2380* 0.6980 -0.3596 
Wage (%∆) t 1.0275  0.0271 0.9827 -0.0174 1.2003**  0.1826** 0.8915 -0.1149 2.0309**  0.7085** 
Wage (%∆) t-1 1.0101  0.0100 1.0494**  0.0482** 0.8892** -0.1174** 0.9711 -0.0293 1.0966  0.0922 
Wage (%∆) t+1 1.1072**  0.1019** 1.1220**  0.1151** 1.1442**  0.1347** 0.8679 -0.1417 0.9853 -0.0148 
Oil Price (%∆) t 0.9950** -0.0050** 1.0001  0.0001 0.9751** -0.0253** 1.4981**  0.4042** 0.9610 -0.0397 
Oil Price (%∆) t-1 0.9971** -0.0029** 0.9927** -0.0074** 1.0209**  0.0207** 1.1423**  0.1331** 1.0406  0.0398 
Oil Price (%∆) t+1 1.0077**  0.0076** 1.0065**  0.0065** 1.0087**  0.0086** 1.5375**  0.4302** 0.9899 -0.0102 
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Alcoholic/Beverage 1.0135  0.0134 1.0401**  0.0393** – – – – – – 
Energy 1.7440**  0.5562** – – – – – – – – 
Non-Energy 0.7242** -0.3227** 0.7269** -0.3189** – – – – – – 
Housing 0.5196** -0.6547** – – – – – – – – 
Transport/Travel 0.4997** -0.6938** – – 1.0134  0.0133 – – – – 
Communication 0.7711** -0.2599** – – – – – – – – 
Recreation/Personal 0.5564** -0.5863** – – 1.1548**  0.1439** – – – – 
Miscellaneous 0.5239** -0.6465** – – 1.0351  0.0345 – – – – 
Independent Shop 0.9210** -0.0823** 0.9473** -0.0541** 0.8330** -0.1827** 0.9241** -0.0789** 0.7566** -0.2789** 
Price 1.0002**  0.0002** 1.0002**  0.0002** 1.0006**  0.0006** 1.0035**  0.0035** 1.0034*  0.0034* 
Price (%∆)  1.0000**  0.0000** 1.0000**  0.0000** 1.0006**  0.0006** 1.0128**  0.0128** 1.0012  0.0012 
Sales 2.6936**  0.9909** 2.6267**  0.9657** 3.6455**  1.2935** 1.3450**  0.2964** 2.8898**  1.0612** 
Market Share 14.5700**  2.6790** 1.5093*  0.4116* 24.735**  3.2082** 3.9447**  1.3724** 9.3169  2.2318 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. H. R. denotes hazard ratio, which is equal to  coeffexp .  
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Table 15 Estimation Results of Separate Cox Model by Period (Part A) 
  
Goods sectors  
excluding Energy 
Services sectors  
excluding Communication 
Energy 
  All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 
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February -0.1961** -0.1113** -0.1328** -0.6509** -0.5050** -0.6542** -0.2844* -0.1818  0.1092 
March -0.1747** -0.0951** -0.2730** -0.3568** -0.2805** -0.3832**  0.2075  0.2593  0.7480* 
April -0.1107** -0.1709** -0.1464** -0.2856** -0.3582** -0.2652**  0.5712**  0.7092**  1.2945** 
May -0.2208** -0.2457**  0.0376 -0.0817** -0.1268** -0.2023**  0.7391**  0.9686**  0.7516** 
June -0.2196** -0.2430**  0.0504 -0.3067** -0.3791** -0.0881  0.2957**  0.2455  0.7054* 
July -0.0862** -0.0276 -0.0506 -0.5590** -0.5395** -0.4934**  0.4242**  0.7525**  0.7487* 
August -0.2636** -0.2016** -0.0304 -0.7543** -0.4807** -0.7838**  0.1015  0.3367*  0.2881 
September -0.3148** -0.1586** -0.0904** -0.6501** -0.5693** -0.2998**  0.4379**  0.6269**  0.3369 
October -0.2100** -0.1749** -0.2401** -0.4886** -0.4099** -0.3451**  0.7425**  0.8250**  1.1255** 
November -0.2337** -0.1605**  0.0843** -0.5357** -0.4839** -0.1392*  0.5405**  0.3779*  0.7259* 
December -0.2102** -0.2889** -0.0134 -0.7285** -0.8752** -0.2963**  0.2784** -0.2160 -0.0470 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
S
p
a
ce
 D
im
en
si
o
n
 
South East  0.0025 -0.0238* -0.0027  0.0026 -0.0446*  0.0381 -0.0482 -0.0768  0.0559 
South West  0.0001 -0.0298**  0.0317* -0.0380* -0.1058**  0.0601* -0.1116* -0.1380*  0.0044 
East Anglia -0.0194* -0.0262*  0.0348* -0.0752** -0.0512 -0.0558 -0.1085* -0.1520*  0.0508 
East Midlands  0.0247**  0.0141  0.0421**  0.0179  0.0133  0.0221 -0.0887 -0.1125 -0.0700 
West Midlands  0.0255**  0.0041  0.0809**  0.0107  0.0001  0.0233 -0.0202 -0.0481  0.0722 
Yorks & Humber  0.0033 -0.0100  0.0602** -0.0070 -0.0439  0.0098 -0.0163 -0.0327 -0.0887 
North West  0.0179*  0.0039  0.0622**  0.0337  0.0542*  0.0402 -0.0274 -0.0878  0.0916 
North  0.0235*  0.0191  0.0826**  0.0068 -0.0147  0.0433 -0.1029 -0.1405*  0.0384 
Wales -0.0018  0.0009  0.0593** -0.0072 -0.0669*  0.1584** -0.1863** -0.1164 -0.1220 
Scotland  0.0120  0.0008  0.0618**  0.0150  0.0269  0.0334 -0.0803 -0.1130  0.0588 
Northern Ireland -0.0003 -0.0049  0.0539** -0.0176 -0.1183**  0.0728 -0.1905 -0.1894** -0.1405 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. Period 2: 1997m6-2003m12. Period 3: 2004m1-2007m12. 
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Table 16 Estimation Results of Separate Cox Model by Period (Part B) 
  
Goods sectors 
excluding Energy 
Services sectors 
excluding Communication 
Energy 
  All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 
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Inflation t -0.0010 -0.0892** -0.0824* -0.1223**  0.2861** -0.2916**  0.2662** -0.0970  0.6199 
Inflation t-1  0.0518**  0.0606** -0.0432  0.0131** -0.2648**  0.2060**  0.6572**  0.3498** -0.1105 
Inflation t+1 -0.1145** -0.0778** -0.2654** -0.0994**  0.2099** -0.6314** -0.1571  0.2504 -0.8754* 
Interest Rate (∆) t -0.0710** -0.0875** -0.7063** -0.1551** -0.2337** -0.8313**  0.1732  0.2686 -0.5542 
Interest Rate (∆) t-1  0.0819**  0.0710** -0.1302*  0.2923**  0.1157  0.4527**  0.3336**  1.0576**  0.4771 
Interest Rate (∆) t+1 -0.1357** -0.0188 -0.5975** -0.1306** -0.2242** -1.0383** -0.2380* -0.2161 -0.2939 
Wage (%∆) t -0.0174 -0.0479*  0.2098**  0.1826**  0.0998  0.2303* -0.1149  0.1719 -1.8409** 
Wage (%∆) t-1  0.0482**  0.0436**  0.0496** -0.1174**  0.0065 -1.1555** -0.0293 -0.0445 -0.6744 
Wage (%∆) t+1  0.1151**  0.0425**  0.1982**  0.1347**  0.2084**  0.7923** -0.1417 -0.1812  0.8985* 
Oil Price (%∆) t  0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0110** -0.0253**  0.0003 -0.0831**  0.4042**  0.1262**  0.5197** 
Oil Price (%∆) t-1 -0.0074** -0.0057** -0.0075**  0.0207**  0.0243**  0.0504**  0.1331**  0.0808**  0.3497** 
Oil Price (%∆) t+1  0.0065**  0.0049**  0.0206**  0.0086** -0.0480**  0.0354**  0.4302**  0.2891**  0.4907** 
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Alcoholic/Beverage  0.0393**  0.0820**  0.1687** – – – – – – 
Energy – – – – – – – – – 
Non-Energy -0.3189** -0.3393** -0.2681** – – – – – – 
Housing – – – – – – – – – 
Transport/Travel – – –  0.0133 -0.0429  0.0967** – – – 
Communication – – – – – – – – – 
Recreation/Personal – – –  0.1439**  0.0880**  0.2226** – – – 
Miscellaneous – – –  0.0345 -0.0024  0.0778** – – – 
Independent Shop -0.0541** -0.0463** -0.0896** -0.1827** -0.1739** -0.2167** -0.0789** -0.1179** -0.0669 
Price  0.0002**  0.0001**  0.0001**  0.0006**  0.0007**  0.0005**  0.0035**  0.0044**  0.0031** 
Price (%∆)   0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0022**  0.0006**  0.0005**  0.0018**  0.0128**  0.0179**  0.0120** 
Sales  0.9657**  0.9762**  0.9873**  1.2935**  1.3339**  1.1397**  0.2964**  0.4227**  0.3441** 
Market Share  0.4116*  2.4819**  2.4705**  3.2082**  2.6115**  4.1390**  1.3724**  1.8564**  2.7682** 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. Period 2: 1997m6-2003m12. Period 3: 2004m1-2007m12. 
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6.2.2. Pooled Cox Model 
The estimation results of pooled Cox model is reported in the first two columns of 
Table 13 and Table 14. It is to model the overall price setting behaviour, assuming 
there is no significant cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity in  0h t . This as-
sumption will be examined later, but some conclusions, which are robust to this as-
sumption, can still be drawn. 
Firstly, January, the reference group for calendar months, has the highest probability 
of price change, because all the other calendar month dummies have negative signs. A 
direct reason is that Christmas sales typically last until January. This result is con-
sistent with our earlier finding for rigidity in frequency. April, the beginning of each 
tax year, seems to have the highest hazard rate among the other months. In addition, 
all the 11 calendar month dummies are significant, which strongly supports the time-
dependent models. 
Secondly, as expected, there is little evidence for heterogeneity by region, since only 
4 region dummies are significant. However, a familiar feature is still recognisable, i.e. 
the north (including Scotland) tends to have higher  h t  than the south. This finding 
is again consistent with the corresponding result for rigidity in frequency. 
The third conclusion is that the retailer is sensitive to changes in macroeconomic state. 
In particular, the reaction to the four sets of macroeconomic state variables is studied, 
and the retailer seems to respond to information using both backward looking expec-
tations and forward looking expectations. 
(i) Inflation: 
The retailer is not significantly sensitive to the current inflation, but it positively 
reacts to the absolute value of inflation last period (0.0507) and negatively to that 
next period (-0.1164). It may result from lack of information on inflation, so the 
retailer prefers to change the price after the precise information is available. 
(ii) Interest Rate: 
This feature of price setting behaviour is also found when the retailer faces inter-
est rate changes. The only difference is that the retailer does have precise infor-
mation on the current interest rate, leading to a significant coefficient on current 
changes in interest rate too. Furthermore, the negative coefficients on the current 
(-0.0723) and future (-0.1558) changes in interest rate are coherent in logic with 
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the positive coefficient on the current (0.1318) change in interest rate. Obviously, 
if a change in interest rate is only reacted after one period, the probability of price 
change is then relatively lower when the change in interest rate actually occurs or 
expected to occur.  
(iii) Wage: 
By contrast, the response to changes in wage is only significant for the future val-
ues. It shows that the retailer has quite reliable information and bargaining power 
on wage, and it adjusts price based on forward looking expectations. Hence, the 
past and current changes in wage hardly affect the price setting. 
(iv) Oil Price: 
The last factor introduced by this chapter is the volatility of resource price, prox-
ied by oil price, which seems to play an essential role in price setting when study-
ing the distribution of DAF. Indeed, all the related coefficients are highly signifi-
cant. The past (-0.0029) and current (-0.0050) changes in oil price both have nega-
tive effect, while the effect of future (0.0076) change is positive. This pattern is 
similar to wage, but different from inflation and interest rate. It may be attributed 
to the developed commodity markets based on financial derivatives, which re-
duced the uncertainty of oil price in the future.  
The last but not least conclusion is that microeconomic covariates play important role 
in price setting behaviour. As expected, the coefficients of sector and shop type dum-
mies are significant. In particular, goods sectors have higher  h t  than the services 
sectors. The highest is energy good, which must be treated as an exception in goods 
sectors. Also, communication service is the highest among all the services sectors, 
and it should be treated as an exception in the services sectors and estimated separate-
ly. Moreover, independent shops have lower  h t , compared to multiple shops. In 
addition, the level of price and the (absolute) percentage change of price have little 
but positive effect on  h t . The two positive coefficients suggest that higher price 
levels give more space of price change, and that there is a positive relationship be-
tween frequency and the magnitude of price change. Items on sales have much higher 
probability to change price. Next, the elasticity of the hazard rate on the demand (de-
scribed by the market share) is as high as 14.57. It means that if the ―grand‖ market 
share of a particular item of a particular retailer grows 1% (which is very huge), then 
the hazard rate of price change will be 14.57 times higher than before. It actually re-
flects the difference between independent shops and multiple shops from another per-
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spective, since an independent shop would become a multiple shop if its market share 
increases by 1%. 
6.2.3. Separate Cox Model by Sector 
Since remarkable differences in  h t  are observed between goods sectors and ser-
vices sectors, there is no such a common  0h t  underlying both sectors. However, 
there is indeed a similarity within goods sectors except for energy and within services 
sectors except for communication. Thus, it is advisable to run at least four separate 
Cox models for goods sectors excluding energy, services sectors excluding communi-
cation, energy sector itself and communication sector itself. The results are listed in 
the rest columns of Table 13 and Table 14. Note that a key principle to explain the 
effect of macroeconomic covariates is the input intensity. 
The results for goods sectors are almost the same as the pooled model, but some new 
features emerge. The calendar month with the second highest hazard rate is not April 
but July now, because the summer sales are usually in July, which is the second big-
gest shopping season next to Christmas sales in January. It shows one of the special 
features in seasonality of goods sectors. The difference across regions is little. The 
effects of state variables are quite similar to pooled Cox model, except for slight dif-
ferences in magnitude and significance. One exception is that the effect of shop type 
is greater for goods sectors than services sectors. That is to say, being a multiple shop 
is more important for a retailer in goods sectors than that in services sectors. Another 
exception is that the effect of past change in wage is now positive, implying that 
goods sectors have lagged response to labour costs. It may be because goods sectors 
in the UK are mainly capital intensive, so retailers are relatively insensitive to the 
changes in labour market. 
The separate Cox model for services sectors excluding communication is a bit more 
different in several aspects. The foremost difference is still in seasonality. Compared 
to April for the pooled model and July for the goods sectors, May is the month with 
the second highest hazard rate. The gap between January and May is just 4 months, 
which may be related with the minor cycle observed in services sectors. Regarding the 
state variables, an important difference is the effect of past change in wage, which is 
negative. With the same argument, services sectors are mainly labour intensive, so 
changes in wage are quickly reacted to, and the effect of past changes in wage has less 
effect. 
For energy sector, the results are quite different and unique. Firstly, January now does 
not have the highest hazard rate. Instead, October stands out and becomes the highest. 
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Secondly, even less heterogeneity across regions are presented. Thirdly, no coeffi-
cients related to wage are significant, but, by contrast, all the coefficients related to oil 
price are positive and significant. This apparent results from the fact that energy sec-
tor is resource intensive.  
For communication sector, very few coefficients are significant. It may be due to lack 
of enough observations, or it may imply weak state-dependent features. However, the 
effect of current change in wage is quite noticeable, which again can be explained by 
the labour intensity of communication service. 
After controlling for all the four sets of covariates, the heterogeneities in the hazard 
function  th  are purified away. The resulting  0h t  is more reliable to represent the 
common features of  h t , which is only dependent of the analysis time t . Figure 17 
presents  0h t  for the Cox models of pooled, goods sectors and services sectors. Sim-
ilar to but more precise than nonparametric analysis, the pooled  0h t  can be decom-
posed into a decreasing part (goods sectors) and a cyclical part (services sectors). 
Figure 17 Baseline Hazard Functions for Cox Models of Retailer Price 
 
6.2.4. Separate Cox Model by Period 
To investigate the time-series heterogeneity in price setting behaviour by means of 
semiparametric analysis, the sample is splitted into three sub-samples, as defined ear-
58 
 
lier. The results for all the periods (1997m1-2007m12), period 2 (1997m6-2003m12) 
and period 3 (2004m1-2007m12) are compared in Table 15 and Table 16, where only 
coefficients of separate models for goods sectors, services sectors and energy are re-
ported. The formula  coeffexp  can be used to obtain the hazard ratios. The signs of 
coefficients do not change much over time, but the magnitude of the effects is volatile.  
For the goods sectors excluding energy, January is still the calendar month with high-
est hazard rate for period 2, but November takes over its place for period 3. May and 
June are not significantly different from January in hazard rate for period 3, implying 
that the summer sales seem to be prolonged and very similar to the Christmas sales in 
latest years. There is little difference across regions for period 2, and the distinction 
between south and north is preserved over time, as in the pooled estimation. However, 
for period 3, the difference across regions is more significant. As for macroeconomic 
covariates, similar results are found in the backward looking feature and forward 
looking feature. Regarding microeconomic covariates, alcoholic/beverage and non-
energy goods sectors have much higher hazard rates for period 3. In addition, similar 
effects are found in shop type (negative), level of price (positive), percentage change 
of price (positive), sales (positive) and market share (positive). For most state varia-
bles in the model, the magnitude of effects always tends to be lower for period 2 rela-
tive to period 3. One possible reason could be the uncertainty right after the independ-
ence of Bank of England, resulting in a weaker state dependent feature in price setting 
behaviour for period 2. By contrast, period 3 is more familiar with the new govern-
ment system, so is more active to react to the changes in economic state. 
In services sectors excluding communication, other calendar months are systematical-
ly lower in hazard rates than January throughout the 12 years, despite a bit difference 
in magnitude. Heterogeneity across regions is still little for both periods. The back-
ward and forward looking feature becomes stronger and more significant in period 3, 
compared to period 2. The cross-sectional difference by sector is also more conspicu-
ous in period 3, which reflects the speciality in services sectors. Also, there are higher 
effects for services sectors than those for goods sectors, in level of price, percentage 
change of price, sales and market share. This phenomenon implies that services sec-
tors are less competitive than goods sectors, given that the services sectors have 
stronger state dependent price setting feature and higher pricing power. 
Energy is a special sector in goods sectors, and it has a different  h t . Instead of Jan-
uary, energy price is more likely to be reset in October and May, which may reflect 
the seasonality of demand in energy. As shown in Table 15, all the region dummies 
are insignificant for period 3, which implies that the price setting behaviour in energy 
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market is more and more integrated across the UK. However, energy price of period 3 
is no longer significantly affected by interest rate, but it now negatively reacts to the 
current wage change. The effect of oil price is still strong and significant. The only 
change in microeconomic covariates is the shop type which is insignificant, because a 
smaller retailer can just follow the price change in other retailers. 
To summarise the findings in semiparametric analysis, there are three key features. 
Firstly, both time dependent and state dependent features are found in price setting 
behaviour. Goods sectors are more state dependent, while services sectors are more 
time dependent. Second, both backward looking and forward looking are used in state 
dependent feature. Third, there is evidence of cross-sectional but little time-series het-
erogeneities in  h t , since the changes over time are mainly in the magnitude of coef-
ficients rather than in direction. 
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6.3. Parametric Analysis 
In fact, semiparametric analysis is the most reliable approach in analysing price set-
ting behaviour, because of its flexibility in  0h t . However, if the shape of  0h t  is 
known to some extent, an adventure can be done on specifying  0h t  by a certain dis-
tribution, as in parametric analysis. 
There are two equivalent ways of parametric analysis, namely, proportional hazard 
(PH) model and accelerated failure time (AFT) model. The key difference is the de-
pendent variable on the left hand side of the model. The PH model uses hazard rate as 
dependent variable, so it is very similar to Cox model. By contrast, the AFT model 
puts failure time on the left hand side. In fact, the two models generate exactly the 
same conclusions for Weibull distribution, so only PH model estimations are reported. 
The results can be easily compare with the semiparametric analysis. 
6.3.1. Model Specification 
There are two important differences in model specification between parametric analy-
sis and semiparametric analysis. On the one hand, the semiparametric analysis leaves 
 0h t  unspecified, while in semiparametric analysis a specific distribution for  0h t  
has to be assumed ex ante. Two popular candidates are exponential distribution and 
Weibull distribution. In fact, the former is just a special case of the later, because ex-
ponential distribution implies a horizontal  0h t , while  0h t  implied by Weibull dis-
tribution could be increasing, decreasing or constant.  
On the other hand, some cycle dummies have to be added to the parametric model. It 
is obviously biased if the spikes in  0h t , as found in nonparametric and semipara-
metric analysis, are ignored. To capture the spiky feature, the model includes cycle 
dummies measured in analysis time, from 4-month to 60-month by 4 months. It also 
includes a 1-month dummy to reflect the high hazard rate in the first month. Now, the 
covariates from time dimensions ix  also include these extra cycle dummies, while 
keeping the rest three sets of covariates iviiiii xxx ,,  unchanged. 
Like semiparametric analysis, a pooled PH model is conducted for all the sectors and 
all the years first, and then the separate PH models by sector and by period are esti-
mated to take into account the cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneities. Since 
Weibull distribution is more general, exponential distribution results are only reported 
in pooled model. All the other separate models use Weibull specification.  
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Table 17 Estimation Results of Pooled and Separate PH Model by Sector (Part A) 
   Pooled Goods sectors Services sectors 
Energy Communication 
   Exponential Weibull excl. Energy excl. Comm. 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
T
im
e 
D
im
en
si
o
n
 
C
a
le
n
d
a
r 
M
o
n
th
 
February -0.3194** -0.3547** -0.2631** -0.6543** -0.4754** -0.4432 
March -0.2283** -0.2692** -0.2322** -0.3543**  0.0131  0.0743 
April -0.1343** -0.1531** -0.1345** -0.2981**  0.6072**  0.2659 
May -0.1464** -0.1188** -0.1552** -0.0468*  0.9750** -0.1167 
June -0.2088** -0.1666** -0.1358** -0.2697**  0.3993**  0.0167 
July -0.1420** -0.0936**  0.0028 -0.5154**  0.7915**  0.2429 
August -0.3366** -0.3028** -0.2058** -0.7181**  0.3442**  0.1320 
September -0.3316** -0.2810** -0.2202** -0.6114**  0.6360** -0.4764 
October -0.2445** -0.2249** -0.1844** -0.4672**  0.9258**  0.2427 
November -0.2806** -0.2683** -0.2176** -0.5269**  0.5567** -0.0499 
December -0.3010** -0.2945** -0.1942** -0.7383**  0.2361*  0.5180 
C
y
cl
e 
D
u
m
m
ie
s 
1-month  0.5931**  2.0112**  2.0279**  1.5295**  2.7890**  1.9298** 
4-month  0.2151**  0.5825**  0.4763**  0.8592**  0.6888**  0.4138** 
8-month  0.0197 -0.0125 -0.2063**  0.4651** -0.6233** -0.8658** 
12-month  0.3698**  0.1111** -0.4777**  1.0503** -1.0035** -0.9151* 
16-month -0.0772** -0.5205** -0.8575**  0.2832** -1.5053** -2.2151* 
20-month -0.1986** -0.7607** -1.0442** -0.0513 -1.5788** -1.1524 
24-month -0.0789** -0.7434** -1.2208**  0.2283** -1.8549** – 
28-month -0.2326** -0.9926** -1.2978** -0.1705** -1.9636** – 
32-month -0.4413** -1.2731** -1.6025** -0.4438** -2.2028** – 
36-month -0.1697** -1.0679** -1.4272** -0.1398 -2.1252** – 
40-month -0.4558** -1.4210** -1.9398** -0.2018 -2.6930** – 
44-month -0.4855** -1.4966** -1.9103** -0.4252** – – 
48-month -0.6784** -1.7450** -2.3532** -0.3016 – – 
52-month -0.3775* -1.4712** -1.6271** -0.7695* – – 
56-month -0.9674** -2.1198** -3.2415** -0.2770 – – 
60-month -1.6140** -2.7661** -2.9717** -1.3773 – – 
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Table 18 Estimation Results of Pooled and Separate PH Model by Sector (Part B) 
  Pooled Goods sectors Services sectors 
Energy Communication 
  Exponential Weibull excl. Energy excl. Comm. 
C
o
v
a
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s 
fr
o
m
 
M
a
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ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 D
im
e
n
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n
 
Inflation t  0.0035  0.0102  0.0106 -0.1206**  0.2956**  0.2117 
Inflation t-1  0.0598**  0.0899**  0.0994**  0.1274**  0.7857**  1.0227** 
Inflation t+1 -0.0997** -0.0801** -0.0819** -0.0705* -0.1003 -0.4622 
Interest Rate (∆) t -0.0778** -0.0929** -0.0911** -0.1584**  0.1657 -0.0959 
Interest Rate (∆) t-1  0.1232**  0.1035**  0.0564**  0.2732**  0.0850 -0.0616 
Interest Rate (∆) t+1 -0.1635** -0.1906** -0.1716** -0.1540** -0.6182** -0.1439 
Wage (%∆) t  0.0066 -0.0519** -0.1005**  0.1407** -0.3842**  0.7144* 
Wage (%∆) t-1  0.0097  0.0027  0.0454** -0.1248** -0.0985 -0.3070 
Wage (%∆) t+1  0.0729**  0.0144  0.0172  0.1187** -0.2577** -0.1980 
Oil Price (%∆) t -0.0050** -0.0052** -0.0001 -0.0252**  0.0083** -0.0333 
Oil Price (%∆) t-1 -0.0020* -0.0011** -0.0061**  0.0222**  0.0120**  0.0238 
Oil Price (%∆) t+1  0.0050**  0.0002**  0.0013  0.0040  0.0057** -0.0115 
C
o
v
a
r
ia
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
M
ic
ro
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o
n
o
m
ic
 D
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Alcoholic/Beverage  0.0338**  0.0936**  0.1440** – – – 
Energy  0.5854**  0.6557** – – – – 
Non-Energy -0.3188** -0.3205** -0.3178** – – – 
Housing -0.6793** -0.7376** – – – – 
Transport/Travel -0.7123** -0.7529** –  0.0268 – – 
Communication -0.2257** -0.1450** – – – – 
Recreation/Personal -0.6063** -0.6436** –  0.1594** – – 
Miscellaneous -0.6531** -0.6526** –  0.0756** – – 
Independent Shop -0.0879** -0.1014** -0.0713** -0.2027** -0.0399 -0.3259** 
Price  0.0002**  0.0003**  0.0003**  0.0006**  0.0044**  0.0043** 
Price (%∆)   0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0006**  0.0079**  0.0020 
Sales  1.0216**  1.1026**  1.0993**  1.3488**  0.4539**  1.1861** 
Market Share  2.7265**  2.7881**  0.5325**  3.4474**  1.9090**  2.2431* 
Shape Parameter (Weibull) –  1.5622**  1.5806**  1.4221**  1.8979**  1.9055** 
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Table 19 Estimation Results of Separate PH Model by Period (Part A) 
   
Goods sectors 
excluding Energy 
Services sectors 
excluding Communication 
Energy 
   All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
T
im
e 
D
im
en
si
o
n
 
C
a
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r 
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n
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February -0.2631** -0.2159** -0.2571** -0.6543** -0.5222** -0.7181** -0.4754** -0.3344 -0.0799 
March -0.2322** -0.1878** -0.2253** -0.3543** -0.2913** -0.3391**  0.0131  0.1698  1.0416** 
April -0.1345** -0.2579** -0.0440 -0.2981** -0.3897** -0.2543**  0.6072**  0.6972**  1.9140** 
May -0.1552** -0.2730**  0.1487** -0.0468* -0.1178** -0.1675**  0.9750**  1.1322**  1.4980** 
June -0.1358** -0.1992**  0.0618* -0.2697** -0.3577** -0.1261*  0.3993**  0.3659*  1.3788** 
July  0.0028  0.0155  0.0754* -0.5154** -0.5198** -0.4232**  0.7915**  0.9614**  1.8619** 
August -0.2058** -0.1246**  0.1497** -0.7181** -0.4322** -0.7133**  0.3442**  0.5202**  1.3933** 
September -0.2202** -0.0440* -0.0871** -0.6114** -0.5157** -0.3340**  0.6360**  1.0611**  0.8692** 
October -0.1844** -0.1002** -0.1128** -0.4672** -0.3632** -0.2682**  0.9258**  1.0020**  1.4791** 
November -0.2176** -0.0357  0.1830** -0.5269** -0.4361** -0.1489*  0.5567**  0.4522**  0.8182* 
December -0.1942** -0.2280** -0.0619* -0.7383** -0.8757** -0.3648**  0.2361* -0.2114 -0.2943 
C
y
cl
e 
D
u
m
m
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1-month  2.0279**  2.0653**  2.1481**  1.5295**  1.3990**  1.9616**  2.7890**  3.8131**  2.9210** 
4-month  0.4763**  0.4604**  0.3283**  0.8592**  0.9272**  0.6391**  0.6888**  0.8265**  0.2203 
8-month -0.2063** -0.3308** -0.3838**  0.4651**  0.5375**  0.2595** -0.6233** -0.3514** -0.9519** 
12-month -0.4777** -0.5717** -0.5711**  1.0503**  1.0104**  0.8959** -1.0035** -0.9908** -0.6322** 
16-month -0.8575** -0.9338** -0.9338**  0.2832**  0.3117**  0.0869 -1.5053** -1.2959** -2.0951** 
20-month -1.0442** -1.2359** -1.3729** -0.0513 -0.1618** -0.1986** -1.5788** -1.6834** -1.3487** 
24-month -1.2208** -1.2002** -1.4467**  0.2283**  0.0576  0.2334** -1.8549** -2.0820** -2.3448** 
28-month -1.2978** -1.3477** -1.3526** -0.1705** -0.1163 -0.4561** -1.9636** -2.4717 -1.7714* 
32-month -1.6025** -1.7901** -1.9087** -0.4438** -0.5492** -0.3159* -2.2028** -2.3295** -14.7168 
36-month -1.4272** -1.3698** -1.6007** -0.1398 -0.3324*  0.0740 -2.1252** -1.8527** -14.4069 
40-month -1.9398** -2.3287** -1.3706** -0.2018 -0.4692* -0.6803* -2.6930** -2.4551* – 
44-month -1.9103** -2.2903** -1.0820** -0.4252** -0.9531** -0.4478 – – – 
48-month -2.3532** -2.2425** – -0.3016 -0.4681 – – – – 
52-month -1.6271** -2.2142** – -0.7695* -1.2622 – – – – 
56-month -3.2415** -4.0450** – -0.2770 -1.1309 – – – – 
60-month -2.9717** -3.7135** – -1.3773 -13.2547 – – – – 
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Table 20 Estimation Results of Separate PH Model by Period (Part B) 
  
Goods sectors 
excluding Energy 
Services sectors 
excluding Communication 
Energy 
  All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 All Period 2 Period 3 
C
o
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r
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m
 
M
a
cr
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 D
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Inflation t  0.0106  0.1709**  0.1325** -0.1206** -0.3564** -0.3399**  0.2956** -0.1811  1.5011** 
Inflation t-1  0.0994**  0.2108**  0.0846*  0.1274**  0.2449**  0.1829*  0.7857**  0.3415** -0.2531 
Inflation t+1 -0.0819** -0.0795** -0.1889** -0.0705* -0.2649** -0.5371** -0.1003  0.4214 -0.0294 
Interest Rate (∆) t -0.0911** -0.2332** -0.8069** -0.1584** -0.2998** -0.8059**  0.1657  0.0377** -1.6884** 
Interest Rate (∆) t-1  0.0564**  0.0058 -0.0123  0.2732**  0.1592*  0.3708**  0.0850  0.9907** -0.6045 
Interest Rate (∆) t+1 -0.1716** -0.1804** -0.5811** -0.1540** -0.3391** -0.9236** -0.6182** -0.6612 -1.4259** 
Wage (%∆) t -0.1005** -0.1122**  0.0018  0.1407**  0.0316  0.4178** -0.3842**  0.0985 -2.4761** 
Wage (%∆) t-1  0.0454**  0.0300  0.6389** -0.1248** -0.0093 -1.1258** -0.0985  0.1470 -0.4525 
Wage (%∆) t+1  0.0172  0.1289**  0.1619**  0.1187**  0.1672**  0.4309** -0.2577** -0.3522*  1.6205** 
Oil Price (%∆) t -0.0001 -0.0104** -0.0016 -0.0252** -0.0043 -0.0769**  0.0083**  0.0104  0.0210 
Oil Price (%∆) t-1 -0.0061** -0.0056** -0.0231**  0.0222**  0.0258**  0.0453**  0.0120**  0.0109  0.0718** 
Oil Price (%∆) t+1  0.0013  0.0254**  0.0065**  0.0040 -0.0602**  0.0221**  0.0057**  0.0356**  0.0327 
C
o
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Alcoholic/Beverage  0.1440**  0.1599**  0.1907** – – – – – – 
Energy – – – – – – – – – 
Non-Energy -0.3178** -0.3502** -0.2439** – – – – – – 
Housing – – – – – – – – – 
Transport/Travel – – –  0.0268 -0.0470  0.1280** – – – 
Communication – – – – – – – – – 
Recreation/Personal – – –  0.1594**  0.0778**  0.2692** – – – 
Miscellaneous – – –  0.0756**  0.0484  0.1138** – – – 
Independent Shop -0.0713** -0.0482** -0.0808** -0.2027** -0.1898** -0.2441** -0.0399 -0.0752** -0.0215 
Price  0.0003**  0.0002**  0.0002**  0.0006**  0.0007**  0.0006**  0.0044**  0.0053**  0.0039** 
Price (%∆)   0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0027**  0.0006**  0.0005**  0.0021**  0.0079**  0.0246**  0.0068** 
Sales  1.0993**  1.1183**  1.1021**  1.3488**  1.3890**  1.1769**  0.4539**  0.6216**  0.4584** 
Market Share  0.5325**  3.9004**  2.9668**  3.4474**  2.7473**  4.8835**  1.9090**  8.7467**  12.332** 
Shape Parameter (Weibull)  1.5806**  1.6398** 1.6369**  1.4221**  1.4750**  1.5213**  1.8979**  2.2195**  2.1772** 
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6.3.2. Pooled PH Model 
The pooled regression is to summarise the overall feature of price setting behaviour in 
the whole economy. The resulting  0h t  is the pure relationship between price reset-
ting probability and time, after controlling other factors. To model  0h t , both expo-
nential and Weibull distribution are tried. The latter is more general and flexible, 
since the former has an extra restriction on the shape parameter. If exponential distri-
bution is correct, then the estimated shape parameter in Weibull distribution should be 
close to 1. However, it turns out to be significantly different from 1. Thus, Weibull 
distribution is preferred to model  0h t , and it is used for estimating the separate PH 
models. 
As shown in Table 17 and Table 18, the estimated coefficients are close to semipara-
metric analysis in Table 13 and Table 14, both in direction and in quantity. Though it 
does not mean these results are true, it still suggests that inclusion of the cycle dum-
mies in parametric analysis does make the model comparable with semiparametric 
analysis. This section will only focus on the cycle dummies added to the PH model. 
Note that the covariates from space dimension, i.e. region dummies, are omitted in the 
reported estimation results, because most of them turn out to be insignificant. 
Not surprisingly, the cycle dummy for 1-month has the highest effect on  h t , similar 
to the previously observed feature that there is a sharp decline in the first period  h t . 
There is an overall declining trend of cyclical effect, and it even goes negative after 
12-month cycle. It does not mean that  h t  is lower in these periods. Rather, this is 
because the discrepancy between actual  h t  and estimated  0h t . As shown earlier, 
the actual  h t  is downward sloping. However, the estimated shape of Weibull  0h t  
turns out to be upward sloping, since the shape parameter is greater than 1. Even for 
exponential  0h t , the slope is horizontal. The cyclical dummies for longer periods 
have to compensate for the increasing gap between the estimated  0h t  and the actual 
 h t . As a result, the cyclical effects are more and more negative. Nevertheless, com-
pared to the neighbourhood, 4-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-month and 52-month 
cycles tend to have relatively higher effect. This is consistent with the spiky features 
observed earlier.  
There are several drawbacks of parametric analysis. Apart from the inflexible shape 
of  0h t , it assumes that all the sectors share a common  0h t  throughout the sample 
period. The problem of inflexibility is common to all parametric PH models, but the 
second issue can be addressed by running separate estimations. 
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6.3.3. Separate PH Model by Sector 
Based on the previous findings, the whole economy is disaggregated into goods sec-
tors excluding energy, services sectors excluding communication, energy sector and 
communication sector. PH models for the 4 sectors are run separately, and reported 
with the pooled model in Table 17 and Table 18. 
For the covariates from time dimension, January is still the calendar month with the 
highest probability to reset prices for both goods sectors and services sectors. Con-
sistent to the semiparametric analysis, July is next to January for goods sectors, and 
April is ranked as the second highest for services sectors. This finding reinforces the 
explanations that summer sales and the beginning of a tax year have substantial effect 
on the price setting behaviour in goods sectors and services sectors respectively. Simi-
larly, October and May are still the two calendar months when energy sector is most 
likely to adjust the prices, though the rankings of the two months are reversed. Also, 
there is no significant seasonality for communication sector, suggesting a very fast 
change and short product life cycle in this market. 
The estimated coefficients of cycle dummies for goods sectors do not exhibit a clear 
cyclical manner, since the estimated coefficients decrease in a monotonic way. In con-
trast, those for services sectors jump around every 12 months. (Figure 18) This corre-
sponds to the previous conclusion that goods sectors contribute to the decreasing 
component of  h t , and services sectors account for the cyclical component. 
As indicated earlier, the other covariates have almost the same estimated coefficients 
as those in semiparametric analysis. Due to the inflexible and unrealistic restriction of 
 0h t , the coefficients are less credible than those obtained in semiparametric analysis. 
However, one interesting result of running parametric models is the estimated shape 
parameter of Weibull distribution. This shape parameter determines what  0h t  looks 
like, after controlling for all the covariates. If it is equal to 1, then there is a flat  0h t , 
which is in fact an exponential distribution. If the shape parameter is less than 1, 
 0h t  is decreasing. If it is greater than 1, then there is an upward sloping  0h t . In 
our case, all the sectors, including the pooled model, have upward sloping  0h t , 
which are graphed in Figure 19. Goods sectors are quite close to the pooled model, 
while services sectors have a very flat (close to 1)  0h t . Communication sector 
seems to have the highest slope, and the hazard rate is almost equal to 1 at 18 months‘ 
time. This is consistent with the results obtained in previous sections. 
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Figure 18 Estimated Coefficients of Cycle Dummies of Retailer Price 
 
Figure 19 Estimated Weibull Baseline Hazard Functions by Sector (Retailer) 
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The upward sloping  0h t  found in parametric analysis seems to be contradictory to 
the semiparametric analysis, where all  0h t  are found downward sloping. However, 
this might be an illusionary discrepancy, because the graphs only show the first 72 
months for nonparametric analysis and 48 months for semiparametric analysis. If the 
complete time horizon is shown,  h t  in any cases will eventually increase to 1, since 
all prices will finally change. Only the first 72 months are graphed because the sur-
vived prices become less as time gets longer, and the standard errors of the estimated 
hazard rates get greater. Moreover, it is a general consensus in the literature to show 
 h t  only in the first several years, cutting the wild end out. For example, Álvarez & 
Hernando (2004) and Aucremanne & Dhyne (2005) keep 36 months, while Bunn & 
Ellis (2009) only keep 24 months. Though all  h t  tend to grow in the end, the para-
metric analysis still fails to capture the declining feature at the beginning. 
6.3.4. Separate PH Model by Period 
The estimated results of separate PH model by period are presented in Table 19 and 
Table 20, omitting the results of covariates from space dimension, i.e. region dum-
mies iix . The estimated coefficients are again qualitatively consistent with the Cox 
model but quantitatively different. This section will only focus on the implied  0h t  
of the two subperiods, which reveal additional information about heterogeneity. 
The first thing noticed in Figure 20 is that both sectors in the two subperiods have 
 0h t  significantly higher than that estimated for all periods. This is mainly due to the 
shorter length of the two periods. For the whole sample, there are 144 months, but 
there are only 79 months for period 2 and 48 months for period 3. More price spells 
will be right censored in the two subperiods, and the average length of duration will 
be shorter. That implies the estimated  0h t  will accordingly be higher, due to over-
sampling of short price spells.  
Though the estimation by period is biased in the absolute sense, it is still sensible to 
conclude that there is little time-series heterogeneity based on the relative position 
between  0h t  for the two subperiods. Also similar to previous results, goods sectors 
(excluding energy) have consistently higher hazard rates than services sectors (ex-
cluding communication), after controlling for other covariates. 
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Figure 20 Estimated Weibull Baseline Hazard Functions by Period (Retailer) 
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7. Comparison between Methods 
Two important issues are studied in price setting behaviour, based on microdata for 
retailers in the UK. The first is the measure of rigidity focusing on the outcome of 
price setting behaviour. Both conventional and cross-sectional methods are used, but 
the new method (DAF) is preferred due to its unbiasedness. The second issue is  h t  
focusing on the mechanism of price setting behaviour, which generates the price dura-
tion. All the three types of models in nonparametric, semiparametric, and parametric 
analyses are covered, but semiparametric analysis is preferred due to its efficiency 
and flexibility. 
Note that one can always derive the predicted duration for each product after estima-
tion of survival analysis models. To make different methods comparable, duration is 
appropriate as a unified connecting link between different methods. The five methods 
employed across this paper are compared in terms of duration in Table 21. 
Table 21 Comparison between Methods to Measure Retailer Price Rigidity 
Method Overall Goods sectors Services sectors 
Conventional Method 
(derived from frequency) 
5.5165 4.1374  11.3826  
Cross-Sectional Method 
(directly estimated DAF) 
9.3460  7.4287  11.3803 
Nonparametric Analysis 
(predicted from model) 
6.9063  5.2155  12.1521  
Semiparametric Analysis 
(predicted from model) 
9.6181  7.4664  11.1098  
Parametric Analysis 
(predicted from model) 
10.4289  8.8361  14.7224  
As indicated earlier, conventional method results in underestimation of duration, due 
to the oversampling of short spells. The new measure DAF is a cross-sectional meth-
od of duration, estimated directly from data, so it is the most reliable estimate of dura-
tion, among all the five methods. Thus, DAF is used as the true estimate of duration. 
In nonparametric analysis, the expected duration can be derived using standard defini-
tion of expectation, based on estimated  h t . The result should be close to mean DAF, 
since they are both unbiased estimates of the same thing. However, it turns out to be 
6.9063 months, lower than the mean DAF 9.3460 months, but higher than the conven-
tional method 5.5165 months. This is because nonparametric analysis only uses one 
spell out of the whole trajectory for each product. The problem of inefficiency may 
lead to the difference between true and estimated durations, though it is still unbiased. 
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In semiparametric analysis, the mean duration can also be obtained based on the pre-
dicted hazard rates from the estimated Cox models. As shown in Table 21, the result-
ing durations are very close to those of DAF, implying a strong support for semipar-
ametric analysis. Indeed, it is the most appropriate method in survival analysis, and 
two advantages make it outperform nonparametric and parametric analyses. Namely, 
it is both more efficient in using data (efficiency), and more flexible in model specifi-
cation (unbiasedness).  
In parametric analysis, the derived durations are a bit longer, compared to DAF. That 
is because the restricted assumption on  0h t  leads to biasedness in predicted dura-
tions. As seen from nonparametric or semiparametric analyses,  h t  has a complicat-
ed shape, which is difficult to be characterised by any known function form. Though 
only two candidates, exponential and Weibull distributions, are reported in this paper, 
the problem exists for all functions with analytical closed form in parametric analysis. 
To summarise, nonparametric analysis is unbiased but inefficient, parametric analysis 
is efficient but biased, while semiparametric analysis is both unbiased and efficient. It 
also gives very close estimate of durations to the true value, as suggested by DAF. If 
one only focuses on the outcome of price setting behaviour, DAF is the best choice. If 
one wants to study the mechanism of price setting behaviour, then semiparametric 
analysis is the most appropriate method. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper addresses two aspects, i.e. outcome and mechanism, of price setting behav-
iour for the retailers in the UK. The cross-sectional DAF methodology is applied for 
the first issue and survival analysis methodology for the second.  
There are three important stylised facts on the first issue, which is actually to measure 
the rigidity of price change. 
(i) The overall mean duration is 9.3 months in terms of DAF, much longer 
than the conventional method 5.5 months implied from the frequency. This 
suggests a strong evidence of rigidity in retailer‘s price setting behaviour, 
different from other studies based on the conventional method. 
(ii) There is little support for rigidity in direction of price change, but the re-
sults do show evidence for rigidity in magnitude of price change. In other 
words, price faces the same rigidity to rise or fall, but it tends to end with 
attractive numbers and change by fixed proportion. 
(iii) Significant cross-sectional heterogeneity is observed by sector and by shop 
type, while little regional difference or time-series heterogeneity is found. 
Goods sectors tend to be more flexible than services sectors, while multi-
ple shops change prices more frequently than independent shops. 
Apart from the stylised facts on rigidity, another important conclusion is drawn in the 
descriptive statistics. That is, the distribution of DAF directly estimated from data is 
very close to that indirectly derived from distribution of age according to the formula 
proposed by Dixon (2010). 
There are also three important findings on the second issue, which is actually to iden-
tify the factors that influence retailers‘ price setting behaviour. 
(i) The hazard function can be decomposed into decreasing component from 
goods sectors and the cyclical component from services sectors. Moreover, 
there are major cycles of 12 months and minor cycles of 4 months. 
(ii) January is the calendar month with the highest hazard rate of price change, 
followed by April and August for different sectors. This is consistent with 
time dependent models with Taylor feature. 
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(iii) Both backward looking and forward looking expectations are used in eval-
uating the effects of macroeconomic state. Retailers are also sensitive to 
changes in microeconomic state. This supports state dependent models. 
The findings on heterogeneities overlap those in descriptive statistics, but with more 
detailed explanations. For example, input intensity is introduced to interpret the dif-
ferent coefficients for different sectors. Regional difference is still insignificant after 
controlling for other covariates, suggesting a uniform pricing strategy across UK. In 
adventuring on parametric models, a monotonically increasing  0h t  is found, which 
is decreasing initially in other analyses. One cannot make too much out of this result 
because the restriction of parametric analysis is liable to bias the estimation. 
A comparison is made in terms of mean duration among the five methods. The con-
clusion is that DAF, as the best estimate of duration, is preferred in studying the out-
come of price setting behaviour, while semiparametric analysis, as the unbiased and 
efficient estimate of hazard function, is preferred in studying the mechanism of price 
setting behaviour. The two methods give similar results in mean duration, so either 
could be used to calibrate or confront with the macroeconomic models. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity and Rigidity of  
Producer Firm’s Price Setting Behaviour① 
 
 
                                                 
① This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and reproduced with the 
permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen‘s Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical 
data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analy-
sis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National 
Statistics aggregates. 
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1. Introduction 
The retailers are closely interacting with producers in price setting. This chapter will 
focus on the producer price setting behaviour to paint a complete picture of how firms 
set prices in the whole economy, because the producers play an indispensible role in 
price rigidity and shock persistence in macroeconomic models. 
On the one hand, as being in the earlier stage (upstream) in the supply chain, some 
producers (e.g. energy goods firms) are facing more volatile input prices, so the pro-
ducer prices tend to be more flexible for these sectors, as in Nakamura & Steinsson 
(2008) for US, Vermeulen et al. (2007) for EU and Bunn & Ellis (2009) for UK. The 
producer price change absorbs some effects from structural shocks. In this sense, the 
producers act as a ―buffer‖ for the retailers against the fluctuations in resource prices. 
Hence, the producers make the retailer price rigidity even greater. 
On the other hand, the effect of macroeconomic shocks will have more persistent ef-
fect, if producers provide an additional channel of propagating the shocks. The pro-
ducers then act as a ―container‖ for the retailers to prolong the effect of shocks. Thus, 
the producers make the response of the economy to shocks more persistent. There is 
another possible scope to use producer prices, given that there is a subtle link between 
price and wage setting behaviour. Since producers are mainly manufacturers, labour is 
an important input. A change in wage is usually accompanied by a change in producer 
price to reflect the production costs. There are no wage microdata ready for use, so 
the producer prices are useful to draw informative inference on wage setting behav-
iour. It can then be used to calibrate macroeconomic models. 
This chapter does not differ from the previous chapter in structure. Both conventional 
and cross-sectional methods are used to study the outcome of price setting behaviour, 
while survival analysis is employed to investigate the mechanism of price setting be-
haviour, taking various factors into account, especially the degree of competition and 
friction. Systematic comparisons between retailers and producers are made. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the methodologies, with 
emphasis on the difference from the previous chapter. Section 3 describes and com-
pares the microdata of retailer and producer prices. Price rigidity is measured by both 
conventional and cross-sectional methods in Section 4 and Section 5, while Section 6 
applies survival analysis to model the producer price setting behaviour. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2. Methodology 
This chapter follows the same methodology and terminology established in the previ-
ous chapter to study the producer price data. Since this chapter only focuses on the 
producer or wholesaler firm‘s price setting behaviour, the terms ―firm‖ and ―produc-
er‖ are interchangeably used in this chapter. 
2.1. Cross-Sectional Method 
Firstly, to descriptively summarise the outcome of the producer‘s price setting behav-
iour, i.e. the price change, both traditional and cross-sectional methods are used. The 
results give different implications to the rigidity of the economy in the early stage of 
supply chain. Again, cross-sectional method is preferred due to its robustness to over-
sampling in short price spells. 
There is a complicated panel structure for producer price dataset. Each producer has 
several products, and the entire series of price quotes over the sample period for each 
product is termed as a ―price trajectory‖. Each price trajectory is then made of several 
price spells, and each price spell contains several consecutively constant price quotes 
over the price duration of that price spell.  
To study the economy-wide price setting behaviour, essentially it is to study how the 
cross-section of products behaves over time. Thus, it is the price trajectory, rather than 
price spell, that should be the basic unit. It is because one price trajectory corresponds 
to only one product, but there may be many price spells belonging to one product. If 
price spell is regarded as the basic unit, products with short duration of spells will be 
oversampled, and it is obviously unfair to products with longer duration of price spells. 
2.2. Survival Analysis Method 
The second question, in contrast, is to investigate the mechanism of the producer‘s 
price setting behaviour, i.e. factors affecting the price change. Survival analysis ap-
proaches (nonparametric and semiparametric) are applied and compared. One differ-
ence from the previous chapter lies in the econometric models specified in semipara-
metric analysis. Since producers tend to have higher market power in price setting, 
they are more responsive to the change in their demand curves, which can be reflected 
in the firms‘ market shares. Based on this feature, the models include both market 
share within industry and market share across economy to capture the detailed mech-
anism. 
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3. Data 
The microdata used in this chapter are individual price quotes of goods bought and 
sold by UK manufacturers, underlying the construction of Producer Price Indices (PPI) 
including both output PPI (the prices of output produced by manufacturers for sale) 
and input PPI (the prices of input purchased by manufacturers)
①
. On the one hand, 
output PPI, commonly known as ―factory gate‖ prices, measures the price level at the 
wholesaler‘s level, in contrast to CPI/RPI at retailer level. It gives extra information 
of the price setting behaviour in the early stage of supply chain. On the other hand, 
input PPI provides important information about the input markets, which complement 
the knowledge of output markets. It enables econometricians to draw a complete im-
plication of price setting behaviour in the entire economy, and also enables macroe-
conomists to calibrate DSGE models with nominal rigidities in both markets. 
The producer data has a panel structure. Each producer firm has several products, and 
for each product the entire series of price quotes over the sample period is termed as a 
―price trajectory‖. Each price trajectory is then made of several price spells, and each 
price spell consists of several price quotes constant over that duration. To illustrate, 
the following graph gives a simple example of the price trajectory of a hypothesised 
product, which is under observation for 10 periods, from 0t   to 10t  . Accordingly, 
there are 11 price quotes ( tP ) for this price trajectory. A price change defines the end 
of a price spell, i.e. at 3,5,6,10t  , resulting in 4 price spells in this trajectory. The 
corresponding durations of the spells are respectively 3, 2, 1 and 4. 
 
To study the economy-wide price setting behaviour, it is essentially to study how the 
cross-section of products behaves over time. Thus, the price trajectory, rather than 
price spell, is the basic unit in this paper. It is because one product only has one price 
                                                 
① Richardson, I. 2000. "Producer Price Indices: Principles and Procedures," In Government Statistical 
Service Methodology Series. ONS. 
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trajectory, while there may be many price spells belonging to one product. It will re-
sult in oversampling of short spells if price spell is treated as the basic unit. 
Each price quote in the data represents the price of a particular product for a particular 
producer in a given month. Monthly price movements outside the range -25% to 25% 
are regarded as ―incredible‖ by ONS and are not used if the contributing firms fail to 
confirm. This paper follows this treatment. After filtering out the improper observa-
tions, there are 822,579 price quotes finally being used in the clean data, spanning 122 
months from 1998m1 to 2008m2. 
3.1. Data Collection 
Around 9,000 price quotes are collected monthly by statutory survey from some 4,000 
firms. In addition, some prices are obtained from administrative sources, such as other 
government departments and trade publications. There is no direct price collection of 
input prices from firms. Output PPI is used as proxy to calculate the input PPI
①
.  
Here, a price quote can be denoted by , , , ,i j k s tP , where the subscripts tskji ,,,,  unique-
ly identify the producer, product, industry, division and time of any price quote. Ac-
cordingly, jN  is the total number of price quotes (i.e. producers) in product j  for in-
dustry k , kN  is the total number of products for industry k , sN  is the total number 
of industries for division s , and tN  is the total number of divisions for period t . For 
example, , , , ,i j k s tP  could be the price of frozen potato ( j ) produced by producer ( i ), 
which belongs to potato industry ( k ) and food division ( s ) in 2000m1 ( t ). Given 
these price quotes, there are 4 steps to calculate PPI, similar to CPI/RPI. 
Step 1: 6-Digit
②
 Product Index ( E tskjI ,,, ) is obtained for each product j  by weighted 
( , , , ,
P
i j k s tw ) mean of price relatives, where the price relative is the current price of a 
product divided by its price in the base year: , , , , , , , , , , , ,/i j k s t i j k s t i j k s bp P P .  
Step 2: 4-Digit Industry Index ( I tskI ,, ) is obtained across the products within an in-
dustry based on 6-digit product indices E tskjI ,,,  and product weights 
E
tskw ,, . 
Step 3: 2-Digit Division Index ( StsI , ) is obtained across industries within a division 
based on 4-digit industry indices I tskI ,,  and industry weights 
I
tskw ,, .  
Step 4: Aggregate Index ( AtI ) for a month is obtained across divisions based on divi-
sion indices StsI ,  and division weights 
S
tsw , . 
                                                 
① Morris, L. and T. Birch. 2001. "Introducing a New Estimator for the Producer Price Index." 
Economic Trends, 573, pp. 63-71. 
② 6-digit product group is defined by the European ―Classification of Products by Activity‖ (CPA). 
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3.2. Weight 
The 4 steps above to obtain the aggregate indices need 4 weights
①
 corresponding to 
each step, i.e. the producer weight P tskjiw ,,,, , product weight 
E
tskw ,, , industry weight 
I
tskw ,,  and division weight 
S
tsw , . In particular, the producer weight 
P
tskjiw ,,,,  is the value 
of the reporting producer‘s sales of products within the 6-digit product relative to the 
sales of products within the product of other reporting producers included in the sam-
ple. Information on the value of a reporting producer‘s sales of products is based on 
the PRODCOM
②
 survey by Eurostat. The process for the aggregate indices can then 
be summarised into one big formula: 
, , , , , , , ,
1
, , ,
1
, , , ,
1
, ,
1
, , ,
1
,
1
, ,
1
,
1
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
1 1
j
k
j
s
k
t
s
t
t s
N
P
N i j k s t i j k s t
E i
j k s t N
j P
N i j k s t
I i
k s t N
Ek
j k s tN
jS
s t N
Is
k s t
A k
t N
S
s t
s
S I E P
s t k s t j k s t i j k s t
N N
S I E
s t k s t j k s t
s k
w p
w
w
w
w
w
w
I
w
w w w w
w w w








 




  

 








 
, , , ,
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
1 1
i j k s t
jt s k
jk
NN N N
i j k s tNN
s k j i P
i j k s t
j i
p
w

   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 

 
 
The aggregate indices can be interpreted as a weighted average of price quotes, with a 
―grand weight‖ tskji ,,,,  specific to each observation: 
, , , , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1
jt s k
S I E P
s t k s t j k s t i j k s t
i j k s t NN N N
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s k j i
w w w w
w w w w

   
  

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, where 1
1 1 1 1
,,,, 
   
t s k jN
s
N
k
N
j
N
i
tskji  
                                                 
① Morris, L. and J. Gough. 2003. "Introducing a New Method to Calculate Index Weights for the 
Producer Price Indices." Economic Trends, 598, pp. 71-76. 
② PRODCOM is an acronym for ―Products of the European Community‖. 
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Thus, the big formula now becomes: 
 
   

t s k jN
s
N
k
N
j
N
i
tskjitskji
A
t pI
1 1 1 1
,,,,,,,,  
Accordingly, to study price duration, this cross-sectional ―grand weight‖ tskji ,,,,  will 
be used to calculate the weighted distribution of durations.  
Note that, for each product, in addition to this ―weight across economy‖ ( tskji ,,,, ), we 
can also define its ―weight within industry‖ (
, , , ,
I
i j k s t ). Both will be used in semipara-
metric model specifications. 
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3.3. Data Summary 
The clean data contains 23,781 price trajectories (products) containing 822,579 price 
quotes collected from 11,562 producers. Note that there is only manufacturing goods 
in the producer data. There is no services counterpart as in retailer data. This differ-
ence contributes to the observed higher flexibility in producer price later on, since 
goods prices are more flexible than services prices. The panel of price trajectories can 
be characterised in two dimensions: the variation in length and the variation by sector. 
On the one hand, the variation in length results from the unbalanced panel structure. 
As in retailer data, new products enter while old products exit the PPI baskets, so the 
lengths of price trajectories are different for each product. The table below gives the 
summary of price trajectory length (in month) in the producer price panel. 
Table 22 Descriptive Summary of Price Trajectory (Retailer V.S. Producer) 
 Mean 1% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 99% Obs. 
Retailer 20.72 1 3 7 14 30 46 95 612,173 
Producer 25.45 3 8 11 23 46 79 116 23,781 
The producer price trajectories tend to be much longer than the retailer price trajecto-
ries. It reflects that the early stage of the supply chain is more stable in product line, 
and the rotation of products is less frequent than that of retailer products.  
On average, the producer‘s products are under observation longer than 2 years. Simi-
lar to the retailer price trajectories, the mean length of producer price trajectories is 
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also higher than the median, so the distribution is slightly positively skewed. Thus, the 
right tail of the distribution is longer, and it has some very long price trajectories. 
On the other hand, the variation by sector is straightforward. The producers can be 
grouped into 6 main sectors, according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 
A more general distinction between ―consumption goods‖ and ―production goods‖ 
can also be drawn. Note that there are no services sectors in producer data. 
Table 23 Descriptive Summary of Producer Price Trajectory by Sector 
Sector Median Mean Obs. 
Consumption Goods    
Consumer Food Goods 22 25.24 3,815 
Consumer Durable Goods 20 26.67 1,493 
Consumer Non-Food Non-Durable Goods 20 24.84 3,909 
Production Goods    
Intermediate Goods 20 25.73 10,001 
Capital Goods 20 25.02 4,535 
Energy Goods 62 55.13 28 
Total 20 25.45  23,781 
Note that the intermediate goods sector is the largest group, since it includes all the 
gross products sold to the next stage in the supply chain. At the other end, the energy 
goods sector contains only 28 price trajectories, but their importance is considered by 
industry weights. 
Again, the price trajectories for producer data are longer than those for retailer data, 
whose median length is 14 months and mean length is 20.72 months. It suggests that 
most producers‘ products have a lifecycle around 2 years, describing the lifetime of a 
technology generation. An outlier is energy goods sector with a price trajectory 
around 4 years. This is not a surprise, because energy goods are mainly homogenous 
raw materials such as oil and coal, of which the product lines do not rotate frequently. 
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4. Conventional Method 
This section first presents the results following the conventional method and provides 
a comprehensive descriptive statistics of the three aspects of rigidity, including the 
frequency, direction and magnitude of price change. It will be shown that the produc-
er price seems more flexible than the retailer price if conventional method is used. 
This is due to two reasons: the oversampling of short price spells, and the heavy PPI 
weight given to energy goods which have a high frequency of price change. 
4.1. Rigidity in Frequency of Price Change 
4.1.1. Overall Frequency 
The descriptive statistics of the frequency of producer price change are summarised in 
Table 24, both unweighted and weighted. 
Table 24 Overall Frequency of Producer Price Change 
  Mean Median S.D. Skewness 
Unweighted 
Overall 17.70% 17.52% 0.01994 1.07070 
Increase 10.61% 10.50% 0.02048 0.75566 
Decrease 7.09% 7.15% 0.01096 -0.03169 
Weighted 
Overall 25.21% 25.01% 0.02376 0.03088 
Increase 15.26% 15.65% 0.03149 -0.24712 
Decrease 9.95% 9.84% 0.02637 0.26188 
The first striking feature is that the weighted frequencies are much higher than the 
unweighted frequencies. This is mainly due to the greater PPI weight
①
 given to energy 
goods (4.4%), compared to the unweighted trajectory percentage (28/23781=0.1%). 
As shown soon, the energy goods have a very high frequency of price change (mean 
84.2% and median 87.14%), pushing the overall frequency from 18% to 25%. 
A related feature is that the unweighted frequency is a bit lower than that of retailer 
price (mean 17.89% and median 17.54%). The weighted frequency, however, is much 
higher, compared to the retailer price (mean 18.63% and median 18.34%). The CPI 
weight
②
 assigned to energy goods (3.1%), while the unweighted trajectory percentage 
of energy goods is 11272/612173=1.8%. The high frequency of energy goods price 
(mean 47.38% and median 46.46%) does push the overall frequency of retailer price 
change up but relatively less.  
                                                 
① PPI division weight is based on Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). 
② CPI division weight is based on Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HHFCE). 
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Hence, the perceived difference between unweighted and weighted frequency can be 
explained by the relative difference between PPI weight and sample structure. Hence, 
the conclusions are quite different under weighted and unweighted treatment. In this 
chapter, the weighted results are preferred because (i) there is no doubt to consider the 
importance of energy goods in the economy; (ii) there are very few energy goods in 
the sample; and (iii) it is popular in related studies to use weighted frequency. Based 
on the conventional method, the producer price seems more flexible than retailer price. 
However, it is known from previous chapter that this is just an illusion due to the 
oversampling of short price spells. 
4.1.2. Time-Series Heterogeneity in Frequency of Price Change 
The frequency of price change varies across time, and this time-series heterogeneity 
can be seen from Figure 21. Two features are found: (i) some months (January and 
April have mean frequency higher than 20%) tend to have higher frequency, com-
pared to the other months; and (ii) the frequency is very volatile before 2001m1, but 
becomes relatively stable after that. It can again be explained by the fluctuations in 
the weights of energy goods and crude oil price, which is even more important for 
producer price setting behaviour. However, this subtle relation can only be specified 
in the semiparametric analysis. 
Figure 21 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Frequency of Producer Price 
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4.1.3. Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Frequency of Price Change 
There are also significant cross-sectional heterogeneities by sector. Similar to retail-
er‘s behaviour, a key cause for the different frequencies across sectors is degree of 
competition. The higher is competition, the less is rigidity and the higher is frequency 
of price change. Following the convention, the producers can be classified as con-
sumption goods sectors and production goods sectors.  
Figure 22 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Frequency by Sector (Producer) 
 
Within the consumption goods sectors, the food goods are more frequent (mean 
26.77% and median 25.86%) than durable and other consumption goods (both under 
15%). This result corresponds to the findings in retailer‘s behaviour, where the fre-
quency of the goods sectors is around 20%. This suggests that the retailers and pro-
ducers have synchronised price setting behaviour. As the link between retailing mar-
kets and wholesaling markets, the consumption goods retailers tend to change prices 
more frequently. 
Compared to the consumption goods sectors, production goods sectors are on average 
more frequent in price change, where intermediate goods are similar to food goods 
and capital goods are similar to durable goods.  
Again, there is a remarkable exception, i.e. energy goods, with an extremely high fre-
quency (mean 84.21% and median 87.14%). Almost all energy goods prices are ex-
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pected to change within 1 month. Given the high importance of energy goods in sup-
ply chain, this outlier plays a significant role in determining the aggregate producer 
price setting behaviour. As illustrated earlier, inclusion of energy goods will make a 
huge difference in overall frequency of price change in producer price. If energy 
goods are left out, the overall frequency will decrease from 25.21% to 19.47%, which 
would be a bit higher than but close to that of retailer price (18.63%). 
Another interesting comparison is that the frequency of retailer energy goods (mean 
63.86% and median 64.06%) is lower than that of producer energy goods (mean 
84.21% and median 87.14%). It is different from other goods, where retailing markets 
tend to have higher frequency than wholesaling markets. It could be due to the high 
volume of transactions and higher degree of competition in energy goods market, giv-
en its vital role in modern production. To see the importance of energy goods, it push-
es the frequency of producer price from below to above the frequency of retailer price. 
Both supply side and demand side of the energy goods market are large enough to 
compete against each other, with influences from international market. However, the 
retailing markets of energy goods are actually less competitive, and the energy goods 
retailers have more monopolistic market power.  
4.2. Rigidity in Direction of Price Change 
Another conclusion drawn from the frequency of price change is that price increases 
(15.26%) are more frequent than price decreases (9.95%), as shown in Figure 21. The 
higher proportion of increase results from the persistent inflation over time. Hence, it 
should not be regarded as an evidence for the so-called ―downward rigidity‖, which 
asserts that price is more difficult to adjust downward. The summary of increase ver-
sus decrease of price changes is presented in Table 25. Moreover, as shown in Figure 
23, the symmetry of the distribution of price change reinforces the conclusion that 
there is no downward or upward rigidity. 
Table 25 Direction of Producer Price Change 
  Mean Median S.D. Skewness 
Unweighted 
Overall 17.70% 17.52% 0.0199 1.0707 
Increase 10.61% 10.50% 0.0205 0.7556 
Decrease 7.09% 7.15% 0.0110 -0.0316 
Weighted 
Overall 25.21% 25.01% 0.0238 0.0309 
Increase 15.26% 15.65% 0.0315 -0.2471 
Decrease 9.95% 9.84% 0.0264 0.2619 
86 
 
4.3. Rigidity in Magnitude of Price Change 
Similar to the retailer‘s price setting behaviour, there is little rigidity in magnitude of 
price change. As shown in Figure 5, most price changes are around zero, and this fea-
ture does not change if energy goods are excluded. This supports the state dependent 
models. Among others, Rotemberg (2005) ―customer anger‖ model is quite appropri-
ate to explain this feature in the producer‘s scenario, since big price fluctuations tend 
to induce more customer loss. 
A remarkable difference of this distribution from retailer price change is that there are 
few percentage spikes. The distribution of magnitude of producer price change is 
smoother. Arguably, it makes sense for retailers to cut price by percentage, such as 
30% or 50%, during sales to attract customers. However, it seems not a popular strat-
egy for producers, especially when energy goods are excluded. As a result, the magni-
tude of producer price change is more precise and flexible. 
Figure 23 Distribution of Magnitude of Producer Price Change 
 
An immediate implication from Figure 23 is that the last decimal of producer prices 
must be less concentrated, compared to retailer prices. It is justified by Table 26, with 
―0‖ being the most likely last decimal, leaving the other decimals close to uniform 
distribution. Hence, ―attractive pricing‖ is less important for producers. 
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Table 26 Distribution of Last Decimal of Producer Price 
Last Decimal Example Percentage 
0 £9.50 39.67% 
1 £8.31 5.91% 
2 £7.62 5.67% 
3 £6.23 5.96% 
4 £5.04 6.83% 
5 £4.75 9.50% 
6 £3.86 5.68% 
7 £2.17 6.19% 
8 £1.48 6.37% 
9 £0.99 8.22% 
To summarise the findings by conventional methods, there seems to be less rigidity in 
frequency and magnitude of producer price change, compared to retailer price change. 
Little rigidity in neither direction nor magnitude of price change is found in both re-
tailer and producer prices. 
 
88 
 
5. Cross-Sectional Method 
Based on the conventional method, the producer prices are even more flexible than 
the retailer prices, and the implied duration is only 4 months. However, this method is 
under the same problem of oversampling in short spells. Consistent to the previous 
chapter, cross-sectional duration across firm (DAF) proposed by Dixon (2010) is em-
ployed to provide an unbiased and robust measure of duration, and thus rigidity.  
5.1. Distribution of DAF 
5.1.1. Overall Distribution of DAF 
The overall distribution of DAF during the sample period is illustrated in two forms. 
Table 27 summarises the estimated price duration following the cross-sectional meth-
od (DAF), while the average distribution of DAF is shown in Figure 24, with compar-
ison between retailer and producer prices. 
Table 27 Distribution of DAF (Retailer V.S. Producer) 
 
Retailer Price Producer Price 
 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Mean 9.1847 9.3460 16.9902 15.2838 
Median 9.3145 9.5493 17.6946 15.8402 
S.D. 0.5194 0.7094 2.6495 2.2965 
Skewness -2.8158 -1.2760 -0.9998 -0.9794 
1% 6.5289 6.7016 8.9881 8.4438 
5% 8.1957 7.9567 11.7101 10.7961 
10% 8.7173 8.5054 13.4574 12.1128 
25% 9.1443 8.9375 15.6544 14.1386 
75% 9.4350 9.9120 18.9333 16.8416 
90% 9.5571 10.0024 19.8711 17.7937 
95% 9.6654 10.1311 20.2280 18.2217 
99% 9.9782 10.2182 20.8495 18.6982 
The first feature is that the average DAF is much longer than the frequency implied 
duration, which is shared by both retailer and producer prices. Not surprisingly, the 
cross-sectional method is robust to the oversampling problem. Surprisingly, the 
weighted mean DAF (15.2838 months) is more than 3 times longer than frequency 
implied duration (about 4 months). It suggests that the producer prices have a higher 
proportion of long durations than the retailer prices. This is confirmed by the distribu-
tion of DAF in Figure 24, where the producer prices have a fatter tail. This results in a 
more severe underestimation of duration if conventional method is used. 
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The second feature is that the weighted DAF is lower than the unweighted DAF for 
producer prices, but the case is reversed for retailer prices. To see the reason, note that 
the importance of energy goods in the sample is much higher than the proportion of 
observations. In addition, the energy goods prices have very short durations, resulting 
in a significant downward impact on the overall DAF. 
Another feature seen in Figure 24 is quite typical in this chapter, i.e. the 4-month mi-
nor cycle and 12-month major cycles in the distribution of DAF. This common feature 
implies that the producers and retailers are synchronised in resetting prices and rein-
forced by each other. It is again an evidence of time dependent pricing models, such 
as Taylor (1979) and Calvo (1983). 
Figure 24 Distribution of DAF (Producer V.S. Retailer) 
 
5.1.2. Time-Series Heterogeneity in DAF 
The UK enjoyed a quite stable economy during the sample period, just before the out-
break of the late-2000s financial crisis. Figure 25 shows the evolution of mean DAF 
over time.  
Similar to that of retailer price, the mean DAF of producer price is also sensitive to 
the oil price shocks. Given the importance of oil, the two remarkable dates again di-
vide the sample period into three eras. When the oil price is low and stable after 
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1999m1, the mean DAF stays high and flat. In contrast, when the oil price is high and 
volatile after 2005m1, the mean DAF drops considerably. That is to say, the oil price 
has a negative effect on the mean duration, or equivalently, the producers are more 
flexible when oil price is fluctuating. This is a strong support for the state dependent 
pricing models, such as Mankiw (1985) and Rotemberg (2005). 
Figure 25 Time-Series Heterogeneity in Mean DAF of Producer Price 
 
5.1.3. Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in DAF 
The average DAF also differ across sectors, but not as significant as in retailer price. 
As shown in Table 28, it is difficult to say whether consumption goods or production 
goods have higher mean DAF. The food and durable consumption goods are quite 
flexible, compared to intermediate and capital production goods. However, the non-
food non-durable goods have the longest mean DAF (17 months). At the other ex-
treme, the energy goods have the shortest mean DAF (4 months). 
The full distributions of DAF are also reported by sector in Figure 26, omitting the 
energy goods due to its short duration. There is as much difference within groups as 
between groups. Despite the differences, there are several stylised facts consistent to 
previous results. Firstly, typical 4-month minor cycles and 12-month major cycles are 
again observed in the distribution of DAF, echoing the findings in retailer prices. Sec-
91 
 
ondly, a high proportion of producers reset their prices within 1 year, but there is a fat 
tail in the distribution. 
Table 28 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Mean DAF 
Sector DAF 
Consumption Goods  
Consumer Food Goods 11.2551 
Consumer Durable Goods 11.6582 
Consumer Non-Food Non-Durable Goods 17.1228 
Production Goods  
Intermediate Goods 12.2292 
Capital Goods 14.2833 
Energy Goods 3.9619 
Figure 26 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Distribution of DAF 
 
5.2. Distribution of Age 
The distribution of age is another cross-sectional measure of price rigidity, in the 
sense that longer average age of the prices in the economy implies higher price rigidi-
ty. It is similar to demography, where the age profile of a country gives information of 
how long people live on average. The advantage of distribution of age over DAF is 
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that it is robust to right censoring, since the definition of age does not require the 
knowledge of when current price ends. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the distribution of age is just an equivalent way of 
looking at the same thing as the distribution of DAF. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see some similar features in age, compared to DAF. For example, producer price has a 
higher average age (8.6007 months) than that of retailer price (5.6044 months), be-
cause the former has a fatter tail in the distribution. On the other hand, age (8.6007 
months) is shorter than DAF (15.2838 months), since age is incomplete duration.  
The distribution of age is summarised in Table 29 and visualised in Figure 27, with 
comparison between retailer and producer prices. Note that the difference between 
unweighted and weighted distributions is more significant in producer price than in 
retailer price. Again, it is due to the extraordinary importance of energy goods, which 
reduces the rigidity of producer price. 
Table 29 Distribution of Age (Retailer V.S. Producer) 
 
Retailer Price Producer Price 
 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Mean 5.5663 5.6044 9.5988 8.6007 
Median 5.5405 5.6459 9.6517 8.6891 
S.D. 0.4110 0.4689 0.7518 0.6795 
Skewness -0.1492 -0.6205 -0.3072 -0.1676 
1% 4.1205 3.9284 7.7049 7.0395 
5% 4.9946 4.8069 8.3459 7.4523 
10% 5.1511 4.9801 8.5490 7.7250 
25% 5.3588 5.3373 9.0415 8.0346 
75% 5.7408 5.8709 10.0424 9.1533 
90% 6.1389 6.1696 10.4868 9.4015 
95% 6.3450 6.3445 10.7418 9.6249 
99% 6.5316 6.7028 11.2720 10.0529 
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Figure 27 Distribution of Age (Producer V.S. Retailer) 
 
5.3. Relationship between DAF and Age 
The formula proposed by Dixon (2010) give analytical relationships between distribu-
tions of DAF and age. The estimated and derived distributions turn out to be very 
close under retailer price. The same job is done under producer price, and they are 
again proven to hold. This can be seen by Figure 28, where the estimated distributions 
are almost the same as the derived ones. 
In principle, the formulae are theoretically correct, but there are two sources resulting 
in the tiny discrepancies between the estimated and derived distributions. First, the 
economy is not always in steady state due to various shocks. Second, the right censor-
ing cases tend to bias the estimated distribution of DAF downward. In contrast, the 
distribution of age is robust to right censoring, so the derived distribution of DAF is 
actually more reliable than the estimated one.  
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Figure 28 True and Derived Distribution of DAF and Age of Producer Price 
 
 
 
95 
 
6. Survival Analysis 
The difference in price rigidity between conventional and cross-sectional methods ad-
dresses the outcome of price setting behaviour. This section will turn to how this out-
come is generated by producers, i.e. factors that influencing firm‘s price setting be-
haviour, or the mechanism of price setting. 
In the light of survival analysis, hazard function is the key to understand the mecha-
nism of price setting behaviour, since it characterises the conditional probability of 
price change. It is easy to see the link between hazard function  h t  and price dura-
tion T , i.e. any factor that positively affects  h t  tend to negatively affecting T . In 
terms of degree of reliance on assumption, survival analysis can be classified into 
nonparametric, semiparametric and parametric. Since parametric analysis is proven in 
last chapter to be too restrictive to be plausible, this chapter will only focus on non-
parametric and semiparametric analysis.  
6.1. Nonparametric Analysis 
Nonparametric analysis assumes the least on data generating process, since the esti-
mated  h t  only depends on time t . Therefore,  h t  presented in this section is 
closely correlated to the rigidity measures in previous sections, because time is the 
only extra factor considered to describe the hazard function. In other words, the in-
stantaneous risk of price change only varies with the age of the current price. 
6.1.1. Pooled Hazard Function 
As shown in previous chapter, there are four equivalent forms of presenting the distri-
bution of duration. It is easy to derive one from another among hazard function  th , 
cumulative hazard function  tH , survivor function  tS , and cumulative density 
function  tF . Figure 29 shows the four equivalent forms of presenting the distribu-
tion of duration. The distribution functions of producers (solid) are contrasted with 
those of retailers (dashed). Since  h t  is the most popular form, this paper will only 
focus on the features of  h t . Also, the weighted and unweighted distributions do not 
differ qualitatively, therefore only the weighted results are reported hereinafter.  
There is a high probability (27.57%) of price change in the first month, mainly due to 
the energy price. However, the producer‘s  th  has a relatively flatter shape than the 
retailer‘s. The stylised ―downward‖ slope observed in retailer price is not found in 
producer price. The hazard rates are consistently lower in the first 36 months, suggest-
ing that the producer price is less likely to change, or equivalently, more rigid. This 
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feature is consistent with that drawn from cross-sectional method, but different from 
the conventional method, which is biased due to oversampling. 
Another feature of  th  is that there are regular big spikes every 12 months (major 
cycle) and small spikes every 4 months (minor cycle). This is a support to time de-
pendent models, such as Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE). The spikes have a very 
similar pattern to retailer price, especially at the major cycles. In fact, the two hazard 
functions in comparison have almost constant differences at the minor cycles. It sug-
gests that the producers and retailers are closely interacting with each other, so the 
price setting behaviour is much synchronised. 
Figure 29 Distribution Functions (Producer V.S. Retailer) 
 
6.1.2. Heterogeneity in Hazard Function 
The producers are different in various aspects across sectors. Following the previous 
classification, distinction between consumption goods and production goods are made.  
On average, the production goods have higher hazard functions than the consumption 
goods. However, similar to the findings in distribution of DAF, there is as much het-
erogeneity within sector as between sectors, as graphed in Figure 30. This difference 
is tiny, except for energy goods, which have an extremely high hazard function (not 
97 
 
shown). This heterogeneity can be again explained by different degrees of competi-
tion in the specific market. 
The production goods sectors are usually more competitive, given numerous firms 
and homogenous products. These sectors are mostly related to raw materials and en-
ergy goods, on which the whole economy is based. High degree of competition in the-
se markets results in higher hazard functions. In particular, energy goods have the 
highest probability of price change, since this sector faces both national and interna-
tional competition. The energy goods markets could be regarded as perfectly competi-
tion and the fluctuations are quite volatile. 
In contrast, the consumption goods sectors face lower competition because products 
tend to be differentiated across firms. Given that consumption goods are final goods, 
there are more procedures involved in production, so products are more likely to be 
different across firms. This feature makes the consumption goods markets more close 
to monopolistic competition. 
Figure 30 Heterogeneity in Hazard Function of Producer Price 
 
To summarise, the hazard function of producer price is on average lower than that of 
retailer price, implying a higher rigidity for producer price. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the cross-sectional method. Moreover, the heterogeneity by sector is not 
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much. The production goods have slightly higher hazard functions than the consump-
tion goods, which can be explained by the degree of competition. 
6.2. Semiparametric Analysis 
As argued in last chapter, semiparametric analysis controls for covariates that differ 
across observations, leaving the baseline hazard function  0h t  nonparametric. Hence, 
it lies between nonparametric and parametric analysis. It is therefore more flexible 
and reliable in obtaining both hazard function and effects of various covariates. The 
proportional hazard Cox model is again used: 
   0 exp i i ii iih t h t    β x β x iii iii iv iv  β x β x  
Firstly, since  0h t  only depends on the analytical time t , the monthly seasonality 
due to calendar time needs to be controlled in the covariates. Thus, similar to the re-
tailer model, January is treated as the base, and the rest 11 calendar month dummies 
are used to capture the covariates from time dimension ( ix ). The estimated coeffi-
cients are listed in Table 30. 
Secondly, note that the region information is not available in producer price microdata. 
Also, last chapter shows that there is little regional difference in retailer‘s price setting 
in the UK, and it is arguable that the producer‘s price setting is even less dependent of 
location since producers are facing wider markets. Thus, the covariates from space 
dimension ( iix ) are omitted. 
Thirdly, covariates from macroeconomic dimension ( iiix ) are the same as those used 
in retailer model. Inflation is included to capture the impacts of macroeconomic envi-
ronments on producer‘s real revenue, while interest rate, wage and oil price are used 
to capture the macroeconomic effects on producer‘s capital costs, labour costs and 
resources costs. Both lags and leads of these variables are used to account for back-
ward looking expectation and forward looking expectation, which might be involved 
in price setting. The estimates are shown in Table 31. 
Lastly, important covariates from microeconomic dimension ( ivx ) related to each in-
dividual firm are considered in the model, including sector dummies, level of price, 
magnitude of price change, market shares of the producer firms. In particular, both 
within-industry and economy-wide market shares are available in producer price data, 
in contrast to retailer model where only economy-wide market share is included. This 
detailed distinction gives deeper insight into the effect of competitiveness on the price 
rigidity. Table 32 summarises the estimation results. 
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Table 30 Estimations of Pooled and Separate Cox Models by PPI Sector (Part A) 
 Covariates Pooled 
Consumption Goods Production Goods 
Non-Food 
Non-Durable 
Food 
Goods 
Durable 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Capital 
Goods 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
T
im
e 
D
im
en
si
o
n
 
February -0.6378** -0.5490** -0.2970** -0.7735** -0.6339** -0.8120** 
March -0.0564** -0.3852** 0.5459** 0.0658** -0.0024** -0.5163** 
April -0.3086** -0.3456** 0.2775** 0.0613** -0.3774** -0.7897** 
May -0.4010** -0.4256** 0.1132** -0.3859** -0.4652** -0.6584** 
June -0.2885** -0.3172** 0.4053** -0.2357** -0.4224** -0.5804** 
July -0.1421** -0.0493** 0.4869** 0.1123** -0.2756** -0.5918** 
August -0.2524** -0.3161** 0.5273** 0.0108** -0.4942** -0.5924** 
September -0.4321** -0.3710** -0.0253** -0.8381** -0.4855** -0.5712** 
October -0.2525** -0.5165** 0.3042** 0.1126** -0.2612** -0.5792** 
November -0.1735** -0.5082** 0.3594** 0.3596** -0.3742** -0.1920** 
December -0.4108** -0.3865** 0.2362** -0.4494** -0.5017** -0.7085** 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table 31 Estimations of Pooled and Separate Cox Model by PPI Sector (Part B) 
 Covariates Pooled 
Consumption Goods Production Goods 
Non-Food 
Non-Durable 
Food 
Goods 
Durable 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Capital 
Goods 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
M
a
cr
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 D
im
en
si
o
n
 
Inflation t 0.1134** 0.1260** -0.1798** 0.3214** 0.0982** 0.2551** 
Inflation t-1 0.4840** 0.4642** 0.7861** 1.1192** 0.3412** 0.2830** 
Inflation t+1 0.0158** -0.3361** 0.0149** 0.5873** 0.0623** 0.2986** 
Interest Rate (∆) t -0.0060** -0.6066** 0.6187** -0.9865** 0.0522** 0.2370** 
Interest Rate (∆) t-1 0.2359** 0.1451** -0.2270** 1.0710** -0.4069** -0.2128** 
Interest Rate (∆) t+1 -0.1377** -0.1369** -0.2540** -0.8429** -0.1885** 0.4805** 
Wage (%∆) t 0.2174** 0.1706** -0.2763** -0.2996** -0.2627** -0.5868** 
Wage (%∆) t-1 -0.4946** -0.2333** -1.1784** -0.3555** 0.4834** -0.2421** 
Wage (%∆) t+1 0.0225** -0.0403** 0.1889** 0.4468** -0.0752** 0.0482** 
Oil Price (%∆) t 0.0022** 0.0371** -0.0183** -0.0379** -0.0043** -0.0052** 
Oil Price (%∆) t-1 -0.0072** 0.0301** -0.0234** -0.0184** 0.0126** -0.0134** 
Oil Price (%∆) t+1 0.0035** 0.0287** 0.0243** 0.0480** 0.0173** 0.0060** 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table 32 Estimations of Pooled and Separate Cox Model by PPI Sector (Part C) 
 Covariates Pooled 
Consumption Goods Production Goods 
Non-Food 
Non-Durable 
Food 
Goods 
Durable 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Capital 
Goods 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s 
fr
o
m
 
M
ic
ro
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 D
im
en
si
o
n
 
Consumer Food 0.0781** – – – – – 
Consumer Durable -0.1913** – – – – – 
Consumer NFND -0.3427** – – – – – 
Intermediate Goods 0.0058** – – – – – 
Capital Goods -0.1452** – – – – – 
Price 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0003* 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000* 
Price (%∆) 0.0000* 0.0003* 0.0003** 0.0043* 0.0000* 0.0000** 
Market Share 
(Industry-Wide) 
-0.0010** -0.0008** -0.0017** -0.0010** -0.0011** -0.0029** 
Market Share 
(Economy-Wide) 
1.5069** 1.2996** 2.8108** 1.3910** 1.5867** 1.0643** 
Notes: * denotes 5% significance level. ** denotes 1% significance level. 
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6.2.1. Pooled Cox Model 
The estimated coefficients ( , ,i iii ivβ β β ) for pooled Cox model are listed in the first 
columns of Table 30, Table 31 and Table 32, which aim to paint an overall picture of 
the average producer‘s price setting behaviour. 
From the estimated coefficients of calendar month dummies ( iβ ), it is no surprising 
that January is again the month with highest likelihood that producers change their 
prices, due to Christmas sales. This finding is consistent with that in retailer microdata. 
It suggests that this typical seasonality makes price much more flexible than usual, 
which is a strong evidence for time dependent pricing models. The second highest 
hazard rates is March, which is one month earlier than that in retailer. Remember that 
April is the starting month of a new tax year, implying that producers tend to adjust 
prices a bit in advance, while retailers only react when new tax policy is out. In addi-
tion, July is the third highest month, very likely due to summer sales. 
Turning to the macroeconomic covariates ( iiiβ ), all the estimates turn out to be highly 
significant. Both backward looking and forward looking expectations are important in 
producer‘s price setting behaviour. The positive estimates for all the three coefficients 
of inflation show that producer‘s reaction to inflation is both sensitive and persistent. 
In contrast, retailers only respond to lagged inflation. Arguably, producers are mainly 
wholesalers, so a small change in inflation will have massive effects on the real reve-
nue. It motivates the producers to react quicker to the change in general price level. 
Similar argument holds for explaining the significance of costs covariates. In particu-
lar, oil price is very influential in producer‘s costs. A rise in energy price will bring up 
the transportation costs of both raw materials and processed products. Moreover, this 
effect will spread to every corner of the economy. The income effect reinforces the 
substitution effect, leading to even worse economic environments and even recession. 
The significant effects are directly tangible for producers, so the change in costs will 
be immediately reflected in their prices. Furthermore, even the expected change in oil 
price will be taken into account, which is also found in retailer price. This is because 
developed commodity markets reveal informative signal of future resources prices, 
based on which firms could adjust their price in advance. 
The microeconomic covariates ( ivβ ) related to each individual producer firm indicate 
that hazard function differs significantly among sectors. Treating energy goods as 
base group, only consumer food sector and intermediate goods sector have higher 
hazard rates. This is mainly due to the nature of these two sectors, since both food and 
intermediate goods are not storable. In particular, some food prices might change sev-
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eral times even within one day. The level of price and the change of price are still 
very close to zero, similar to the findings in retailer price.  
Regarding the effects of market shares, it is interesting to observe opposite signs on 
industry-wide and economy-wide weights. The implied competitiveness of the market 
is the key to provide a consistent explanation for this seemingly contradictory phe-
nomenon. On the one hand, a higher industry-wide market share implies a higher pric-
ing power of the firm, or equivalently, a lower competitiveness of the industry. It is 
natural to have a lower frequency of price change in less competitive market. On the 
other hand, a higher economy-wide market share implies a higher importance of the 
goods, while most such goods are produced in well-established traditional industries. 
The competitiveness of these mature industries is usually higher than those which are 
still growing, so the price change of producer firms with higher economy-wide market 
share should be more frequent. Hence, the seemingly contradictory phenomenon is 
actually coherent in mechanism of price setting behaviour. 
6.2.2. Separate Cox Model by Sector 
Significant estimated coefficients of sector dummies imply remarkable heterogeneity 
in hazard function across sectors. Therefore, in addition to use pooled model to de-
scribe producer‘s average price setting behaviour. Cox models for each PPI sector are 
estimated separately and shown in the other columns of Table 30, Table 31 and Table 
32. 
Firstly on calendar month dummies, non-food-non-durable goods and both production 
goods exhibit similar seasonal pattern to pooled results. However, January is no long-
er the month with highest hazard rate for food goods and durable goods sectors. In-
stead, summer (June, July and August) is the season with most frequent price change 
for food products, due to the temperature and storability. 
Regarding macroeconomic and microeconomic covariates, there are no clear regulari-
ties found across different sectors, except that lagged inflation and expected oil price 
have positive effects on likelihood of price change for all sectors. Moreover, there are 
substantial heterogeneities within and between consumption goods and production 
goods. This is strong evidence supporting heterogeneous agent model, such as GTE or 
GCE. A representative firm might be able to capture the average degree of nominal 
friction, but it will fail in explaining the dispersion due to its simplicity. That is why 
simple Taylor or simple Calvo models cannot generate enough persistence of struc-
tural shocks within plausible calibrated values of price rigidity. 
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6.2.3. Baseline Hazard Function 
After controlling for all these covariates in Cox model, the leftovers are used to de-
scribe the pure hazard function which only depends on time t . This pure hazard func-
tion is termed as baseline hazard function  0h t . Both pooled and separate estimated 
 0h t  are shown in Figure 31. 
Figure 31 Baseline Hazard Functions for Cox Models of Producer Price 
 
The contrast within and among sectors shows a very similar pattern in baseline hazard 
function once the effects of various factors are purged off. It is also consistent with 
the features found in retailer price such as a downward slope and 4-month/12-month 
spikes. These common features between retailers and producers indicate that price 
setting behaviour in the whole economy tends to co-move and synchronised.  
Despite little, the consumption goods sectors tend to have higher baseline hazard rates 
than that of production goods sectors. Recall that retailers have even less price rigidity, 
according to the cross-sectional measure (DAF). It is natural to infer that the upstream 
firms in the supply chain tend to have more nominal frictions in price setting than 
downstream firms. This conclusion not only holds in general, but also holds in partic-
ular industry. For example, although some sectors such as energy goods sector might 
have more flexible prices than retailer prices as a whole, the energy goods producers 
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still have more rigidities than the energy goods retailers. As moving more towards the 
downstream of supply chain, the number of firms grows, and the products are more 
differentiated. Competition is greater due to more substitutable goods in the market. 
The structure of the supply chain looks like an ―ecological pyramid‖. The relationship 
between the position in supply chain and price rigidity be illustrated in Figure 32. 
Figure 32 Supply Chain and Price Rigidity 
 
The transmission of structural shocks, such as productivity shock and monetary policy 
shock, has multiple channels. Apart from a direct effect on the retailer firms, an indi-
rect effect will be transmitted through producer firms in the upstream of supply chain. 
Hence, if there is even a small nominal friction in both producer and retailer firms, the 
effect of shocks could still be very persistent, due to the ―container‖ role of producers. 
On the other hand, producer firms split and mitigate the magnitude of impacts from 
the shock for retailer firms. This ―buffer‖ effect reduces the volatility and fluctuations 
in price and output in the economy.  
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter uses monthly microdata underlying PPI from 1998m1 to 2008m2 to in-
vestigate the price setting behaviour of producer firms in the UK. Two themes are ex-
plored: the outcome and the mechanism of price setting behaviour. For the first theme, 
both conventional and cross-sectional methods are applied. Under conventional meth-
od, it is found that producer price is more flexible than retailer price. However, this 
conclusion is illusionary because conventional method tends to oversample the short 
durations. In contrast, cross-sectional method (DAF) leads to an opposite conclusion 
that producer price on average lasts longer than retailer price.  
Survival analysis is used for analysing the mechanism of price setting behaviour. To 
start with, nonparametric Kaplan-Meier approach is used to estimate the hazard func-
tion and survival function of producer‘s price setting. A very similar pattern is found 
in producer price with retailer price, i.e. downward sloping and typical 4-month 
spikes. Heterogeneity across sectors is also examined and consumption goods sectors 
have longer implied duration than production goods sectors. 
To control for the factors that might influence the overall hazard function, semipara-
metric Cox model is used. After filtering out the effects from seasonality, macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic covariates, the baseline hazard functions of different sec-
tors turn out very similar. The downward slope and typical spikes features still remain, 
but the difference between consumption goods sectors and production goods sectors 
now vanishes. It is arguable to use baseline hazard functions to calibrate any hetero-
geneous price setting models in macroeconomic application, since they are ―deep 
structural parameters‖ after removing policy dependent components. 
A more systematic analysis of price rigidity is made in a wider perspective. In the 
economic system, as moving from upstream of supply chain to downstream, price ri-
gidity is decreasing due to the growing degree of competition. Furthermore, as a 
shock hits the economy, the producer firms act as both ―container‖ to prolong the per-
sistence of shocks and ―buffer‖ to reduce the fluctuations. Hence, the microdata evi-
dence suggests that inclusion of producer firms and heterogeneity in price setting be-
haviour might greatly improve the performance of macroeconomic models. 
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1. Introduction 
The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models become more and 
more popular in both academia and policy making (e.g. Federal Reserve in US, Bank 
of England in UK and European Central Bank in Euro area), especially after the sem-
inal works of Smets & Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005) and 
Smets & Wouters (2007). These models succeed in capturing some stylised facts of 
empirical persistence found in macroeconomic data, i.e. the hump shape impulse re-
sponse functions of output, consumption, investment, employment, capital, inflation, 
interest rate and other important variables. These features rely on four modelling 
components of frictions in the DSGE models. Firstly, sticky price and wage setting 
behaviour are featured by Calvo model with partial indexation, following Kollmann 
(1997) and Erceg et al. (2000). This feature is essential to get persistence in inflation. 
Secondly, capital utilisation rate is employed to obtain persistence in capital accumu-
lation, following Greenwood et al. (1988) and King & Rebelo (1999). Thirdly, ad-
justment costs are needed to get investment smoothing, in the spirit of Lucas (1967) 
and Gould (1968). Fourthly, habit formation, after Fuhrer (2000) and McCallum & 
Nelson (1999), is incorporated to achieve consumption smoothing. 
A main controversial modelling component is the price setting behaviour. Indeed, the 
assumption of Calvo with indexation may be appropriate for wage setting, since it is 
arguable that wage negotiation is costly. Wage contracts cannot be flexibly reset with-
in some duration, so indexation is necessary to account for the inflation risk. For in-
stance, the minimum wage in the UK is reset every year according to the inflation. 
However, price setting behaviour is much more different, and little evidence is found 
from the microdata level for the usage of price indexation among firms. Another im-
portant drawback of these homogeneous type price setting models (including Calvo 
with indexation) is that the estimated degree of price rigidity is ridiculously high. For 
example, over 90% firms cannot reset prices at the optimal levels in Smets & Wouters 
(2003). This is inconsistent with microdata evidence and common sense. It seems to 
be a dilemma between enough persistence and reasonable degree of rigidity. In the 
light of a series of papers, e.g. Wolman (1999) and Dixon & Kara (2005), two price 
setting models with heterogeneous agent paradigm are developed, the Generalised 
Calvo Economy (GCE) and Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE). Both models pro-
vide a better description of the price setting behaviour, compared to homogeneous 
agent models such as simple Calvo, simple Taylor as well as Calvo with indexation 
(termed as ICE hereinafter). This paper develops a benchmark DSGE model based on 
Smets & Wouters (2003), with price setting mechanism replaced by different candi-
dates. It is shown that heterogeneous agent framework has greatly improved the per-
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formance of DSGE model, especially in impulse response functions. The dilemma in 
homogeneous agent model can be resolved by heterogeneous price setting behaviour. 
Along with the development of modelling, various macroeconometric tools are devel-
oped to estimate and test DSGE models. As classified by Geweke (1999), there is a 
distinction between weak and strong econometric interpretations of DSGE models. 
The strong interpretation applies system-based estimation and testing. This approach 
includes Classical maximum likelihood (ML) as in Sargent (1989) and Leeper & Sims 
(1994), and Bayesian inference proposed by Geweke (1999) and Schorfheide (2000). 
The weak interpretation, on the other hand, only focuses on some features of DSGE 
models of interested, such as Euler equation or impulse response functions. This ap-
proach encompasses the earliest calibration practice to match data moments adopted 
in Kydland & Prescott (1982), Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) in Hansen & 
Singleton (1982), Minimum Distance (MD) between VAR and DSGE impulse re-
sponse functions in Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005), and indirect inference in 
Meenagh et al. (2009) and Le, Minford & Wickens (2010).  
From another perspective regarding model testing, one could either test a DSGE mod-
el against the observed data in absolute sense, or test one model against another model 
in relative sense. As Meenagh & Minford (2011) argued, DSGE models fit data poor-
ly and are usually rejected if they are tested in absolute sense. Nevertheless, models 
are not designed to be true, but to be useful in mimicking some important and interest-
ing part of the real world. A model is useful if it outperforms the other competitors in 
the relative sense that it can better replicate various stylised facts found in data. Hence, 
relative testing provides a way of finding a useful model, rather than a true model.  
This paper concentrates on the inferences based on Bayesian approach, while other 
approaches, such as maximum likelihood and indirect inferences, are also discussed to 
draw a comparison. Interestingly, all approaches lead to similar conclusion, i.e. DSGE 
model with heterogeneous price setting behaviour generates more persistence and per-
forms econometrically better than homogeneous price setting model. This improve-
ment greatly enhances the empirical validity and reliability of New Keynesian DSGE 
models, and also facilitates optimal monetary policy and welfare analysis.  
Following the introduction, Section 2 discusses different approaches to macroecono-
metric inference and the chosen methodology for this chapter. Section 3 details the 
DSGE model framework and the 5 variants in price setting behaviour, and Section 4 
describes the microdata and macrodata used to estimate and compare the models. Sec-
tion 5 summarises the empirical findings in model comparison, estimation and other 
features of DSGE models. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Methodology 
Over the last 30 years, macroeconometric techniques have experienced revolutionary 
development. Some important and popular macroeconometric approaches are listed in 
Table 33. In particular, simulation-based methods have become possible, thanks to the 
growing computing power. One phenomenal consequence is the popularity of Bayesi-
an inference, which was never so widely spread because the computation burden was 
unimaginably huge just several decades ago. Though Bayesian approach is controver-
sial in using prior, its advantages in efficiency and flexibility are still very attractive to 
macroeconomists for estimating and evaluating DSGE models. Also, indirect infer-
ence, which belongs to Classical methodology based on simulation, has been greatly 
developed over the years. This chapter will focus on both ML and Bayesian inference 
to conduct macrodata analysis on DSGE models. Other popular tools, such as VAR, 
BVAR and indirect inference are also discussed.
①
  
Table 33 Macroeconometric Approaches 
Approach Example 
Calibration Kydland & Prescott (1982) 
VAR Sims (1980) 
BVAR Doan et al. (1984) 
GMM Hansen & Singleton (1982) 
Minimum Distance IRF Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005) 
Indirect Inference Meenagh, Minford & Wickens (2009) 
ML Sargent (1989) 
ML DSGE-VAR Ireland (2004) 
Bayesian Smets & Wouters (2003) 
Bayesian DSGE-VAR Schorfheide (2000) 
One can classify macroeconometric approaches into different categories in terms of 
different criteria. For example, according to the role of prior in obtaining the structur-
al parameters, calibration is on one extreme treating prior as the only information 
source, while Classical ML is on the other extreme using nothing from prior. Bayesi-
an approach lies in somewhere between calibration and ML, since it can be treated as 
a weighted average between the two approaches. For another example, according to 
the role of DSGE model in estimation, VAR is on one extreme using little information 
from DSGE model, while Bayesian and ML are on the other extreme with all condi-
tions strictly derived from microfounded DSGE model. Approaches like GMM and 
minimum distance lie in somewhere between the two extremes, since they only focus-
es on some partial aspects of the DSGE model. For the last example of categorisation, 
most approaches including Bayesian are ―direct‖ inference based on the forecasting 
                                                 
① I am obliged to Professor Patrick Minford‘s comments and critiques on this section. 
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criterion (smallness of forecast error), while indirect inference is based on the behav-
iour criterion (closeness of simulated behaviour with data). 
The first and foremost advantage of Bayesian approach, compared to Classical ap-
proach, is its incorporation of prior information, which greatly mitigates the identifi-
cation problem in estimating DSGE models. Identification problem is rooted in objec-
tive function, under which different values of structural parameters lead to the same 
joint distribution for the observables. Canova & Sala (2006) summarise different 
types of identification problems: (i) observational equivalence, which means that dif-
ferent structural models with different economic interpretations may not be distin-
guishable in terms of the chosen objective function; (ii) partial identification, which 
refers to the case where two or more structural parameters enter the objective function 
proportionally, making them separately unrecoverable; (iii) under identification, 
which occurs if a structural parameter disappears from a log-linearised solution; (iv) 
limited information identification, which is related to the situation where only a subset 
of the model‘s implications is used; and (v) weak identification, under which there is 
no unique solution, due to the lack of curvature in objective function. Bayesian infer-
ence is based on the likelihood function, which might also be flat, whereas even a 
weakly informative prior can introduce enough curvature in the posterior density sur-
face that facilitates maximisation. In other words, Classical econometricians treat pa-
rameter space equally important, while Bayesian approach assigns different weights 
through prior distribution. This weighted maximisation procedure also avoids getting 
absurd estimates, which might happen under ML approach. 
The second advantage of Bayesian approach is its easiness of model comparison be-
tween non-nested models. Bayes factor or posterior odds provide handy quantitative 
criteria to relatively evaluate the performance of models with totally disparate specifi-
cations. In contrast, likelihood ratio test is only useful when a model is a special case 
of the other. Note that Bayesian model comparison is a testing procedure in a relative 
sense, which means it cannot tell whether a model is verified or falsified by the ob-
servable data. If one tries to test DSGE models against data in an absolute sense, sim-
ulation-based indirect inference approach, among others, would be a nice choice. 
The third advantage of Bayesian approach lies in its natural way of addressing mis-
specification of models. Quoting Fernández-Villaverde (2010), Bayesians are search-
ing for the ―right‖ rather than the ―true‖ values of parameters to come up with good 
description of data. Indeed, all models are wrong, but some are useful. Bayesian ap-
proach is an efficient way of maximising one‘s ability to use the model as a tool to 
mimic the features of data and draw plausible policy implications. 
112 
 
However, there are several disadvantages of Bayesian inference. One big limitation of 
Bayesian approach, as mentioned above, is that it cannot test model in absolute sense, 
but only rank different models relatively. That is to say, a relatively best model might 
still be rejected by data, but one would never know that under Bayesian inference. In 
contrast, Classical or Frequentist approaches (including ML and indirect inference) 
test the models in both absolute and relative senses through likelihood ratio or Wald 
statistic. Another vital drawback of Bayesian inference is its reliance on prior. The 
validity and reliability of both estimation and testing depends on the correctness of 
prior. If prior is wrong, the posterior conclusions could be even more biased. 
As a matter of fact, there is no absolutely best approach, but only relatively most ap-
propriate approach. The choice depends on the question at hand. In this paper, the 
purpose is to compare and rank homogenous and heterogeneous price setting models 
in a common DSGE framework. Whether a model is rejected by data in absolute 
sense is less important in this thesis. The judgement relies on all the three dimensions, 
i.e. theory, data and prior. Hence, Bayesian approach
①
 is chosen to provide an overall 
performance evaluation and system-based parameter estimation. At the same time, 
VAR and BVAR are employed to provide a comparison basis. Indirect inference is 
also discussed to reinforce the results obtained from Bayesian model comparison, 
while ML is used to highlight the advantage in parameter estimation of Bayesian ap-
proach. 
Given the two disadvantages of Bayesian inference, future work may consider using 
simulation-based methods, such as indirect inference, to test these models against data 
in absolute sense. It is expected that some heterogeneous price setting models could 
survive the absolute tests and be estimated using prior-free methods. Moreover, esti-
mation results can be used to check the robustness of the ranking, which might change 
after searching across the parameter space for the best combination to minimise the 
Wald statistics. 
 
                                                 
① Bayesian and ML estimation procedures are done with the help of Dynare, see Adjemian, S.; H. 
Bastani; M. Juillard; F. Mihoubi; G. Perendia; M. Ratto and S. Villemot. 2011. "Dynare: 
Reference Manual, Version 4," In Dynare Working Papers. CEPREMAP. 
113 
 
3. The Model 
The DSGE models used in this paper are based on the benchmark model proposed by 
Smets & Wouters (2003), where the price setting behaviour is assumed to be Calvo 
with Indexation (ICE). As noted earlier, this simplification of price setting behaviour 
inconsistent with the micro level evidence of firm‘s price setting behaviour. In the 
light of Wolman (1999), Dixon & Kara (2005) and Coenen et al. (2007), a new para-
digm for modelling price/wage setting behaviour is established. Generalised Taylor 
Economy (GTE) and Generalised Calvo Economy (GCE) are developed to capture the 
heterogeneity in price/wage setting behaviour. The idea of this paper is to replace the 
price setting component (ICE) in benchmark model by various candidates, such as 
simple Calvo, simple Taylor, GCE and GTE, resulting in 5 variants of the benchmark 
model, on which Bayesian econometric techniques can be used to draw model com-
parison as well as parameter estimation. 
There are four agents in this modelling framework: (i) the household demands for fi-
nal goods while supplying labour and capital to the intermediate goods firm; (ii) the 
intermediate goods firm demands for labour and capital from household, while sup-
plying intermediate goods to final goods firm; (iii) the final goods firm demands for 
intermediate goods from intermediate goods firm, while supplying final goods to 
household; and (iv) the government influences the economy through fiscal policy and 
monetary policy. As in other New Keynesian monetary models, money is not mod-
elled explicitly, but implicitly incorporated into the system via Taylor rule. To illus-
trate the model structure in Figure 33, the arrows indicates the flows of resources 
among the three market agents, and dash lines represent the government policies. 
Figure 33 Logic Structure of the Model 
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3.1. The Household 
It is assumed that there is a continuum of households indexed by  0,1i . The house-
holds maximise the expected lifetime utility function over an infinite horizon
①
: 
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Here, the instantaneous utility function itu  depends on the current consumption 
i
tc  and 
labour supply itl  as well as an external habit variable, which is defined as a proportion 
of the aggregate consumption 1t th hC  , following Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans 
(2005) and Smets & Wouters (2003). C  is the inverted intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution or coefficient of relative risk aversion in consumption, while L  is the 
inverted elasticity of labour. There are two shocks introduced in the utility function, 
i.e. the preference shock Ut  and labour supply shock 
L
t . Both shocks follow a first 
order autoregressive process: 
1
U U U
t U t t     , where 
U
t  is  20, UIID  ; 
1
L L L
t L t t     , where 
L
t  is  20, LIID  . 
There are three constraints under this maximisation problem, i.e. the intertemporal 
budget constraint, capital accumulation equation, and labour demand function.  
 Constraint 1: Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
   11 1
labour income dividend insurance physical inv.
capital income
financial investment
B i
i i K i i i i i i i i i it t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t
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P P

 
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         
 
 
The left hand side is the income flow (inflow), consisting of labour income, capital 
income from the physical investment, dividend received from the monopolistically 
competitive firms and a state contingent security payoff (perfect insurance). The right 
hand side is the expenditure flow (outflow), including consumption, physical invest-
ment, financial investment on government bonds and a real lump-sum tax. In general, 
there should be another income flow (direct transfer) from the government. However, 
it is nothing but a constant, and it makes no difference at all. Since this paper‘s focus 
is not on public finance, it is then ignored and simply assumed that the tax revenue 
will be consumed by the government without giving back to households. 
                                                 
① The notational convention in this chapter is that lower case is used for individual-level variables, and 
upper case for aggregate-level variables. 
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Note that itz  is the utilisation rate of capital, and    represents the cost of capital 
utilisation. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005), the steady state of capital 
utilisation rate is set as 1 ( 1z  ), and the cost is equal to 0 (  1 0  ). 
Also note that the assumption of perfect insurance market (frictionless financial mar-
ket) leads to equalised inflows and outflows across households by ita . As a result, the 
individual levels are just equal to the aggregate levels for the following variables: 
i
t tc C , 
i
t tb B , 
i
t tdiv DIV , 
i
t tinv I ,
i
t tk K , 
i
t tz Z  
 Constraint 2: Capital Accumulation Equation 
 1
1
change in capital stock
net investment flow
1 1 I tt t t t
t
I
K K I
I
 

  
     
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The left hand side is the change in capital stock, with a constant depreciation rate  . 
The right hand side is the net investment flow, with an investment adjustment cost 
function    depending on the ratio between investments in current and last periods. 
In steady state, investment level is constant over time and  1 0  . Following Smets 
& Wouters (2003), a first order autoregressive process is introduced to disturb the ad-
justment cost function: 
1
I I I
t I t t     , where 
I
t  is  20, IIID  . 
This constraint has two features. On the one hand, the physical investment needs time 
to build, which is the typical feature of any RBC-paradigm models since Kydland & 
Prescott (1982). On the other hand, adjustment of investment is costly, which is the 
typical feature in the spirit of Gould (1968) and Lucas (1967). To change the supply 
of rental services of physical capital, household could either change the utilisation rate 
of capital tZ , or change the investment tI , but both incur costs. 
 Constraint 3: Labour Demand Function 
The households are assumed to supply differentiated labour, so they have certain 
wage setting power in the monopolistically competitive labour market. These differ-
entiated labour will be combined somehow into a composite labour tL , which is then 
employed by intermediate goods firms. Each household faces a labour demand func-
tion, which will be derived later from the intermediate goods firm‘s cost minimisation 
problem. For now, this constraint is presented without proof. 
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This condition simply says that the demand for household i ‘s labour is a proportion 
of the aggregate labour demand. The wage mark-up shock ,W t  is assumed to move 
around a constant W  by a normal white noise error: 
,
W
W t W t    , where 
W
t  is  20, WIID  . 
To summarise, there are two roles of the household. It is both the demand side of final 
goods market and the supply side of the factor (labour and capital) markets. The op-
timal consumption and investment behaviour is based on expected utility maximisa-
tion subject to intertemporal budget constraint and capital accumulation equation, 
while the optimal wage setting behaviour is subject to labour demand function as well. 
The Lagrangian of household‘s maximisation problem can be written as: 
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3.1.1. Final Goods Demand and Consumption Behaviour 
The first order conditions obtained from the Lagrangian with respect to consumption 
tC  and bond tB  can be used to derive the intertemporal condition: 
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This dynamic marginal condition describes the trade-off between present consump-
tion and future consumption. In addition, it is also known as ―Lucas asset pricing for 
bond‖. Note that the first term in the expectation operator is the real ―stochastic dis-
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count factor‖ (SDF), while the nominal SDF also takes into account the inflation 
1
11
t
t
t
P
P
   . This equation is popular in financial economics to determine the price 
B
tP  of the discount bond, or equivalently, the nominal return on bond 
1B
t B
t
R
P
 . 
3.1.2. Capital Supply and Investment Behaviour 
Also from the first maximisation problem (consumption and investment), first order 
conditions with respect to investment tI , capital stock tK  and capital utilisation rate 
of capital tZ  generate the following equilibrium conditions. 
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The first condition implies that the optimal investment adjustment must gain a balance 
between marginal benefit and marginal cost in a dynamic fashion. The second condi-
tion is an extension of typical RBC intertemporal condition, which focuses on the re-
turn on physical investment KtR . Note that the second term inside the expectation op-
erator is the net return after deducting the capital utilisation costs and depreciation. It 
is also known as ―Lucas asset pricing for capital‖, in contrast to that for bond. The last 
condition simply describes that the optimal capital utilisation rate is such that margin-
al cost equal to the marginal revenue. 
The Lagrangian multipliers t  and t  can be respectively interpreted as the shadow 
price of income and the shadow price of capital (or Tobin‘s Q). It is handy to define a 
relative shadow price of capital with respect to income t t tQ   . 
3.1.3. Labour Supply and Wage Setting Behaviour 
In the labour market, each household offers a differentiated type of labour with a mo-
nopolistic power on wage setting. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005) 
and Smets & Wouters (2003), the there is a proportion ( W ) of wages which cannot 
adjust optimally, but follow a simple indexation rule: 
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The degree of indexation is measured by W , which is equal to 0 if there is no indexa-
tion and reduces to simple Calvo wage setting as in Calvo (1983). On the other ex-
treme, if 1W  , then there is perfect indexation to inflation in past period. The rest 
1 W  of the wages are randomly picked, and they can be adjusted optimally. The op-
timal nominal wage tw  is set to maximise the expected utility function subject to all 
the three constraints. 
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The intuition behind this equilibrium condition is that the luckily chosen household 
resets its wage such that the present value of marginal benefit of labour is equal to a 
mark-up over the present value of marginal cost. This dynamic marginal condition is 
nothing but an extension of Classical intratemporal condition between consumption 
and leisure without wage rigidity. Accordingly, the law of motion of the aggregate 
wage tW  is: 
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In fact, the wage setting behaviour could also take GTE or GCE form, instead of Cal-
vo with Indexation (ICE). However, due to the lack of data, it is very difficult to con-
duct empirical studies on wage setting behaviour. As a result, this paper will keep 
wage setting in line with Smets & Wouters (2003), but it should not limit the potential 
to apply more general wage setting models in the future if wage data is available. 
3.2. The Final Goods Firm 
The final goods market is assumed perfectly competitive. The firms produce a com-
posite output from the intermediate goods produced by the intermediate goods firms. 
Therefore, the final goods firms are both the supply side in final goods market and the 
demand side in intermediate goods market. This duality results in two equivalent op-
timisation problems. On the one hand, the firms choose the optimal output level to 
maximise the profit. On the other hand, the optimal input levels are chosen to mini-
mise the total cost. A representative final goods firm‘s optimisation problem can be 
formulated as: 
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Here, tP  is the aggregate price level (treated as given by the final goods firms) and tY  
is the aggregate output or final goods level, while jtp  and 
j
ty  are the price and goods 
produced by intermediate goods firm j . The inputs are not perfectly substitutable, so 
the production function takes a popular form proposed by Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). 
Note that a price mark-up shock is also introduced here, echoing the wage mark-up 
shock
①
. The degree of substitutability between intermediate goods is now random. 
,
P
P t P t    , where 
P
t  is  20, PIID  . 
The first order condition derived from this optimisation problem gives the intermedi-
ate goods demand, which will be used as a constraint in intermediate goods firm‘s op-
timisation problem. 
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Due to the perfect competition market structure in final goods market, a zero profit is 
obtained for all final goods firms. 
3.3. The Intermediate Goods Firm 
Assume that there is a continuum of intermediate goods firms indexed by  0,1j . 
Each firm produces differentiated goods and sets its own price with certain monopo-
listic power to maximise its profit. Meanwhile, the intermediate goods firm demands 
for a composite labour and capital as inputs in production function. 
Given the two roles of intermediate goods firms, two equivalent optimisation prob-
lems are simultaneously formulated. As the demand side of labour and capital, each 
firm minimises its total cost subject to production function. On the other hand, as the 
supply side of intermediate goods, each firm maximises its expected profit by setting 
a possibly fixed price, subject to production function as well as the intermediate goods 
demand function derived from final goods firm‘s problem. 
3.3.1. Cost Minimisation Problem 
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Here, each firm only decides on how much composite labour jtL  to employ and how 
much is the effective utilisation of the capital stock 1
j
t tZ K  . The composite labour tL  
                                                 
① This shock is also termed as ―goods mark-up shock‖ or ―cost-push shock‖. 
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is formed by all the differentiated labour supplied by households, and the aggregate 
wage tW  for this composite labour can also be obtained in a Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) 
fashion: 
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Note that the Cobb-Douglas neoclassical production function with fixed cost   is 
stochastic due to the productivity shock At , which also follows a first-order auto-
regressive process: 
1
A A A
t A t t     , where 
A
t  is  20, AIID  . 
The first order conditions of this cost minimisation problem imply the equalisation of 
capital-labour ratio and marginal cost across all intermediate goods firms, because 
these two quantities are independent of j . 
   1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
j
t t t t
K j K
t t t t t t
j K K
j t t t t t
t tj A A
t t t
W L W L
R Z K R Z K
TC W R W R
MC MC
y
  
 
 
     
 
 
 
  
       
         
        
 
3.3.2. Profit Maximisation Problem 
Each firm j  has some monopolistic power on price setting in the intermediate goods 
market. The simplest two models are Taylor (1979) and Calvo (1983). An extension 
of simple Calvo, Calvo with Indexation Economy (ICE), is developed by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum & Evans (2005). This section introduces two more price setting models 
developed recently by a series of papers, i.e. Generalised Calvo Economy (GCE) and 
Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE). The two models become increasingly popular 
because of their heterogeneous agent features. The topological relationship among 
these 5 models is illustrated below. 
Figure 34 Topological Relationship among Price Setting Models 
 
GCE ≈ GTE 
Calvo 
ICE 
Taylor 
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Firstly, it can be seen that simple Calvo is a special case of both ICE (if indexation 
degree is zero) and GCE (if hazard rate is constant), while simple Taylor is a special 
case of GTE (if there is only one sector with homogenous duration across firms).  
Secondly, it is shown by that GCE is very close to GTE in the sense that they both 
describe an economy with heterogeneous firms. In particular, GCE assumes that firms 
have time-varying hazard rates, in contrast to the constant hazard rate as in simple 
Calvo model. At a particular point in time, prices in this economy have different ages 
and, thus, different hazard rates. On the other hand, GTE assumes that there are sever-
al sectors with different durations, in contrast to the homogenous duration across 
firms as in simple Taylor model. Dixon (2010) argues that it is always possible to find 
a unique GTE for a given GCE with the same distribution of durations, and vice versa. 
However, there is a subtle difference between GCE and GTE in the mechanism of 
price setting behaviour, though exactly the same in the outcome. As noted in Dixon & 
Le Bihan (2010), firms do not know when to reset the prices ex ante in GCE, while 
they know exactly when to reset the price in GTE. This uncertainty makes firms in 
GCE more forward looking than those in GTE. Consequently, the impulse response 
functions of the two models also differ. 
The following equations present the optimal price setting behaviour under these 5 
models. They are all derived from the intermediate goods firm‘s dynamic profit max-
imisation problem, subject to the demand function of intermediate goods derived in 
previous section. As a benchmark case, the optimal price tp
  under flexible price can 
be derived when marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost: 
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 Simple Calvo 
It is assumed that there is a proportion 1 P  of current prices can be reset by firms, 
while the rest P  will stay the same as last period. This P  is called survival rate, and 
1 P  is termed hazard rate. They are constant and independent of how long the price 
duration is. In other words, the proportion 1 P  is randomly picked each period 
without discrimination. As a result, there might be some prices lasting forever, while 
some prices are reset very frequently. 
Due to the uncertainty of price change, firms have to maximise the discounted profits 
in the future. The first order conditions give the equilibrium condition of optimal reset 
price tp  for firm j : 
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Note that this optimal reset price tp  is the same for all intermediate goods firms, 
since they share the same marginal costs and market conditions. Basically, the optimal 
reset price is obtained when the expected sum of discounted marginal revenue (left 
hand side) is equal to the expected sum of discounted marginal cost (right hand side). 
This is a straightforward extension of the condition under flexible price. 
Therefore, the law of motion of the aggregate price index tP  is: 
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 Calvo with Indexation Economy (ICE) 
In addition to the assumption of simple Calvo, it is also assumed that the P  propor-
tion of prices, which could not be reset, will be automatically adjusted according to a 
predetermined indexation rule: 
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The optimal reset price condition under ICE, as an extension of simple Calvo where 
0P  , now becomes: 
 1 ,
0 01
1
P
j jt t t
t P t t t P t t P t
t t t
p P MC
E y E y
P P P

    
    
  
    
 
  
    
   
    
       
     
   
Accordingly, the law of motion of the aggregate price index tP  is now: 
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 Generalised Calvo Economy (GCE) 
GCE is another way of generalising simple Calvo model, in addition to ICE. Initially 
proposed by Wolman (1999) and popularised by Guerrieri (2006), GCE assumes a 
duration dependent hazard function  h t  and survival function  S t . Compared to 
the simple Calvo model, hazard rate is constant   1 Ph t   , and so is survival rate 
  PS t  . Here, it is assumed that the maximum duration is T , i.e. all prices will be 
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reset at the end of period T . In other words,   1h T   or   0S T  . Based on the pre-
vious microdata studies, it is appropriate to set 20T   quarters. Under this time-
varying hazard/survival rates, the optimal reset price tp  for any intermediate goods 
firm in GCE becomes: 
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Note that it is simply a weighted average of future optimal flexible prices tp
 , and the 
aggregate price index tP  is: 
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 Simple Taylor 
Instead of assuming uncertainty of when to reset the price, simple Taylor explores an-
other possible fashion of incorporating price rigidity. Following the seminal papers of 
Taylor (1979) and Taylor (1980), it is assumed that the price duration is fixed and 
known ex ante by the firms. There is a staggering structure in price setting across the 
economy, resulting in a steady state distribution of price duration. Suppose T  is the 
fixed price duration for all firms, and then there exist T  cohorts in the economy reset-
ting their prices in a staggering fashion. The optimal reset price is simply a weighted 
average over the future optimal flexible prices: 
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The aggregate price index tP  turns out to be: 
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Compared to the condition in GCE, it is easy to see that simple Taylor is just a special 
case of GCE, when  S t  is constant for  1, 1t T   and   0S T  . Note that weight 
of each cohort is the same for simple Taylor, but different for GCE (decreasing in  ) 
and GTE (varying). It will be shown soon that simple Taylor is also a special case of 
GTE there is only one sector. 
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 Generalised Taylor Economy (GTE) 
The GTE is developed by a series of works, such as Taylor (1993), Coenen, Levin & 
Christoffel (2007) and Dixon & Le Bihan (2010). It is an extension of simple Taylor 
model in the sense that it allows heterogeneous firms, or multiple sectors, in terms of 
fixed price duration. To be consistent with previous illustration, assume that there are 
T  sectors, which are only different in the price duration. The minimum price duration 
is 1 period, and the maximum is T . In fact, each sector is a simple Taylor economy, 
which has the same number of cohorts as the length of price duration. For example, 
for sector 2, all the firms reset prices every 2 periods, so there are 2 cohorts. In gen-
eral, for sector 1 T  , the firms reset prices every   periods, and there are   co-
horts resetting prices in a staggering fashion. The proportion of each sector   is dif-
ferent, but constant in steady state. The optimal reset price for sector   is exactly the 
same as that in simple Taylor model with price duration equal to  : 
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It is also necessary to derive the sector price index tP
 , which is an average over the 
  cohorts in the sector: 
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Hence, the aggregate price index can be defined as: 
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If there is only one price duration, then the economy will be homogenous, GTE re-
duces to simple Taylor. In this case, t tp p
   and t tP P
  . 
To summarise, there are two basic traditions in time dependent models of price rigidi-
ty, i.e. Calvo and Taylor. Their extensions, both GCE and GTE generalise to hetero-
geneous agent framework, while ICE is another way to extend simple Calvo. In gen-
eral, Calvo type models are more forward looking due to the uncertainty of price du-
ration. Under different modelling paradigms, profit maximisation problems of the in-
termediate goods firms lead to four typical conditions: (i) the optimal flexible price 
equation for tp
  (the same for all models), (ii) optimal reset price equation for tp  (dif-
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ferent for different models), (iii) aggregate price index equation for tP  (different for 
different models), and (iv) inflation definition t  (the same for all models). 
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By the way, to complete the circulation system of resources as illustrated in Figure 33, 
the monopolistic profits of intermediate goods firms are paid to households as divi-
dends tDIV , which is an inflow in budget constraint. 
3.4. The Government 
Government is able to influence the macroeconomic system through both fiscal policy 
and monetary policy. Since the focus of this paper is not on optimal policy, the mech-
anism is simplified as much as possible. 
3.4.1. Fiscal Policy 
As noted in household‘s budget constraint, the government spending tG  does not en-
ter household‘s budget constraint, and it is assumed to be used by government else-
where. It does not change the final results, since it is nothing but an exogenous quanti-
ty, which will drop out when taking derivatives.  
To finance this government spending, tax authority can levy a lump-sum tax ittax  on 
household. This simplification avoids the complicated effects of distortionary taxes, 
such as labour income tax, capital income tax and consumption tax. On the other hand, 
Treasury can also issue government bonds or ―Gilts‖ tB  to finance its expenditure. 
Households purchase the government bonds as a tool of financial investment. Hence, 
the government‘s budget constraint in the perspective of public finance can be written 
as an equation of outflow (left hand side) and inflow (right hand side): 
   1 10 i B Gt t t t t tG tax di B B R      
Note that Gt  is the government expenditure shock, which is an autoregressive process: 
1
G G G
t G t t     , where 
G
t  is  20, GIID  . 
3.4.2. Monetary Policy 
Money can be modelled in various ways in general equilibrium models, such as Mon-
ey in Utility proposed by Samuelson (1958) and Eckstein & Leiderman (1992), or 
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Cash in Advance (CIA) proposed by Lucas (1980) and Goodfriend & McCallum 
(1987), which are popular in New Classical literature among many others. However, 
in canonical New Keynesian monetary models, money is usually not modelled explic-
itly. Instead, a Taylor rule for monetary policy is assumed to describe how nominal 
interest rate BtR  is set by monetary authority. The change in nominal interest rate im-
plies a change in money holdings, through which the role of money is embedded. The 
instrument of monetary policy is usually thought to be interest rate, rather than money 
supply. 
In the light of Taylor (1993), an empirical monetary policy reaction function is added 
into the system to complete the model. The nominal interest rate BtR  is set based on 
previous nominal interest rate 1
B
tR  , inflation gap between actual inflation 1t   and 
inflation target t , output gap between the actual GDP tY  and potential GDP tY
 , as 
well as the change of these gaps. The parameter   measures the degree of interest 
rate smoothing. In fact, the nominal interest rate is a sort of weighted average between 
the past interest rate and the optimal interest rate, which in turn depends on the infla-
tion target and the gaps. Note that the potential output tY
  is defined as the level of 
output that would occur under flexible price and wage in the absence of shocks. The 
interest rate rule is written in the form of log-deviation from steady state: 
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There are two sources of monetary policy shocks in this generalised Taylor rule. The 
first is an autoregressive permanent inflation target shock t , and the other is an IID 
temporary interest rate shock Rt .  
1t t t
    , where t
  is  20,IID  ; 
R
t  is  20, RIID  . 
3.5. General Equilibrium 
The general equilibrium requires that all markets clear, or equivalently, supply equals 
demand for factor markets and goods market. 
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 Goods Market 
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Given fiscal and monetary policies, tG , 
B
tR  and 
i
ttax , an equilibrium is defined as an 
allocation  
   0,1 , 0,1
, , , , , , , , , , , , ,i j i j jt t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i j
C H B l L L k K K Z I y DIV Y
 
 and wages/prices 
 
   0,1 , 0,1
, , , , , ,B K i jt t t t t t t
i j
b R R w W p P
 
, such that: 
i. Given wages/prices and the demand function for labour itl , the allocation 
maximises the utility of the household, subject to the budget constraint; 
ii. Given wages/prices and the demand function for intermediate goods jty , 
the allocation maximises the profits of the firms, subject to the technology 
constraint; 
iii. The policy rules, tG , 
B
tR  and 
i
ttax , are consistent with allocation and wag-
es/prices; 
iv. All markets clear. 
3.6. Summary of the Model 
To solve the system of equations by perturbation method and apply Bayesian infer-
ences, the structural equilibrium conditions derived above is log-linearised around the 
steady state. The full list of the linearised model is presented below. Note that to in-
vestigate the difference resulting from price setting behaviour, the intermediate goods 
firm‘s optimal reset price has 5 variants. However, the other parts of the model are 
exactly the same. 
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 Equation (1): Consumption 
 
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 Equation (2): Investment 
1 1
1 1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1
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Note that   is the inverted investment adjustment cost, and it arises from the invest-
ment adjustment cost function   . 
 Equation (3): Capital Shadow Price 
  1 1 1
1ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ
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Note that Qt  is an IID equity premium shock, which is introduced here to capture 
other sources of risk omitted in the model. 
 Equation (4): Capital 
  1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ1t t tK K I      
 Equation (5): Wage 
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 Equation (6): Labour 
  1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
K
t t t tL W R K       
 Equation (7): Flexible Price 
  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ 1K A Pt t tt t t t tp P R W P            
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 Equation (8): Inflation 
1
ˆ ˆˆ
t t tP P    
 Equation (9): Goods Demand 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 Gt t t t
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 Equation (10): Goods Supply 
 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
K A
t t t t tY K R L          
Note that   is equal to 1 plus the share of fixed cost in production, and it arises from 
the   component in production function. Also note that   is the inverted elasticity 
of capital utilisation cost, and it arises from the capital utilisation cost function   . 
 Equation (11): Monetary Policy 
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The 11 linearised equations above are common to all the models considered in this 
paper. The only difference among simple Calvo, ICE, GCE, simple Taylor and GTE 
lies in price setting behaviour. Note that in simple Calvo and ICE, the price setting 
equation can be rewritten in the form of rational expectation augmented Phillips curve, 
but the other three cases are not. It does not make much difference, since Phillips 
curve is nothing but a transformation by combining with other equations. The 5 vari-
ants of price setting equation (12) are linearised and listed below. 
 Equation (12-Calvo): Price 
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 Equation (12-ICE): Price 
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 Equation (12-GCE): Price 
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 Equation (12-Taylor): Price 
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 Equation (12-GTE): Price 
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There are 12 equations in the simplified and linearised system, so 12 endogenous con-
trol variables:  ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , , , ; , , , , , ,B Kt t t t t t t t t t t tC I K L Y Q R R W p P  . Meanwhile, there are 10 or-
thogonal exogenous shocks:  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , ; , , , ,U L I G A W P Q Rt t t t t t t t t t          . They are derived 
respectively from preference shock, labour supply shock, investment shock, govern-
ment expenditure shock, productivity shock, wage mark-up shock, price mark-up 
shock, equity premium shock, interest rate shock and interest rate target shock. 
Preference shock:
 1
U U U
t U t t     , where 
U
t  is  20, UIID  ; 
Labour supply shock:
 1
L L L
t L t t     , where 
L
t  is  20, LIID  ; 
Investment shock:
 1
I I I
t I t t     , where 
I
t  is  20, IIID  ; 
Government expenditure shock:
 1
G G G
t G t t     , where 
G
t  is  20, GIID  ; 
Productivity shock:
 1
A A A
t A t t     , where 
A
t  is  20, AIID  ; 
Wage mark-up shock:
 ,
W
W t W t    , where 
W
t  is  20, WIID  ; 
Price mark-up shock:
 ,
P
P t P t    , where 
P
t  is  20, PIID  ; 
Equity premium shock: Q
t  is  20, QIID  ; 
Temporary monetary shock:
 
R
t  is  20, RIID  ; 
Permanent monetary shock:
 1t t t
    , where t
  is  20,IID  . 
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Finally, a summary of parameters used in the model is listed in Appendix Table 41 
and Table 42. Thus, the three structural components—12 endogenous controls, 10 ex-
ogenous shocks and parameters—form the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
system through the 12 equilibrium equations with 5 variants in price setting. 
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4. Data 
In prevailing literature, macrodata are usually used in macroeconometric studies to 
estimate the structural parameters and evaluate models. Pure calibration based on mi-
crodata research in the traditional RBC literature is less popular now. Yet, some well-
established parameter calibrations are still used to reduce the dimensionality of esti-
mated parameters. In this chapter, both microdata and macrodata are emphasised. 
4.1. Microdata 
Microdata are referred to the empirical results obtained based on individual-level ob-
servations on consumer‘s behaviour and firm‘s behaviour. Some well-established es-
timated structural parameters are calibrated in this chapter. These calibrated parame-
ters are shown in Table 41 and Table 42, including subjective discount factor 
( 0.99  ), depreciation rate of capital ( 0.025  ), capital output ratio ( 0.3  ), 
capital output ratio ( / 8.8K Y  ), share of investment in GDP ( / 0.22I Y  ), share of 
consumption in GDP ( / 0.6C Y  ), and share of government expenditure in GDP 
( / 0.18G Y  ).  
Moreover, the survival rates  S   for GCE come from the estimated survival func-
tion, and the sector shares     for GTE are based on the estimated distribution of 
duration across firms. To make the model comparison coherent, the average survival 
rate for simple Calvo is also calibrated using the implied value from  S  , and the 
average duration for simple Taylor is based on    . However, for ICE, prices are 
assumed to change every period, which is not supported by microdata evidence. Thus, 
the share of optimally changed price is not calibrated but estimated. 
In the microdata research on firm‘s price setting behaviour in Chapter I, both nonpar-
ametric analysis and semiparametric analysis are applied to estimate the survival 
function and distribution of DAF in the UK from 1996m1 to 2008m1. The nonpara-
metric approach directly estimates the survival function and distribution of DAF, 
without controlling for factors which might affect firms‘ behaviour. In contrast, the 
semiparametric approach considers various factors in estimation, such as inflation, 
interest rate, oil price, etc. Thus, baseline survival function of semiparametric analysis 
is more appropriate for calibrating the ―deep structural parameters‖ in DSGE models. 
Meanwhile, corresponding distribution of DAF can be implied from baseline survival 
function in the light of the formula of Dixon (2010). Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
sensitivity analysis, the estimation results of both nonparametric analysis (Figure 35) 
and semiparametric analysis (Figure 36) will be used in estimation and testing. 
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Figure 35 Survival Function from Microdata Research 
 
Figure 36 Distribution of Duration across Firms from Microdata Research 
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4.2. Macrodata 
7 key macroeconomic variables (output, consumption, investment, labour, inflation, 
interest rate and wage) and 108 observations (1981Q1-2007Q4) in the UK are used. 
The macrodata are collected by Office for National Statistics ONS) in the UK. This 
sample period covers the ―Great Moderation‖ before the recent global financial crisis. 
It also overlaps with the microdata period (1996-2007), making the calibrations plau-
sible and coherent. 
All the observables are nonstationary, according to Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. A 
simplified but standard way of dealing with nonstationarity is to use Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter. Indeed, this method is not the best choice theoretically, since it takes away 
too much information which does not belong to ―trend‖. However, this paper‘s focus 
is not exploring the optimal method of detrending, but to compare different price set-
ting models. Therefore, HP filter will not harm the generalisability. 
To summarise, both microdata and macrodata are used to evaluate and compare the 
price setting models under a common DSGE framework. It provides a microfounda-
tion for macroeconometric analysis in an empirical sense, echoing the theoretical mi-
crofoundation from microeconomics for macroeconomic modelling. 
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5. Results 
The general equilibrium is characterised by the 12 linearised equations with 5 variants 
in price setting mechanism. While confronted with microdata and macrodata, econo-
metric techniques based on strong econometric interpretation, i.e. Classical maximum 
likelihood and Bayesian estimation procedures are applied to estimate the structural 
parameters as well as the processes governing structural shocks. The estimation sub-
section focuses on GCE and GTE results, since the heterogeneous agent models are 
decisively supported in model comparison.  
Next, impulse response functions are presented and compared across the 5 competing 
models using Bayesian approach. The closeness between model-based and data-based 
impulse response functions can be used to check the performance of DSGE models.  
Moreover, variance decomposition is also conducted following Bayesian approach to 
identify the contribution of various structural shocks to the variances of endogenous 
variables of interest. These two subsections provide another perspective for model 
comparison by only focusing on some partial features of rather than the whole DSGE 
model, following the philosophy of weak econometric interpretation. 
Lastly, the 5 models are first evaluated relatively using Bayes Factor (BF). Robust-
ness of the test is checked by various dimensions, such as different calibrations, dif-
ferent prior distributions and different observables. At the same time, indirect infer-
ence approach for model testing (following the philosophy of weak econometric in-
terpretation) is also briefly discussed, based on a PhD colleague‘s work. The relative 
ranking between models turns out exactly the same. 
5.1. Parameter Estimation 
Following the results from model comparison, this subsection will focus on estimation 
of heterogeneous price setting models, i.e. GTE and GCE. Both Bayesian and Classi-
cal maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedures are applied to the 5 models. 
5.1.1. Maximum Likelihood Approach 
ML estimation procedure is applied to all the 5 models, following Sargent (1989). 
Kalman filter is used to obtain the log-likelihood function for given set of parameter 
values, and the paramter values are varied across the parameter space within preset 
bounds to maximise the log-likelihood function. The estimation results are listed in 
Appendix Table 43. Two issues related to ML estimation are addressed here. 
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The most important feature of ML estimation is its identification issues. Identification 
problems are typical for non-Bayesian approach to estimating DSGE models. Firstly, 
two structural parameters cannot be estimated by ML procedure due to identification: 
the inverted elasticity of capital utilisation rate ( ) and the inverted investment 
adjustment cost ( ). After the DSGE model is solved and written in state space form, 
the two structural parameters enter objective function (log-likelihood) only propor-
tionally, making them separately unrecoverable. This is termed as ―partial identifica-
tion problem‖ by Canova & Sala (2006). Therefore, these two parameters are fixed at 
its calibration values, 0.2   and 4  . Moreover, another parameter, the steady 
state level of price mark-up ( P ), is also not estimated, but due to another type of 
identification problem. The objective function turns out to be independent of P , 
which disappears from the log-linearised solution. This is called ―under identification 
problem‖ by Canova & Sala (2006). As introduced in Methodology, there are another 
three types of identification problem, i.e. observational equivalence, limited infor-
mation identification and weak identification. It is very likely that weak identification 
problem also arises in applying ML to these 5 DSGE models. Due to lack of curvature 
in objective function, the standard errors are quite big. Many parameters are not sig-
nificantly different from zero. The identification problems greatly reduced the relia-
bility of ML estimation. 
Another problem with ML estimation is the existence of corner solutions. As seen 
from Appendix Table 43, several parameters (e.g. SD of inflation target shock  , 
AR coefficienct of productivity shock A , and output gap growth coefficient Yr ) are 
equal to zero. It is because the preset lowerbounds for these parameters are zero. 
However, it is obvious that the productivity shock is supposed to be persistent and 
A  must be close to 1. These corner solutions do not make any economic sense, 
because ML approach treats the whole parameter space equally important. As a result, 
the corner solution is more a mathematical optimum than an economic optimum. 
Arguably, the probability of parameter values are different across the paramter space 
according to related economic theory and empirical findings. It is another comparative 
advantage of Bayesian approach over ML approach. 
In spite of the two shortcomings above, ML has an advantage that its computational 
burden
①
 is much less than simulation-based Bayesian approach. In addition to using it 
as comparison basis, there are also some meaningful results worth pointing out.  
                                                 
① ML estimation usually takes 5-10 minutes, but Bayesian estimation takes at least 5-10 hours. For the 
GTE model with 20 price setting sectors, it takes more than 1 week to get the results! 
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Firstly on nominal rigidity, the average survival rate P  in ICE has to be extremely 
high (0.998) to capture the persistence in data. Yet, it is quite similar to the estimate 
(0.908) in Smets & Wouters (2003). It is because in homogeneous price setting mod-
els, it is difficult to have realistic average price rigidity on one hand and enough per-
sistence on the other. Also, the degree of price indexation ( P ) is estimated to be zero, 
suggesting no evidence for indexation in price setting. In contrast, indexation in wag-
es setting behaviour is much more supported, and the estimates for W  (0.733) and 
W  (0.431) make economic sense and are consistent with previous studies. This find-
ing verifies the earlier prediction that ICE is more appropriate for wage setting, but 
not for price setting. 
Secondly on habit persistence, the estimate of habit portion of past consumption ( h ) 
ranges from 0.609 (GCE) to 0.801 Calvo), which are higher than that (0.573) found in 
Smets & Wouters (2003). It might suggest a greater habit persistence of consumers in 
the UK, relative to the Euro area. The habit persistence component in the DSGE mod-
el is vital in explaining consumption smoothing. Note that   and   are not identified, 
so the other two modelling components to generate persistence in capital and 
investment cannot be discussed. 
Thirdly on the Taylor rule coefficients, the response of interest rates to inflation ( r ) 
is around 1.5-1.6, which satisfies the Taylor principle. The inflation growth coeffi-
cient ( r  ) is also significant mainly around 0.25. However, the estimates of output 
gap coefficient ( Yr ) and output gap growth coefficient ( Yr ) are quite different across 
models. Moreover, a high AR coefficient of past interest rate (  ) implies an interest 
rate smoothing feature in monetary policy. 
5.1.2. Bayesian Approach 
Bayesian approach makes use of both data information and prior information to obtain 
the posterior distributions of structural parameters. In contrast to ML, Bayesian ap-
proach solves identification problem by assigning different weights over the parame-
ter space, so that the curvature of objective function is strong enough to identify all 
the structural parameters. Meanwhile, the use of prior also effectively prevents the 
cases of corner solution. In some sense, Bayesian approach includes ML approach as 
a special case. The prior distributions (listed in Table 45) used in this chapter are ex-
actly the same as those in Smets & Wouters (2003), which are quite standard in cur-
rent literature. The posterior modes and Hessian matrix are obtained through Monte 
Carlo based optimisation routine, and the posterior distributions including means are 
based on 500,000 draws through Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
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Based on the results listed in Appendix Table 44 and Table 45, this subsection focuses 
on three issues: (i) the four modelling components to generate persistence, (ii) mone-
tary policy, and (iii) structural shocks. 
Firstly, nominal rigidity in price setting is reflected in the average price survival rate 
( P ), which is only estimated for ICE. It is because P  in simple Calvo has to be cali-
brated to be consistent with the calibration of baseline survival function in GCE. The 
estimated mode of P  under ICE is 0.868, a bit lower than that that (0.908) in Smets 
& Wouters (2003). However, it is still too high compared to the implied P  0.556 im-
plied from microdata. Similarly, wage setting is characterised by the estimated aver-
age wage survival rate ( W ) shown in Figure 37, ranging from 0.677 (GCE) to 0.705 
(ICE), also lower than that in the Euro area (0.737). The estimated degrees of indexa-
tion, P  and W , are also lower than Euro area. All these evidence suggests a more 
flexible price and wage setting behaviour in the UK.  
Secondly, persistence in capital accumulation is measured by the inverted elasticity of 
capital utilisation rate ( ). The estimates are quite close to the prior mean (0.2), a bit 
higher than that found in Euro area (0.169). This implies a less capital utilisation cost 
and less persistence in capital accumulation in the UK.  
Thirdly, persistence in investment can be seen from the inverted elasticity of invest-
ment adjustment cost ( ). The posterior modes and MH means for all the models are 
between 4, which are lower than that in Euro area (6.771). This suggests a higher in-
vestment adjustment cost and more persistence in investment in the UK.   and   
(Figure 38) describe the real rigidity.  
Fourthly, persistence in consumption behaviour depends on the habit portion of past 
consumption ( h ). Similar to the findings in ML estimation, the estimates are over 0.8 
(Figure 39), much higher than that in the Euro area (0.573). Thus, consumption 
smoothing is stronger in the UK. 
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Figure 37 Posterior Distributions of Nominal Rigidity Parameters 
 
Figure 38 Posterior Distributions of Real Rigidity Parameters 
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Figure 39 Posterior Distribution of Habit Persistence 
 
Regarding the monetary policy, the estimated inflation coefficient ( r ) and inflation 
growth coefficient ( r  ) are higher than those in Euro area. Again, Taylor principle in 
monetary policy is verified since r  is greater than 1 (around 1.6). The responses to 
output gap ( Yr ) and output gap growth ( Yr ) are both significant (Figure 40). It does 
not show evidence for an independent role of Bank of England during the sample pe-
riod. Furthermore, the estimated AR coefficient of past interest rate (  ) is around 0.6, 
suggesting a widely found interest rate smoothing (Figure 41). 
Lastly, the structural shocks in the UK tend to have similar persistence, measured by 
the AR(1) coefficients, but quite different standard deviations. The AR(1) coefficients 
of productivity shock ( A ), government spending shock ( G ), labour supply shock 
( L ) and inflation target shock (  ) are all very close to 0.9, as found in Euro area. 
However, the coefficients of preference shock ( U ) and investment shock ( I ) are 
much lower, ranging from 0.3 to 0.4. Moreover, the standard deviations of structural 
shocks are quite different except for productivity shock ( A ). Shocks with lower 
standard deviations include labour supply shock ( L ), equity premium shock ( Q ) 
and wage mark-up shock ( W ). Shocks with higher standard deviations include pref-
erence shock ( U ), government spending shock ( G ), investment shock ( I ), in-
terest rate shock ( R ) and price mark-up shock ( P ). 
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Figure 40 Monetary Policy Responses to Inflation and Output 
 
Figure 41 Monetary Policy Interest Rate Smoothing 
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5.2. Impulse Response Function 
This subsection compares the impulse response functions both among DSGE models 
and against unrestricted VAR models. The estimated impulse response functions for 
GCE, GTE, ICE and simple Calvo models are listed in Appendix from Figure 42 to 
Figure 46. The first four graphs are responses of selected ―quantities‖ (output Y , con-
sumption C , investment I  and labour L ), and the other 4 graphs below a demarca-
tion line are the responses of selected ―prices‖ (inflation  , wage W , nominal interest 
rate BR  and shadow price of physical capital Q ). There are 10 structural shocks, but 
this paper will focus on productivity, mark-up and monetary policy shocks. Also, the 
impulse response functions of unrestricted VAR based on the 7 observables are listed 
in Appendix Figure 47. Since VAR summarises the dynamic features of observable 
data without any restriction, the stylised facts could be used as comparison basis. 
Moreover, a relative comparison among the candidate models could provide a deeper 
insight into which aspects each model could better capture. It complements the Bayes-
ian approach, which is based on strong econometric interpretation and evaluates the 
overall performance of DSGE models. 
5.2.1. Empirical Stylised Facts 
The unrestricted VAR includes 3-period lags after an iterative selection according to 
AIC and BIC criteria. There are 7 observables ( , , , , , ,Y C I L W R  ), so there are 7 re-
duced shocks, which are respectively ( , , , , , ,Y C I L W Re e e e e e e )
①
. As shown in Appen-
dix Figure 47, four important stylised facts can be identified from the impulse re-
sponse functions of the VAR estimation.  
The first feature is the strong persistence in VAR impulse response functions. Most 
shocks (e.g. output, consumption, labour, etc.) do not die out even after 40 quarters. 
The only exception is the response of inflation   to inflation shock e , whose effects 
disappear after 5 quarters. 
The second feature is the hump shape at the beginning of the responses. The effects of 
most shocks do not peak on the arrival of the shock. Rather, the maximum is obtained 
after around 4-8 quarters for most impulse response functions. However, the respons-
es to their own shocks (i.e. Y  to Ye , C  to Ce  and all the diagonal graphs) peak im-
mediately when the shocks occur.  
                                                 
① Note that these shocks are reduced form shocks and do not correspond to any structural shocks as 
there is no identification scheme. Here it only shows the effect of reduced form shocks to output, infla-
tion, etc. It is used to see that in general there are humps and persistence in response to linear combina-
tions of structural shocks. 
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The third feature is the cyclical oscillation over time. The impulse response functions 
do not converge to steady state monotonically, but jump around the long run equilib-
rium (red horizontal lines). 
The last feature is the typical hump around 20 quarters in the impulse response func-
tions. Most response functions experience a local hump around 60 months. This is a 
very interesting phenomenon, because this spike echoes the findings in microdata. As 
shown in Chapter I, the firms in the UK tend to reset prices every 4 months resulting 
in a minor peak, and most firms reset prices every 12 months resulting in a major 
peak. It is found that over 95% prices will change (from the directly estimated distri-
bution of duration across firms). Hence, 20 quarters (or 60 months) is a critical point 
where the effects of shocks will decline, since most firms could adjust their prices fi-
nally. This persistence is induced by the nominal frictions. 
5.2.2. Homogeneous V.S. Heterogeneous 
Under homogeneous price setting behaviour, such as simple Calvo, simple Taylor and 
ICE, there is only one representative firm and one unique price setting mechanism. To 
generate a high persistence close to stylised facts (stylised fact 1), it needs either a ri-
diculously high survival rate (over 0.9) for Calvo-type models or an impossibly long 
price duration (around 20 quarters) for simple Taylor model. If not, the responses to 
shocks are lack of persistence as shown in Appendix. 
In contrast, heterogeneous price setting models do not have this dilemma. Due to its 
flexibility of having heterogeneity in price duration, these models are not only able to 
generate persistent impulse response functions, but also able to have a plausible aver-
age duration or survival rate at the same time. As shown in Appendix Figure 42 to 
Figure 46, heterogeneous price setting models, especially GTE, have more persistent 
responses to various structural shocks. 
Another advantage of heterogeneous models is its ability to generate hump shape re-
sponses (stylised fact 2), especially to the monetary policy shocks (Figure 45 and Fig-
ure 46). Interestingly, a key difference between GCE and GTE is also seen here. GTE 
seems to have higher reactions in quantities ( , , ,Y C I L ) but smaller reactions in prices 
( , , ,BW R Q ). More importantly, GTE displays a hump shape responses of inflation 
to both permanent and temporary monetary shocks, whilst GCE does not. This might 
be the reason why GTE fits the data better than GCE if only output, inflation and in-
terest rate are used as observables as in 5.4.2. 
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Two remarkable features of GTE are identified here, i.e. only GTE exhibits the other 
two stylised facts found in data-based impulse response functions, i.e. cyclical oscilla-
tion (stylised fact 3) and 20-quarter spike (stylised fact 4). The cyclical oscillation can 
be seen in, for instance, the responses to productivity shock (Figure 42) and to price 
mark-up shock (Figure 43). Also, only GTE model exhibits 20-quarter humps, which 
might be due to the 20 price setting sectors in the model. Note that the share of each 
sector is calibrated from the empirical research in Chapter I and consistent with mi-
crodata evidence. These special favourable features make GTE a better heterogeneous 
price setting model than GCE, if one only focuses on the impulse response dynamics, 
especially of output, inflation and interest rate. This is consistent with Dixon & Le 
Bihan (2010), who also find that GTE performs the best in a specific scenario. 
5.2.3. Other Features 
Apart from the four stylised facts discussed above, DSGE impulse response functions 
can be evaluated in some other well-known empirical claims. 
Consumption smoothing can be seen in both VAR and DSGE models. The response 
of consumption is about half of that in output after a productivity shock (Figure 42). 
The effect obtains the maximum about 5 quarters after the shock, similar to the find-
ings in Euro area. This feature is a consequence of intertemporal link in consumption 
resulting from habit persistence. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous models have 
similar qualitative property with a little quantitative difference. In particular, the re-
sponses of GTE seem to be greater than other models. This is because of higher shares 
of short price duration sectors. These firms can react quickly to the positive productiv-
ity shock and attenuate the consumption smoothing. 
Investment smoothing is well documented in Finance literature, such as Das (1991) 
and Fazzari & Petersen (1993). An important reason for this feature is the adjustment 
costs, resulting in hump shape responses of investment to various shocks. An unex-
pected rise in productivity leads to a positive response in investment, which peaks 
around 4 quarters after the shock. A positive shock in temporary monetary policy ( Rt ) 
will reduce the investment for the first 4 quarters after shock, but overshoot above ze-
ro after 10 quarters (Figure 46). However, a positive shock in permanent monetary 
policy ( t
 ) will raise investment until the 8th quarter, and converge back to steady 
state (Figure 45). 
Labour market fluctuations are found persistent in VAR impulse response function. In 
this model, labour supply component follows Smets & Wouters (2003) and use ICE as 
nominal friction. It works well for responses of labour to monetary policy shock, but 
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there is a lack of persistence for responses to price and wage mark-up shocks, which 
die away around 10 quarters (Figure 43 and Figure 44). Traditional RBC models with 
flexible price also fail to capture this, because income effect offsets substitution effect. 
Many attempts are made in literature to address this problem, such as indivisible la-
bour in Hansen (1985), human capital in Lucas (1988) and searching costs in Merz 
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996). There are many other ways of improving the perfor-
mance of labour. This paper, however, only focuses on the price setting behaviour, so 
ICE is good enough for this purpose. In fact, one could also use GTE or GCE to mod-
el the wage setting behaviour and labour market. Due to the lack of microdata in wage, 
this is left for future research. 
The existence of liquidity effect and Fisher effect of monetary policy is a long and 
controversial literature (see Christiano & Eichenbaum (1992)). Following a rise in 
money supply, liquidity effect refers to the negative effect on interest rate in the short 
run, while Fisher effect refers to the positive effect on interest rate in the long run due 
to the expected increase in future inflation. However, in New Keynesian monetary 
models, there is no explicit money. Rather, money is implicitly assumed through a 
nominal interest rate setting rule. In this Taylor-type monetary policy, a permanent 
monetary shock (inflation target shock) and a temporary monetary shock (interest rate 
shock) are equivalent to the money supply shock in New Classical monetary models. 
Note that a positive inflation target shock or a negative interest rate shock implies a 
positive money supply shock. The data-based impulse response function of nominal 
interest rate to a negative money supply shock (row 6, column 6 of Figure 47) evi-
dences both liquidity effect in the short run and Fisher effect in the long run. For tem-
porary monetary policy shock (Figure 46), only liquidity effect is seen. For permanent 
monetary policy shock (Figure 45), both liquidity and Fisher effects are shown. Note 
that only GTE has a hump shape in the response, and it is quantitatively closer to that 
in VAR. This favourable feature suggests that GTE outperforms the other candidates 
in mimicking interest rate dynamics. That is to say, if one is more interested in mone-
tary policy rather than the overall performance, GTE is preferred to the other models 
including GCE. 
5.3. Variance Decomposition 
To investigate the importance of the 10 structural shocks in explaining endogenous 
variables, variance decomposition is done for the 5 models. Table 46 compares the 
results of an asymptotic decomposition of unconditional variance of selected endoge-
nous variables. 
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In general, investment shock ( It ) and government spending shock (
G
t ) seem to be 
the most important shocks for output, consumption, investment and labour, account-
ing for over 60% of the variations. In contrast, the mark-up shocks ( Wt  and 
P
t ) and 
equity premium shock ( Qt ) contribute little, less than 5%, to the variations in the 4 
quantities. As for prices (inflation and nominal interest rate), price mark-up shock 
( Pt ) and interest rate shock (
R
t ) are now the most important sources of variation, 
account for more than 80% of the variance in inflation and nominal interest rate. 
In particular, the variance of inflation is almost determined (over 85%) by the price 
mark-up shock, and little by productivity or preference shocks. This result is exactly 
the same as Smets & Wouters (2003), who argue that monetary policy responds ―quite 
strongly to those shocks, thereby helping to close the output gap and to avoid infla-
tionary or deflationary pressures that may otherwise arise‖. 
Among the 5 models, Taylor behaves in a very distinctive way from the other models. 
Indeed, due to lack of persistence, most shocks die away fast in 3-cohort simple Tay-
lor model. Hence, the variances under simple Taylor model are mainly determined by 
persistent shocks, such as productivity shock and preference shock. Differently, Cal-
vo-type models, including GCE, ICE and simple Calvo, have longer implied mean 
duration, so the variances are explained by shocks with higher volatility, such as in-
vestment shock and government expenditure shock. GTE is almost the same as GCE, 
but with an important exception. The variance of consumption is mainly explained by 
preference shock in GTE (73.66%), whilst, under Calvo-type models, investment 
shock is considered to be the most important source of variation (over 50%). In this 
regard, GTE is more plausible and consistent with the empirical findings in the US 
and Euro area. 
Regarding the policy implications, the government expenditure shock (fiscal policy) 
contributes a substantial amount of variations in real side of economy (output, con-
sumption, investment and labour), while monetary policy shocks seem to affect only 
the nominal side of economy (inflation and interest rate). Hence, to reduce the eco-
nomic fluctuations, it is critical to have smoothed fiscal and monetary policy.  
5.4. Model Comparison 
5.4.1. Bayesian Approach 
Following Geweke (1999), this subsection focuses on Bayesian techniques to evaluate 
and compare DSGE models, which might be fundamentally misspecified. The basic 
criterion for model comparison is the marginal likelihood, defined as: 
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     ,i T N i i T N iM p data model p model p data model d

   

    
Here,    is the structural parameters of model i  to be estimated,  ip model  is 
the prior probability of model i , and  ,T N ip data model  is the likelihood function 
of the observable data T Kdata   given the model and parameter, assuming T  observa-
tions (row) and N  observable variables (column). In this chapter, 108T   observa-
tions from 1981Q1 to 2007Q4 are collected for 7N   key macroeconomic variables 
in the UK: output, consumption, investment, labour, inflation, interest rate and wage.  
The marginal likelihood measures the prediction performance of a model, so it can be 
used to relatively evaluate and compare models. Two popular ways are adopted to 
calculate the marginal likelihood for these models, as discussed in Geweke (1999). 
The first method is Laplace approximation, which assumes a functional form (Gaussi-
an density) of the posterior kernel to be integrated, usually used before Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm but after estimating the mode of parameters (ˆ ). 
     
1
22
ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ 2 ,
K
i T N i iM p data model p model     
The second approach is modified harmonic mean estimator, based on Metropolis-
Hastings simulation, where each draw of parameter vector  
d
  (  1,d D ) comes 
from a candidate probability density function f . In this chapter, the number of Me-
tropolis-Hastings draws is 500,000D   and half of them are dropped to allow a 50% 
burn-in phase.  
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To apply model comparison or relative testing, Bayes Factor (BF) between two com-
peting models i  and j  is usually used: 
,
i
i j
j
M
BF
M
  
The Bayes factors of the 5 competing models, in terms of the two approaches of cal-
culating marginal likelihood, are listed in Table 34. To calibrate the GCE and GTE 
parameters, semiparametric baseline survival function  0h t  and implied distribution 
of duration across firms (DAF) estimated in Chapter I are used. A full list of calibrat-
ed parameters and free parameters to be estimated is shown in Table 41 and Table 42. 
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Note that GCE is chosen as the reference model, since it performs the best among the 
5 models.  
Table 34 Model Comparison by Bayes Factors 
Marginal Likelihood Taylor Calvo ICE GTE GCE 
Laplace Approximation -1120.91 -1053.49 -1034.73 -1008.14 -1001.31 
BF relative to GCE e
119.60
 e
52.18
 e
33.42
 e
6.83
 1 
Modified Harmonic Mean -1083.74 -1023.79 -1006.38 -1004.03 -998.38 
BF relative to GCE e
85.36
 e
25.41
 e
8.00
 e
5.65
 1 
A rule of thumb is proposed by Jeffreys (1961) to interpret the BF while comparing 
two models. Table 35 summarises the guideline to conduct model comparison in 
terms of BF.  
Table 35 Jeffrey’s Guideline for Interpreting Bayes Factor 
BF Interpretation 
1 to 3.2 Not worth more than a bare mention 
3.2 to 10 Substantial 
10 to 100 Strong 
> 100 Decisive 
According to Jeffrey‘s guideline, the first and foremost conclusion drawn from Table 
34 is that simple Calvo, ICE, simple Taylor and GTE are ―decisively‖ rejected against 
GCE. However, note that GTE has the closest marginal likelihood to GCE, though the 
implied BF (e
5.65
=284.29) is significantly higher than 100. The closeness between 
GCE and GTE is not surprising, because both models imply heterogeneous price set-
ting behaviour. A given distribution of durations can always be derived from a GTE 
or a unique corresponding GCE. The only difference between GTE and GCE is the 
uncertainty while setting prices. Under GTE, firms are assumed to know how long the 
price will last ex ante, while under GCE, firms only know the duration dependent 
probability of resetting price. Hence, GCE is more forward looking due to this uncer-
tainty. Heterogeneity in price setting models, especially GCE, is supported based on 
the 7 observable macroeconomic variables in 1981Q1-2007Q4. Evidence shows that, 
on average, firms do not know when to reset the prices in the future, but they know 
the varying probability of price change, with some periodic peaks every 4 months.
①
 
Secondly, ICE performs relatively better than simple Calvo, since it is more flexible 
due to its unrestricted value of price indexation P . Nevertheless, ICE is still strongly 
                                                 
① This argument is based on the survival analysis of microdata underlying CPI and PPI in UK, as found 
in Chapter I. 
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rejected against heterogeneous price setting models. Arguably, indexation in price set-
ting is neither empirically supported nor logically consistent. If there is no nominal 
friction like menu costs, firms will always reset the prices to the optimal level. How-
ever, ICE assumes, on the one hand, no nominal friction—firms can and will reset 
prices every period, while it assumes, on the other hand, that some firms cannot reset 
the prices to optimal level. Hence, although ICE behaves econometrically better than 
simple Calvo and simple Taylor, it is less supported from a theoretical point of view. 
Lastly, simple Taylor is the worst model among all the candidates. The disadvantage 
of simple Taylor is obvious. Since the estimated average price duration across firms 
(DAF) in the UK is around 9 months or 3 quarters, the simple Taylor model has three 
cohorts. That means any monetary shock dies away in 3 quarters under simple Taylor 
model. It fails to generate enough persistence, compared to heterogeneous agent mod-
els and even simple Calvo. Taylor-type models fix the price duration ex ante, result-
ing in less flexibility and worse fit of data. This point also reinforces the first conclu-
sion that firms do not know exactly when to change the price. 
In Smets & Wouters (2003) and Smets & Wouters (2007), DSGE models are found to 
perform at least as good as standard unrestricted VAR and Bayesian VAR (BVAR). 
However, as shown in Table 36, BVAR based on the 7 observables in the UK per-
forms far better than all DSGE models, including heterogeneous GTE and GCE. 
Table 36 Log Marginal Likelihood of Bayesian VAR 
GCE BVAR(1) BVAR(2) BVAR(3) BVAR(4) BVAR(5) BVAR(6) 
-998.38 -815.153 -765.465 -772.165 -758.492 -761.701 -759.653 
These BVAR models are estimated for 1981Q1-2007Q4 using Minnesota prior, as in 
Doan, Litterman & Sims (1984). It turns out that BVAR(4) performs the best, but all 
DSGE models, including GCE and GTE, are strongly rejected compared to BVAR 
model. This is not a surprise, because DSGE models are restricted by economic theo-
ry and very likely to be misspecified, compared to unrestricted VAR or BVAR. 
Hence, if one tries to justify DSGE models by absolute tests, they are usually rejected 
definitely. This unfortunate result is consistent with other types of tests in most empir-
ical studies
①
, including likelihood ratio test (strong interpretation) and indirect infer-
ence test (weak interpretation). However, as argued previously, models are not de-
signed to be true but to be useful in policy analysis and welfare analysis. VAR and 
                                                 
① For a detailed discussion, see Le, V. P. M.; P. Minford and M. Wickens. 2010. "The ‗Puzzles‘ 
Methodology: En Route to Indirect Inference?" Economic Modelling, 27(6), pp. 1417-28. 
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BVAR are not that useful, since they merely summarise the past information in real 
data and cannot be used in policy analysis due to the famous critique of Lucas (1976). 
In contrast, DSGE models might do a bad job in some aspects, but do a good job in 
other aspects in which researchers and policy makers are interested. Relative tests like 
Bayes factor provide a handy criterion to identify the most useful model with least 
overall misspecification. GCE and GTE are justified relative to other homogenous 
agent models in this spirit. Regarding which aspects the heterogeneous agent models 
match data better, impulse response function and variance decomposition will be dis-
cussed in 5.2 and 5.3. 
5.4.2. Robustness of Bayesian Approach 
To check the robustness of the Bayesian model comparison or relative testing, four 
dimensions of the original estimation procedures are investigated. It is shown that the 
model ranking is not sensitive to calibration, prior distribution or macroeconometric 
approach, but might be different if different observables are used. 
Firstly, different calibrations for survival function are used. Bayesian inference in 
5.4.1 is based on the semiparametric baseline survival function after controlling for 
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, which might affect the survival rates. 
Hence, it is directly used for calibrating GCE duration dependent survival function, 
while the implied distribution of DAF is used for calibrating GTE sector shares. Also, 
the implied average survival rate is used to calibrate simple Calvo, and the implied 
average duration (around 9 months) is used to calibrate simple Taylor. It is the most 
reasonable calibration, since the nonparametric survival function does not control for 
these factors and is not ―deep‖ structural parameter. The nonparametric survival func-
tion will change if, say, monetary policy has changed. Semiparametric baseline sur-
vival function does not have this problem, since it is the pure relationship between 
survival rates and analytical time. However, the nonparametric survival function 
could be used to provide robustness analysis of the test. It is shown in Table 37 that 
the relative ranking among models are exactly the same, in spite of slight differences 
in magnitudes in marginal likelihood. 
Table 37 Model Comparison by Bayes Factors (Robustness to Calibration) 
Marginal Likelihood Taylor Calvo ICE GTE GCE 
Laplace Approximation -1115.45 -1110.22 -1001.06 -999.00 -997.50 
BF relative to GCE e
117.95
 e
112.72
 e
3.56
 e
1.50
 1 
Modified Harmonic Mean -1098.69 -1090.63 -992.55 -980.62 -972.46 
BF relative to GCE e
126.23
 e
118.17
 e
20.09
 e
8.16
 1 
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Notice that the Bayes factors of GTE and ICE (Laplace) are quantitatively closer to 
GCE. Compared to the results based on semiparametric analysis, the difference be-
tween GTE and GCE now lies in the second category, ―substantial‖, rather than ―deci-
sive‖ according to Jeffrey‘s guideline. Also, the difference in statistical performance 
between GCE and ICE is now only ―strong‖. However, the relative ranking among 
models are not changed, and the close relationship between GCE and GTE is again 
verified. In this practice, nonparametric survival function is not substantially different 
from semiparametric baseline survival function. However, it is possible that relative 
ranking between models may change if the calibration is far away enough. Given that 
possibility, it is very important to choose the right calibration for use. Another impli-
cation is that, different models might be favoured for different countries, since the 
current calibration is based on the microdata findings in the UK. Thus, the role of mi-
crodata is of equal importance with macrodata.  
Another useful check for robustness to calibration is to make the parameter of price 
rigidity ( P ) in simple Calvo and ICE free to be estimated, rather than calibrated to be 
consistent with microdata evidence. It turns out that, even if the homogeneous price 
setting models are free to vary P  to maximise marginal likelihood, heterogeneous 
price setting models still outperform: Calvo (-1039.15) and ICE (-1017.69), versus 
GCE (-1001.31) and GTE (-1008.14). 
Secondly, different prior distributions are tried to check the reliance of BF on the pri-
or information. The priors used in the previous tests are exactly the same as those 
used in Smets & Wouters (2003). Now if, instead, posterior modes or Metropolis-
Hastings means in Smets & Wouters (2003) are used to specify prior distributions, the 
relative ranking still turns out exactly the same. In particular, Table 38 shows the es-
timated marginal likelihood and BF, when Metropolis-Hastings means are used in the 
prior distributions.  
Table 38 Model Comparison by Bayes Factors (Robustness to Prior) 
Marginal Likelihood Taylor Calvo ICE GTE GCE 
Laplace Approximation -1118.18 -1081.86 -1017.90 -1003.57 -999.41 
BF relative to GCE e
118.78
 e
82.45
 e
18.49
 e
4.16
 1 
Modified Harmonic Mean -1091.22 -1057.21 -999.47 -992.33 -985.42 
BF relative to GCE e
105.80
 e
71.79
 e
14.04
 e
6.90
 1 
Indeed, Bayesian inference is mainly criticised in the usage of prior, which is said to 
have significant influence on parameter estimation and model comparison. If an ab-
surd prior is used, then any absurd conclusion might be drawn. However, in this paper, 
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prior distributions are chosen to have adequately large variances, so that estimation 
procedures travel across a vast range of parameter space. Moreover, the relative rank-
ing is proven robust to different choices of prior distributions within a reasonable 
range. Therefore, the disadvantage of Bayesian approach does not affect the reliability 
of this chapter. 
Thirdly, instead of evaluating models directly in terms of model‘s goodness of fit to 
data as in maximum likelihood and Bayesian inference, indirect inference approach 
compares some partial features simulated by DSGE models with actual data indirectly 
through an auxiliary model, usually using VAR à la Sims (1980). It is called ―indi-
rect‖ because VAR acts as a window through which DSGE model is confronted with 
data. The DSGE model is used to generate pseudo data by bootstrapping, and each 
simulation is used to run a VAR, resulting in a Wald statistic. Since simulation is run 
for many times, distribution of the Wald statistic could be obtained. On the other hand, 
the actual data is all used to run a VAR to calculate the Wald statistic. If the Wald sta-
tistic from the actual data lies in the 95% confidence interval of the simulated distri-
bution, the model cannot be rejected in an absolute sense. If two models are compared 
in a relative sense, then the model with the highest probability value or smallest Wald 
statistic is favoured. 
Indirect inference approach is developed by a research team of faculty and PhD stu-
dents in Cardiff Business School, led by Professor Patrick Minford. The results used 
here is based on the work done by a PhD student in this research team, Jing Jiao, who 
has been working on indirect inference testing of the same set of models as in this pa-
per. The results quoted in Table 39 is based on calibrations of survival function from 
Dixon & Le Bihan (2010) and observables of quarterly France data from 1978 to 2010 
on output, consumption, investment, inflation and interest rate. The auxiliary model 
used is VAR(1), and the specifications of the 5 models are exactly the same. 
Table 39 Model Comparison by Indirect Inference 
 
Taylor Calvo ICE GTE GCE 
Wald Statistic 16.75 15.47 16.12 11.48 7.70 
P-Value 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Unfortunately, all the models are rejected in an absolute sense according to the Wald 
statistics (note that normalised Mahalanobis distances are not reported), similar to the 
findings based on Bayesian approach. However, relatively speaking, GCE performs 
the best relative to the other candidates. In fact, relative ranking among the 5 models 
is exactly the same as that by Bayes factor. In spite of different approaches, microdata 
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and macrodata, heterogeneous price setting models always perform better than homo-
geneous pricing models. This practice greatly reinforces the robustness of the model 
comparison result in a stronger sense.  
Note that a future extension of this study is to use simulation-based approach (e.g. in-
direct inference) to re-estimate the 5 models, so that they pass overall tests of fit to the 
data, either Likelihood ratio or Wald. It is important to check whether the ranking of 
the 5 model still holds. 
Lastly, different observables are used to check whether model comparison depends on 
observable data to be fitted. All the tests above are confronted with the 7 observable 
macroeconomic variables (output, consumption, investment, labour, inflation, interest 
rate and wage), so the relative ranking is, to some extent, comparing the goodness of 
fit of the 5 models in terms of these 7 observables as a whole. However, if one is only 
interested in a subset, rather than all, of these variables, then the relative ranking 
might change, since these models perform differently in fitting different aspects of 
reality. To be comparable to the findings in Dixon & Kara (2011), three variables 
(output, inflation and interest rate) are selected to check the robustness of model com-
parison. Table 40 summarises the results. 
Table 40 Model Comparison by Bayes Factors (Robustness to Observable) 
Marginal Likelihood Taylor Calvo ICE GCE GTE 
Laplace Approximation -510.82 -443.59 -375.24 -354.058 -348.44 
BF relative to GTE e
162.38
 e
95.15
 e
26.80
 e
5.61
 1 
Modified Harmonic Mean -458.24 -396.73 -325.41 -323.223 -317.62 
BF relative to GTE e
140.62
 e
79.11
 e
7.79
 e
5.60
 1 
The relative model ranking changes this time, thought heterogeneous agent models 
still outperform the homogeneous agent models. GTE performs better than GCE if 
only output, inflation and interest rate are used as observables. This result is in line 
with the findings of Dixon & Kara (2011), who maintain that GTE is strongly fa-
voured by data relative to some variants of Calvo. A key reason is that GTE is able to 
generate more persistence in inflation in response to productivity shocks and mone-
tary shocks. This feature greatly improves the performance of GTE, especially when 
more weights are put on explaining the dynamics of output, inflation and interest rate. 
In some sense, the choice of the three observables is logically similar to using weak 
interpretation approaches, such as minimum distance of impulse response and indirect 
inference. It is because the choice of specific set of observables only focuses on some 
partial features of the model. Question determines method, so the ―best‖ model de-
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pends on what one tries to explain. If one is more interested in persistence of inflation, 
then GTE performs the best. However, if one cares about the overall performance, not 
just the three observables, then he might better go for GCE. 
The examination of robustness suggests that model comparison is robust to calibration 
and prior within a wide range. However, if different observables are chosen, the rela-
tive ranking might change due to higher weights on some specific model features. 
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6. Conclusion 
Following the theoretical framework in Smets & Wouters (2003) and Dixon & Le 
Bihan (2010), this paper proposes a DSGE model with either homogeneous or hetero-
geneous price setting behaviour. Based on the microdata findings in Chapter I, cali-
brations for heterogeneous price setting models (GTE and GCE) become possible. 
Both maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation procedures are conducted to esti-
mate the structural parameters and processes driving shocks. Bayesian results are pre-
ferred because there are less corner solutions and more stable with fewer identifica-
tion problem. The structural parameters are shown to be not very different from those 
found in the Euro area, whilst the standard deviations of structural shocks are quite 
different. In particular, more nominal frictions, less persistence in capital accumula-
tion, more persistence in investment and more habit persistence are found in the UK. 
A Taylor principle is discovered in monetary policy of Bank of England with a higher 
weight on inflation. Preference shock, investment shock and price mark-up shock in 
the UK have significantly higher variance than those in Euro area. 
An unrestricted VAR is employed to generate the data-based impulse response func-
tions, from which four stylised facts are found, i.e. persistence, hump shape, oscilla-
tion and a hump around the 20
th
 quarter. GTE seems to be the best model in matching 
these four stylised facts in impulse response functions. In addition, smoothing in con-
sumption, investment and monetary policy are found in both data-based and model-
based impulse response functions. Moreover, the DSGE models are able to generate 
both short run liquidity effect and long run Fisher effect after a permanent shock in 
monetary policy. 
Variance decomposition is obtained to identify the most influential structural shocks 
in the UK economy. Variations in quantities, such as output, consumption, investment 
and labour, are mainly determined by demand side shocks such as investment shock 
and government expenditure shock. In contrast, fluctuations in prices, like inflation 
and interest rate, are more related to price mark-up shock and monetary policy shocks. 
An effective feedback policy greatly reduced the impact of productivity shocks, but as 
a cost, it increases the volatility of inflation. 
With a focus on Bayesian approach, various macroeconometric methods are applied 
to draw model comparison and relative evaluation. It is proven that heterogeneous 
price setting component remarkably improves the performance of DSGE models, but 
all models are still rejected against data. Interestingly, Bayesian and indirect inference 
approaches give exactly the same relative ranking among the 5 candidate models. If 
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all the 7 macroeconomic observables are used, GCE then performs the best and GTE 
follows. In homogeneous price setting models, simple Taylor is the worst, because it 
generates the least persistence. This model ranking is also robust to different calibra-
tions and priors. However, GTE could be the best model if one puts more weight on 
explaining output, inflation and interest rate. 
Overall, the heterogeneous price setting component (GCE and GTE) has significantly 
enhanced the explanatory power and prediction precision of DSGE models. It over-
comes the dilemma of homogenous price setting models that one cannot have plausi-
ble degree of nominal rigidity and enough persistence simultaneously. Which variant 
to use depends on the scope of the policy maker. GCE tends to fit the data better as a 
whole, but GTE performs the best if one only cares about the dynamics of output, in-
flation and interest rate. 
Due to the unavailability of microdata on wage, this model keeps the ICE feature in 
wage setting. Indeed, ICE is logically more plausible in wage setting than in price set-
ting. However, it is still possible to improve the model‘s overall performance if GTE 
and GCE are tried. On the other hand, all the candidates considered here are time de-
pendent models. As found in the microdata, firm‘s price setting behaviour is likely to 
be state dependent. A future study including state dependent price setting behaviour, 
such as menu cost model, would be interesting. Furthermore, in addition to retailer‘s 
price setting behaviour based on CPI microdata, a research on wholesaler‘s price set-
ting behaviour based on PPI microdata could also be informative to the transmission 
of shocks in the economy. Incorporating this microdata evidence could be promising 
to improve the persistence in DSGE model. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This thesis has addressed nominal friction in price setting behaviour from both micro-
data and macrodata perspectives. The link between microdata analysis and macrodata 
analysis are built through the estimated distribution of duration across firms and the 
hazard function of price change. In fact, microdata study provides an empirical micro-
foundation for macrodata study. The novelties in microdata analysis are the use of 
cross-sectional method for descriptive measures of price rigidity and survival analysis 
method for estimating price setting mechanism. The contributions in macrodata anal-
ysis are improvement of performance of DSGE models by incorporating in heteroge-
neous price setting behaviour and application of various macroeconometric approach-
es to model comparison, estimation and dynamic analysis. It is shown that heteroge-
neous agent models can better mimic both microdata and macrodata stylised facts 
simultaneously. 
Regarding the outcome of price setting behaviour, degree of price rigidity is measured 
by the conventional method based on the frequency of price change, which implies a 
short duration less than 6 months. However, this measure is criticised as downward 
biased due to oversampling of short durations by Dixon (2010). Alternatively, cross-
sectional method uses the distribution of duration across firms, resulting in much 
longer durations, i.e. over 9 months for retailer price and 15 months for producer price. 
These findings are strong evidence of rigidity in frequency of price change. There is 
little evidence for rigidity in direction of price change, i.e. the nominal frictions are 
symmetric in both price increases and decreases. Retailer prices tend to have higher 
rigidity in magnitude of price change than producer prices in the light of attractive 
pricing. Also, significant cross-sectional heterogeneity is observed, but little regional 
difference or time-series heterogeneity is found in the UK during the sample period 
1997-2007. 
To investigate the mechanism of price setting behaviour, hazard functions are esti-
mated by different approaches of survival analysis. For retailer price, the hazard func-
tion can be decomposed into decreasing component from goods sectors and the cycli-
cal component from services sectors. For producer price, the hazard function also 
takes similar features of deceasing and cyclical, but not separable across sectors. 
There are minor cycles every 4 months and major cycles every 12 months, which are 
common to both retailer and producer prices. Seasonal peaks in Christmas sales and 
summer sales are revealed in calendar months. Both microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic covariates have significant effects on the conditional probability (hazard func-
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tion) of price change, which are supports for both time dependent and state dependent 
pricing models. 
In the economic system with both retailer and producer firms, as moving from up-
stream of supply chain to downstream, price rigidity is decreasing due to the growing 
degree of competition. Furthermore, as a shock hits the economy, the producer firms 
act as both ―container‖ to prolong the persistence of shocks and ―buffer‖ to reduce the 
fluctuations. Hence, the microdata evidence suggests that inclusion of producer firms 
and heterogeneity in price setting behaviour might greatly improve the performance 
of macroeconomic models. 
Turning to the macrodata analysis of DSGE models with different price setting behav-
iour, heterogeneous agent models (GCE and GTE) performs much better than the ho-
mogeneous agent models (ICE, simple Calvo and simple Taylor). This result is robust 
to different calibration, prior and method. Both Bayesian inference and indirect infer-
ence give exactly the same model ranking. If, instead of using 7 observables to esti-
mate the model, only output, inflation and interest rate are used, GTE will perform the 
best, but heterogeneous agent models still outperforms homogeneous agent models. 
Unrestricted VAR is employed to identify the stylised facts of dynamics of the 7 ob-
servables. Firstly, strong persistence is found in impulse response functions to shocks. 
The second feature is the hump shape at the beginning of the responses. The third fea-
ture is the cyclical oscillation over time after shocks. The last feature is the typical 
hump around 20 quarters in the impulse response functions. It is shown that homoge-
neous agent models fail to generate enough persistence and hump in model-based im-
pulse response functions. In contrast, heterogeneous price setting models, especially 
GTE, could better capture these dynamic stylised facts found in macrodata. 
To conclude, heterogeneous price setting behaviour is an effective way of improving 
the performance of DSGE models. On the one hand, it can generate both persistent 
impulse responses to structural shocks and various stylised facts found in macrodata. 
On the other hand, it can also be consistent with the evidence found in microdata. 
Numerous extensions of this study could be done in the future. To name a few, firstly, 
in addition to nominal frictions in price setting, a heterogeneous wage setting model 
(GTE or GCE) could also be used. Secondly, the findings in producer price could also 
be incorporated into a more sophisticated model with multiple sectors. Thirdly, the 
DSGE model with heterogeneous agent can be used in optimal monetary policy anal-
ysis, accounting for both average price rigidity and distribution of price rigidity. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 41 Structural Parameters (Coefficients) 
Parameter Value Description 
  0.990 Subjective discount factor 
  0.025 Depreciation rate of capital 
  0.300 Capital output ratio  
  TBE Inverted elasticity of capital utilisation rate 
P  TBE Steady state level of price mark-up 
W  TBE Steady state level of wage mark-up 
P  TBE Degree of partial indexation of price 
W  TBE Degree of partial indexation of wage 
P  Micro Calvo price stickiness (average survival rate) 
W  TBE Calvo wage stickiness (average survival rate) 
L  TBE Inverted elasticity of labour supply 
C  TBE Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
h  TBE Habit portion of past consumption 
  TBE 1 + share of fixed cost in production 
  TBE Inverted elasticity of investment adjustment cost 
KR  TBE Steady state return on capital 
K Y  8.800 Capital output ratio 
I Y  0.220 Share of investment in GDP 
C Y  0.600 Share of consumption in GDP 
G Y  0.180 Share of government expenditure in GDP 
  TBE AR coefficient of past interest rate (Taylor rule) 
r  TBE Inflation coefficient (Taylor rule) 
r   TBE Inflation growth coefficient (Taylor rule) 
Yr  TBE Output gap coefficient (Taylor rule) 
Yr  TBE Output gap growth coefficient (Taylor rule) 
 S   Micro Survival rate at date   (GCE) 
  Micro Sector share for duration   (GTE) 
Note: TBE stands for ―To Be Estimated‖, and Micro strands for to be calibrated by 
microdata results in Chapter I. 
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Table 42 Structural Parameters (Shocks) 
Parameter Value Description 
A  TBE AR coefficient of productivity shock 
A  TBE Standard deviation of productivity shock 
U  TBE AR coefficient of preference shock 
U  TBE Standard deviation of preference shock 
L  TBE AR coefficient of labour supply shock 
L  TBE Standard deviation of labour supply shock 
I  TBE AR coefficient of investment shock 
I  TBE Standard deviation of investment shock 
G  TBE AR coefficient of government expenditure shock 
G  TBE Standard deviation of government expenditure shock 
W  0 AR coefficient of wage mark-up shock  
W  TBE Standard deviation of price mark-up shock 
P  0 AR coefficient of price mark-up shock  
P  TBE Standard deviation of wage mark-up shock 
Q  0 AR coefficient of return on equity  
Q  TBE Standard deviation of return on equity 
R  0 AR coefficient of interest rate shock  
R  TBE Standard deviation of interest rate shock 
  TBE AR coefficient of inflation target shock 
  TBE Standard deviation of inflation target shock 
Note: TBE stands for ―To Be Estimated‖. 
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Table 43 Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results 
Parameter 
Taylor Calvo ICE GTE GCE 
Mode S.E. Mode S.E. Mode S.E. Mode S.E. Mode S.E. 
A  0.933 0.191 0.602 0.227 0.507 0.269 0.422 0.046 0.501 0.342 
  0.062 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.034 0.048 0.027 0.036 0.000 0.085 
U  0.590 0.091 1.461 0.107 0.697 0.210 0.286 0.065 0.589 0.343 
G  0.819 0.125 0.672 0.216 0.642 0.222 0.443 0.055 0.547 0.356 
L  1.616 0.053 1.194 0.065 0.999 0.006 1.039 0.024 1.274 0.133 
I  0.978 0.148 1.420 0.100 0.752 0.236 0.380 0.085 0.664 0.353 
R  1.078 0.091 0.760 0.189 0.674 0.270 0.276 0.172 0.496 0.498 
Q  0.408 0.009 0.397 0.001 0.403 0.580 0.391 0.003 0.404 0.014 
P  1.591 0.499 0.697 0.110 0.563 0.265 0.462 0.121 0.283 0.064 
W  0.919 0.245 0.774 0.168 0.526 0.258 0.460 0.047 0.478 0.492 
A  0.000 0.034 0.621 0.260 0.935 0.246 0.744 0.037 0.656 0.324 
  0.857 0.006 0.847 0.065 0.850 0.031 0.855 0.002 0.845 0.000 
U  0.942 1.811 0.637 0.399 0.856 0.881 0.954 0.235 0.825 1.052 
G  0.939 0.353 0.941 0.294 0.762 0.090 0.884 0.016 0.952 0.706 
L  0.966 0.855 0.990 1.303 0.840 0.076 0.967 1.150 0.999 1.625 
I  0.634 0.146 0.000 1.065 0.493 0.192 0.847 0.093 0.622 0.369 
r  1.550 0.159 1.448 0.135 1.516 0.042 1.665 0.008 1.568 0.211 
r   0.407 0.019 0.156 0.122 0.299 0.140 0.276 0.034 0.264 0.184 
  0.418 0.187 0.587 0.288 0.581 0.313 0.678 0.067 0.624 0.460 
Yr  0.606 0.226 0.669 0.100 0.067 0.300 0.160 0.079 0.821 0.178 
Yr  0.000 6.354 0.117 0.068 0.047 0.093 0.041 0.023 0.000 2.174 
  N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I 
C  1.020 0.177 1.021 0.122 1.140 0.111 1.015 0.011 0.962 0.119 
h  0.686 0.396 0.801 0.707 0.788 0.659 0.711 0.033 0.609 0.317 
L  1.953 0.044 1.942 0.029 2.002 0.009 1.989 0.019 1.901 0.049 
  1.549 0.131 1.598 0.052 1.590 0.059 1.482 0.019 1.509 0.090 
W  0.555 0.153 0.555 0.027 0.500 0.038 0.507 0.013 0.482 0.068 
  N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I N/I 
W  0.299 0.581 0.653 0.243 0.733 0.237 0.790 0.077 0.598 0.320 
P  N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.998 0.011 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
W  0.771 0.093 0.571 0.077 0.431 0.058 0.738 0.013 0.705 0.103 
P  N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 1.897 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Log 
Likelihood 
-1096.502 -1085.391 -973.047 -944.863 -935.973 
Notes: N/A denotes ―Not Applicable‖, and N/I denotes ―Not Identified‖. 
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Table 44 Bayesian Estimation for Homogeneous Price Setting Models 
Parameter 
Taylor Calvo ICE 
Mode S.E. 
MH 
Mean 
Mode S.E. 
MH 
Mean 
Mode S.E. 
MH 
Mean 
A  0.464 0.034 0.469 0.493 0.036 0.504 0.459 0.034 0.468 
  0.009 0.009 0.020 0.009 0.011 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.017 
U  3.417 0.370 3.462 3.687 0.333 4.112 3.760 0.503 3.754 
G  0.646 0.039 0.644 0.646 0.044 0.641 0.651 0.043 0.651 
L  0.468 0.305 0.664 0.467 0.996 0.731 0.469 0.244 0.750 
I  1.027 0.074 1.059 1.028 0.073 1.051 1.020 0.069 1.053 
R  0.732 0.060 0.743 0.728 0.051 0.743 0.733 0.057 0.748 
Q  0.184 0.191 0.382 0.186 0.144 0.358 0.188 0.298 0.410 
P  12.272 0.997 12.382 1.438 0.132 1.455 0.516 0.036 0.524 
W  0.453 0.036 0.461 0.487 0.033 0.497 0.480 0.033 0.488 
A  0.877 0.037 0.876 0.766 0.032 0.760 0.875 0.014 0.862 
  0.915 0.040 0.790 0.901 0.029 0.849 0.884 0.018 0.857 
U  0.441 0.055 0.459 0.419 0.036 0.402 0.412 0.048 0.430 
G  0.889 0.031 0.838 0.897 0.024 0.829 0.916 0.031 0.873 
L  0.866 0.027 0.839 0.852 0.028 0.755 0.893 0.049 0.817 
I  0.347 0.028 0.338 0.338 0.038 0.342 0.326 0.031 0.310 
r  1.564 0.026 1.588 1.713 0.042 1.721 1.678 0.070 1.686 
r   0.227 0.031 0.217 0.230 0.044 0.228 0.241 0.048 0.240 
  0.657 0.037 0.658 0.684 0.030 0.678 0.656 0.041 0.647 
Yr  0.228 0.011 0.242 0.187 0.022 0.182 0.231 0.020 0.213 
Yr  0.111 0.010 0.126 0.140 0.032 0.120 0.117 0.018 0.099 
  4.304 0.400 4.382 3.938 0.587 4.075 4.023 0.604 3.939 
C  1.515 0.109 1.592 1.503 0.161 1.527 1.416 0.189 1.547 
h  0.831 0.020 0.819 0.840 0.042 0.841 0.851 0.019 0.831 
L  2.531 0.394 2.489 2.599 0.301 2.520 2.766 0.208 2.812 
  1.870 0.065 1.947 1.788 0.174 1.786 1.991 0.091 2.008 
W  0.550 0.038 0.509 0.619 0.078 0.585 0.568 0.025 0.510 
  0.201 0.023 0.190 0.225 0.017 0.216 0.224 0.015 0.185 
W  0.698 0.017 0.713 0.681 0.015 0.683 0.705 0.017 0.701 
P  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.868 0.012 0.861 
W  0.139 0.036 0.149 0.135 0.046 0.151 0.287 0.028 0.290 
P  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.145 0.045 0.167 
Laplace -1120.91 -1053.49 -1034.73 
Harmonic -1083.74 -1023.79 -1006.38 
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Table 45 Bayesian Estimation for Heterogeneous Price Setting Models 
Parameter 
Prior Distribution S&W (2003) GTE GCE 
Form Mean S.D. Mode S.E. 
MH 
Mean 
Mode S.E. 
MH 
Mean 
Mode S.E. 
MH 
Mean 
A  invg 0.4 2 0.598 0.113 0.639 0.472 0.035 0.443 0.522 0.043 0.521 
  invg 0.02 2 0.017 0.008 0.033 0.009 0.040 0.019 0.518 0.107 0.324 
U  invg 0.2 2 0.336 0.096 0.407 3.527 0.443 5.035 5.013 0.656 5.248 
G  invg 0.3 2 0.325 0.026 0.335 0.644 0.044 0.624 0.646 0.041 0.646 
L  invg 1 2 3.520 1.027 3.818 0.496 0.623 0.745 0.477 0.439 3.047 
I  invg 0.1 2 0.085 0.030 0.113 1.039 0.091 1.172 1.027 0.071 1.031 
R  invg 0.1 2 0.081 0.023 0.090 0.733 0.056 0.736 0.686 0.049 0.718 
Q  invg 0.4 2 0.604 0.063 0.613 0.186 0.148 0.642 0.187 0.311 0.379 
P  invg 0.15 2 0.160 0.016 0.165 2.354 0.218 2.398 1.075 0.473 0.589 
W  invg 0.25 2 0.289 0.027 0.297 0.517 0.043 0.561 0.645 0.044 0.667 
A  beta 0.85 0.1 0.823 0.065 0.811 0.813 0.024 0.8245 0.699 0.029 0.712 
  beta 0.85 0.1 0.924 0.088 0.855 0.902 0.054 0.824 0.996 0.004 0.9602 
U  beta 0.85 0.1 0.855 0.035 0.838 0.418 0.051 0.3788 0.384 0.025 0.3672 
G  beta 0.85 0.1 0.949 0.029 0.943 0.888 0.036 0.7499 0.895 0.041 0.8535 
L  beta 0.85 0.1 0.889 0.052 0.881 0.912 0.041 0.8675 0.904 0.030 0.8804 
I  beta 0.85 0.1 0.927 0.022 0.910 0.300 0.088 0.2708 0.382 0.058 0.374 
r  norm 1.7 0.1 1.684 0.109 1.688 1.717 0.046 1.6549 1.661 0.056 1.667 
r   norm 0.3 0.1 0.140 0.053 0.151 0.246 0.050 0.1747 0.337 0.054 0.2968 
  beta 0.8 0.1 0.961 0.014 0.956 0.650 0.025 0.6936 0.568 0.031 0.6138 
Yr  norm 0.125 0.05 0.099 0.041 0.098 0.230 0.032 0.2504 0.214 0.035 0.2154 
Yr  norm 0.063 0.05 0.159 0.027 0.158 0.094 0.018 0.0916 0.137 0.024 0.1421 
  norm 4 1.5 6.771 1.026 6.962 3.874 0.447 4.9525 3.966 1.051 3.8422 
C  norm 1 0.375 1.353 0.282 1.391 1.463 0.071 1.3874 1.500 0.274 1.4787 
h  beta 0.7 0.1 0.573 0.076 0.592 0.836 0.016 0.8767 0.877 0.021 0.8718 
L  norm 2 0.75 2.400 0.589 2.503 1.867 0.342 1.5916 2.847 0.248 2.7693 
  norm 1.45 0.25 1.408 0.166 1.417 1.991 0.116 2.2938 1.767 0.094 1.8596 
W  beta 0.5 0.15 0.599 0.050 0.597 0.562 0.074 0.639 0.602 0.085 0.5601 
  norm 0.2 0.075 0.169 0.075 0.201 0.206 0.032 0.1965 0.200 0.033 0.1909 
W  beta 0.75 0.05 0.737 0.049 0.742 0.686 0.023 0.7166 0.677 0.025 0.7146 
P  beta 0.75 0.05 0.908 0.011 0.905 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
W  beta 0.75 0.15 0.763 0.188 0.728 0.355 0.050 0.4411 0.683 0.079 0.717 
P  beta 0.75 0.15 0.469 0.103 0.477 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Laplace       -1008.14 -1001.31 
Harmonic       -1004.03 -998.38 
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Figure 42 Impulse Response Functions to Productivity Shock 
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Figure 43 Impulse Response Functions to Price Mark-Up Shock 
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Figure 44 Impulse Response Functions to Wage Mark-Up Shock 
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Figure 45 Impulse Response Functions to Permanent Monetary Policy Shock 
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Figure 46 Impulse Response Functions to Temporary Monetary Policy Shock 
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Figure 47 Impulse Response Functions of Unrestricted VAR 
 
 
 
Note: The rows are the 7 observable variables ( , , , , , ,Y C I L W R  ), while the columns 
indicate to which shocks ( , , , , , ,Y C I L W Re e e e e e e ) the impulse response functions are 
describing. Each impulse response function is based on a positive shock equal to 1 
standard deviation. VAR(3) is used, which has the highest information criterion. 
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Table 46 Variance Decomposition 
Variable Model 
Structural Shocks 
A
t  
U
t  
I
t  
L
t  
G
t  
W
t  
P
t  
Q
t  t
  Rt  
Y  
GCE 3.76 0.39 41.66 1.62 35.79 3.08 0.80 0.01 0.03 12.87 
GTE 2.92 15.25 38.27 1.10 26.58 2.38 0.52 0.00 0.03 12.93 
ICE 2.59 0.52 43.87 1.55 30.68 1.62 5.10 0.01 0.03 14.04 
Calvo 4.39 0.64 43.20 1.07 35.16 3.05 1.29 0.01 0.02 11.17 
Taylor 29.34 23.20 2.30 0.34 25.28 1.94 0.00 0.00 0.01 17.58 
C  
GCE 2.04 10.75 54.41 0.55 11.54 1.54 1.68 0.00 0.02 17.48 
GTE 0.98 73.66 9.94 0.18 4.88 0.99 0.57 0.00 0.01 8.80 
ICE 1.14 11.20 51.81 0.54 8.80 0.71 6.73 0.00 0.02 19.04 
Calvo 2.12 8.90 58.32 0.32 12.23 1.42 2.19 0.00 0.01 14.48 
Taylor 2.97 94.20 0.17 0.01 1.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 
I  
GCE 1.91 3.36 74.19 0.96 12.98 1.61 0.37 0.01 0.02 4.60 
GTE 1.34 7.82 75.90 0.72 9.91 0.94 0.24 0.00 0.02 3.09 
ICE 1.53 3.53 75.48 0.98 9.70 0.95 2.27 0.01 0.02 5.54 
Calvo 2.06 3.45 73.76 0.58 14.56 1.44 0.58 0.01 0.01 3.56 
Taylor 6.99 83.48 1.87 0.07 5.61 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 
L  
GCE 7.96 0.37 36.28 1.69 35.92 4.55 2.02 0.01 0.03 11.17 
GTE 41.07 4.41 20.15 1.73 14.74 12.00 1.38 0.00 0.01 4.50 
ICE 7.46 0.63 39.97 1.90 31.99 3.31 3.24 0.01 0.02 11.47 
Calvo 5.67 0.58 39.22 1.12 36.96 4.01 1.96 0.01 0.02 10.44 
Taylor 99.47 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
  
GCE 5.76 0.42 0.69 0.56 0.72 3.71 86.18 0.00 0.04 1.92 
GTE 5.30 0.75 0.08 0.55 0.01 6.36 86.70 0.00 0.00 0.25 
ICE 1.67 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.30 1.01 94.84 0.00 0.02 1.16 
Calvo 5.62 0.49 0.94 0.35 0.99 3.51 85.05 0.00 0.05 3.00 
Taylor 98.33 1.27 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
BR  
GCE 1.99 0.24 3.47 0.23 2.85 1.32 7.98 0.00 0.01 81.92 
GTE 2.86 4.77 4.20 0.37 3.18 3.17 8.09 0.00 0.00 73.36 
ICE 0.70 0.22 2.38 0.18 2.02 0.43 16.82 0.00 0.00 77.26 
Calvo 2.21 0.29 3.80 0.16 3.07 1.39 10.57 0.00 0.01 78.50 
Taylor 68.33 6.48 0.04 0.03 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.99 
Note: This is an asymptotic decomposition of the unconditional variance of endoge-
nous variables in an infinite time horizon. Shocks are supposed to happen in every 
period between now and infinity, not only once. It is obtained by solving a Lyapunov 
equation in Dynare. 
 
